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RÉSUMÉ 
Les actionnaires de firmes qui affichent une faible performance sociale ou environnementale ont à 
leur disposition un certain nombre d'outils pour forcer les dirigeants à revoir les politiques de la 
firme. Un des mécanismes pouvant leur permettre de communiquer leurs préoccupations aux 
dirigeants est la soumission de résolutions d'actionnaire. Ce genre d'actions est régulé par la règle 
communément appelée Règle l4a-8, promulguée en 1942 par la Commission des valeurs 
mobilières des États-Unis (SEC par son sigle en anglais). Selon les dispositions de la Règle, les 
actionnaires des compagnies cotées en bourse peuvent déposer sans frais, s'ils remplissent 
certains critères, des résolutions (ou propositions) d'actionnaires pour être incluses dans la 
circulaire de sollicitation de procurations de la firme, si les dirigeants présentent des propositions 
eux-mêmes lesquelles seront votés par les actionnaires. 
Deux grands groupes caractérisent les résolutions d'actionnaires soumises selon les dispositions 
de la Règle 14 a-8. Le premier 'groupe de résolutions vise seulement à améliorer la performance 
financière de la firme, et ces résolutions sont appelées «résolutions de gouvernance d'entreprise 
». Le deuxième groupe de résolutions a comme but l'amélioration de la performance sociale des 
firmes. Alors que la majeure partie de la littérature académique s'est concentrée sur les 
résolutions de gouvernance d'entreprise, l'objet de notre recherche est l'étude des résolutions du 
deuxième groupe. En effet, les résolutions de l'actionnariat à caractère social constituent un 
phénomène persistant (au moins un tiers de toutes les résolutions reçues par les firmes aux États­
Unis appartiennent à ce groupe), ce qui motive notre intention de contribuer à la littérature en 
tentant de comprendre pourquoi certaines entreprises font l'objet de ce type de résolutions, 
quelles sont les principales sortes de résolutions à caractère social et qui sont les actionnaires qui 
les promeuvent et enfin, pourquoi certains résultats finaux des résolutions semble plus probables 
que d'autres. 
Nous avons alors bâti une base de données dans laquelle nous avons fusionné les informations sur 
les résolutions d'actionnaires, avec des données financières et comptables extraites de Compustat 
et des données de performance sociale colligées dans la base de la firme KLD Research and 
Analytics, Inc. Cette base de données originale nous a permis de valider empiriquement trois 
problématiques de recherche visant à contribuer à l'avancement des connaissances sur l'activisme 
actionnarial à caractère social. 
Le premier de ces papiers analyse le type d'entreprises ciblées par les activistes qui présentent des 
résolutions à caractère social. À cette fin, nous comparons deux groupes d'entreprises, celles 
ayant reçu une résolution d'actionnaires à l'intention du social (échantillon original) et un autre 
groupe de firmes témoins qui n'en ont pas reçu (du moins, pendant une fenêtre de temps 
appropriée). Les critères retenus pour sélectionner les entreprises témoins sont: la taille et le 
secteur d'activité. Nous avons cherché une firme témoin pour chaque résolution, même si 
certaines compagnies en reçoivent plusieurs chaque année. Notre hypothèse est que les 
actionnaires choisissent des firmes qui présentent certaines caractéristiques pour les cibler avec 
des résolutions. L'atiicle montre que les actionnaires ont tendance à cibler des firmes de grande 
taille, peu performantes sur le plan financier, et qui affichent des indicateurs de risque élevés. 
Nous supposons que les deux résultats puissent être reliés à la possibilité que l'impact négatif des 
enjeux à caractère social sur la valeur des firmes puisse s'avérer plus important quand la 
performance économique est insatisfaisante et le risque plus élevé, favorisant ainsi davantage le 
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monitoring. L'article montre aussi que les firmes peu performantes sur le plan social ont,plus de 
probabilité d'être ciblées par les actionnaires. Nous avons aussi exploré la possibilité que les 
différents types d'actionnaires puissent privilégier différents types d'entreprise. Nous découvrons 
qu'en général les actionnaires ne choisissent pas ou ne ciblent pas tous les mêmes entreprises, 
mais que cette différence n'est pas notoire. 
Notre deuxième article propose des typologies pour les acteurs qui soumettent des résolutions 
ainsi que pour les sujets considérés dans les résolutions. Sur la base de ces typologies, l'article 
examine aussi les résultats des résolutions, en mettant l'emphase sur la capacité des actionnaires 
qui soumettent des propositions de négocier avec les dirigeants en échange du retrait de la 
résolution de la circulaire de sollicitation de procurations. La littérature disponible a assimilé le 
retrait des résolutions au succès, c'est-à-dire à la capacité d'exercer une influence sur les 
dirigeants. Cet article remet en question cette perspective et présente les raisons suggérant que 
dans certaines circonstances les actionnaires puissent s'incliner pour retirer leurs résolutions, et ce 
dans le but d'occulter des résultats décevants. En prenant en considération cet aspect, l'article 
montre que certains types d'actionnaires (tels les fonds de pension, les fonds communs de 
placement, et dans une moindre mesure, les investisseurs religieux) ont plus de capacité à 
influencer les dirigeants. C'est aussi le cas de certains types de sujets considérés dans les 
résolutions, tels que la diversité dans les conseils d'administration, l'égalité dans l'emploi, 
l'énergie et l'environnement, et le respect des droits humains et du travail à]' international. 
Sur la base des résul tats que nous avons obtenus dans le deuxième papier, notre troisième et 
dernier article cherche à voir si un certain nombre de caractéristiques de la firme et de 
caractéristiques des résolutions elles-mêmes augmentent la probabilité d'un règlement entre 
actionnaires et dirigeants, et ce, avant que la résolution ne soit votée lors de l'assemblée générale 
annuelle. Nos résultats indiquent que la taille de l'entreprise ne favorise pas la négociation en 
faveur de l'actionnaire, même s'il est démontré que les actionnaires préfèrent s'attaquer aux 
grandes firmes. Une rentabilité plus élevée de la firme réduit la probabilité d'un règlement 
négocié, mais une performance sociale plus élevée augmente cette probabilité. Le contrôle par la 
firme de marques de grande valeur (qui pourraient être ternies par le refus des dirigeants de 
changer la politique sociale de la firme) ne semble pas avoir un impact sur la probabilité d'un 
règlement favorable pour les actionnaires. Néanmoins, nous reconnaissons que les indicateurs 
comptables utilisés pour mesurer la valeur des actifs intangibles peuvent êtres biaisés, comme 
cela a été suggéré par un nombre de chercheurs en comptabilité. Certaines catégories de sujets et 
d'initiateurs des propositions peuvent avoir une influence sur le dénouement de la résolution. Il 
est important de souligner que certaines variables perdent leur signification statistique quand le 
pourcentage de vote reçu par la proposition la dernière année est introduit comme variable 
indépendante dans les modèles de régression. Le fait que cette dernière variable domine sur les 
autres témoigne du pouvoir du processus de soumission des résolutions d'actionnaires en tant que 
mécanisme de transmission des attentes des actionnaires aux dirigeants. Dans cet article nous 
examinons également l'impact des variables mentionnées plus haut sur le pourcentage de vote 
reçu par les propositions. 
Mots clés: Résolutions de l'actionnariat, gouvernance d'entreprise, performance sociale, 
résolutions à caractère social. 
ABSTRACT
 
Shareholders of firms with poor financial or social performance can make use of a number of 
tools to compel managers to change course. One of these mechanisms to voice concerns to 
management is to file shareholder resolution proposaIs. This activity is regulated by the so-called 
Rule 14 a-8, enacted in 1942 by the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
According to the provisions of the Rule, shareholders of public companies may submit under 
certain circumstances and at no cost for them, non-binding succinct resolutions that should be 
included in the solicitation materials of the firm .to be voted by shareholders, if management itself 
seeks shareholders voting proxies. 
Shareholder-initiated proposaIs filed under the Rule 14 a-8 fall in two groups. A first group of 
shareholder-initiated proposaIs are those intended to solely enhance the corporation's financial 
performance, and they are called "corporate governance proposaIs." A second group of proposaIs 
is aimed at improving corporations' social performance. Social policy resolutions are the object 
of our research, given that most previous scholarly research has been devoted to the examination 
of corporate governance resolution filing activity. Because social policy shareholder resolution is 
a persistent phenomenon (at least a third of aIl shareholder-initiated resolutions received by U.S. 
companies), our research program intends to fill the existing gap. 
VVe have put together ail social policy resolutions filed at U.S. firms during the period 1997-2004, 
and put them in electronic format. This information has been complemented with information 
from other databases (conceming firm accounting, financial, and social performance) in order to 
elaborate three papers, envisaged to further knowledge on social policy shareholder activism. The 
first of these papers analyzes the type of firms being targeted by social policy shareholder 
resolution filers. For this purpose we compare two types of firms, those having received a social 
policy proxy (the original sample) and a group of matching firms which have not (at least during 
an appropriate lapse of time). The chosen matching firms have the closest possible size vis-à-vis 
those in the original sample and they operate in the same industrial classification. We sought a 
matching firm for each resolution received by a firm, even if sorne firms receive multiple 
resolutions each year. Our hypothesis is that activist shareholders select firms presenting certain 
traits in order to target thein. The article shows that filers are more likely to target largefirms. It 
also shows that they tend to target financially underperforming firms, and exhibiting higher risk 
levels. We speculate that both results may be linked to the possibility that scrutiny of potential 
negative impact of social issues on firms' valuation could be higher when the economic fortunes 
of the firms are low and risk is higher, motivating additional interest in monitoring firms. Our 
results also suggest that socially underperforming firms are more likely to be picked up by filers. 
Our paper also explores the possibility that different groups of filers could differ in terms of the 
firms that they select. Overall, evidence on this aspect suggests that fileTs somehow differ in the 
type of firms they selected for targeting, but not in a remarkable fashion. 
Our second article proposes typologies for both filers of social proxies and issues brought to the 
attention of targeted firms' management. Drawing on those typologies, it examines the interplay 
between filers and management, focusing on the capacity of filers to negotiate with management 
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in exchange of withdrawing the resolution from the materials distributed to shareholders. 
Previous research equated withdrawal of resolutions with a successful outcome, i.e. a capacity to 
exert pressure on management. The article argues against this perspective and presents reasons 
suggesting that under sorne circumstances, filers may prefer to withdraw resolutions in order to 
hide unsuccessful outcomes. Taking into account the later aspect, the paper shows that sorne 
types of filers, such as pension funds, mutua! funds, and to a lesser extent, religious investors, are 
more able to negotiate deals with management. Likewise, sorne types of requests presented in the 
resolutions, such as issues related to board diversity of firms, equal employment, energy and 
environment, and international !abor and human rights, present a higher capacity to influence 
management. 
On the basis of evidence and approaches concerning the outcomes of social policy resolutions 
presented in the second paper, our third and last paper analyzes if a certain number of firm 
characteristics as well as those of the resolutions themselves increase the Iikelihood of an 
agreement concerning the resolution, before it is put to vote by shareholders during the annual 
general meeting. Our results suggest that firm size does not seem to tilt the outcome in favor of 
filers, even if the second paper shows that they prefer to select larger firms. Higher profitability 
tends to reduce the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, while a higher social profitability tends 
to increase the likelihood of this outcome. Firm's ownership of valuable brands (which can be 
tarnished by management refusaI to change the social policy of the firm) does not seem to have an 
impact on the probability of a favourable settlement for shareholders. Nevertheless, we reckon 
that accounting indicators sued to measure the value of intangible assets can be biased, as it has 
been suggested by a number of accounting scholars. Certain types of issues and filers may have 
an influence on the outcome of the resolution. Il is important to highlight that sorne of the 
abovementioned variables may loose statistical significance when the vote percentage gathered by 
the resolution the year before is introduced as independent variable in the regression models. The 
fact that this variable dominates over other variables underscores the power of shareholder 
resolution filing as mechanism to transmit shareholder expectations to managers. In this article 
we also examine the impact of the abovementioned variables on the percentage of vote gathered 
by resolutions. 
Keywords: 
Shareholder-initiated resolutions, corporate governance, social performance of firms, social 
policy shareholder resolutions. 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE
 
Présentation de l'étude 
En 1952, la Commission des valeurs mobilières des États-Unis a modifié la Règle 14a-8, afin de 
permettre à l'équipe de direction d'exclure de la circulaire de sollicitation de procurations de la 
firme, les résolutions d'actionnaires qui avaient pour but fondamental la promotion de causes à 
caractère social, racial ou religieux. Cette décision a été renversée au début des années 1970 suite 
à la montée des mouvements sociaux de contestation qui ont marqué l'époque. La décision de 
permettre J'inclusion de ce genre de résolutions a été formellement codifiée en 1976 (Ryan, 
1988). 
Pendant des décennies, la soumission des résolutions d'actionnaires a été le domaine des « gadfly 
investors », i.e. des critiques irritants, et des actionnaires intéressés aux causes sociales. En 1987, 
les investisseurs institutionnels ont commencé à soumettre des résolutions reliées à la 
gouvernance de l'entreprise (Del Guercio et Hawkins, 1999). Cette activité accrue des 
investisseurs institutionnels (notamment les fonds de pension) était la conséquence du déclin du 
marché de prises de contrôle, ainsi que de la montée en importance des investissements 
institutionnels qui rendaient difficile la vente des actions sans peltes économiques impoltantes 
(Prevost et Rao, 2000). L'implication des investisseurs institutionnels dans la soumission des 
résolutions d'actionnaires reliées strictement à la performance financière a donné lieu à des 
modifications ultérieures de la Règle par la SEC, afin de rendre plus facile son utilisation par les 
investisseurs institutionnels (Del Guercio et Hawkins, 1999). 
La recherche académique a suivi l'implication des investisseurs institutionnels. Un corpus 
important de littérature a étudié divers aspects de la soumission de résolutions d'actionnaires dites 
de gouvernance d'entreprise. Karpoff (1998), par exemple, a recensé près de 20 alticles qui ont 
analysé l'impact de l'activisme de l'actionnariat sur la valeur marchande des firmes ciblées, leurs 
opérations, ainsi que leur structure de gouvernance. Par contre, la recherche dédiée aux divers 
aspects de la soumission des résolutions à caractère social a reçu beaucoup moins d'attention 
académique. Peu d'articles, à notre connaissance, ont étudié cette forme d'activisme de 
l'actionnariat. Parmi les alticles analysant le sujet, nous pouvons mentionner: Hoffman (1996), 
Campbell et al. (1999), Chidambaran et Woidtke (1999), Rehbein et al. (2004), Tkac (2006), 
Profitt et Spicer (2006), ainsi que Thomas et Cotter (2007). Cependant, certains de ces articles se 
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concentrent sur les résolutions de gouvernance d'entreprise, ne traitant les résolutions à caractère 
social i que d'une façon marginale. 
Bijzak et Marquette (1998) ont mis en relief le fait que, dû à leur faible coût, les résolutions 
d'actionnaires offrent l'opportunité à des parties qui, autrement, ne seraient pas prises en compte, 
à prendre la parole auprès de dirigeants des firmes pour leur faire part de leur insatisfaction 
concernant la performance de la firme. Ils observent aussi que ce faible coût invite à la 
soumission de propositions qui n'ont pas de conséquences ou bien qui sont de nature frivole. 
L'emphase des chercheurs sur les résolutions reliées exclusivement à la performance financière 
semble refléter la vision que les résolutions à caractère social constituent une simple nuisance. 
Notre recherche vise à éclairer divers aspects reliés à la soumission des résolutions d'actionnaires 
à caractère social. Il nous semble que la persistance de l'activité (plus d'un tiers du total des 
résolutions reçues aux États-Unis selon Thomas et Cotter, 2007) invite à un examen approfondi. 
Notre recherche est de nature exploratoire, car l'activisme de l'actionnariat ne peut être éclai ré 
qu'à l'aide de plusieurs cadres d'analyse, comme nous le discutons plus bas. 
L'activisme de l'actionnariat est un phénomène complexe, pour lequel il n'a pas encore été 
élaboré de cadre théorique unifié capable de faciliter aux chercheurs un corpus de propositions 
susceptibles d'être testées empiriquement, comme c'est le cas de l'activisme de gouvernance 
d'entreprise, qui a été étudié presque exclusivement à l'aide de la théorie de l'agence, proposée 
par Jensen et Meckl ing (1976). Par contre, les motivations des activistes de l'actionnariat à 
caractère social à l'intention du social peuvent être multiples. Ces actionnaires peuvent 
effectivement chercher à maximiser les rendements financiers de l'entreprise par la voie de la 
réduction des risques associés à des enjeux sociaux qui ne sont pas pris en compte par les 
dirigeants des firmes. Mais les actionnaires activistes peuvent aussi poursuivre leurs propres 
agendas, au détriment de la performance financière de la firme. Pour prendre en compte ce 
dernier cas de figure, le recours à d'autres cadres analytiques devient incontournable. 
1 Certains auteurs favorisent le terme « sociétale » en lieu de « social» dans ce qui concerne la relation 
entre firmes et société (par exemple, Swaen et Chumpitaz, 200S). Étant donné que la pIUP311 de notre thèse 
est rédigée en anglais, nous ne ferons pas de distinction entre les deux concepts, utilisant le terme « social» 
pour faire référence à touts les aspects caractérisant la relation entre firmes et société. 
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Notre recherche, de nature exploratoire, cherche à étendre le champ de connaissances sur 
['activisme de l'actionnariat à caractère social. Plus particulièrement, elle vise à comprendre les 
aspects suivants: quels types d'entreprises sont l'objet de ces résolutions de l'actionnariat; quels 
types d'acteurs initient ces actions et quel genre de sujets ils amènent à la considération des 
dirigeants et des autres actionnaires et, aussi, quels sont les résultats de ce genre d'activisme. Par 
rapport à ce dernier aspect, on cherche à caractériser les résultats de l'activisme en termes de 
«succès» et « échec», c'est-à-dire en termes de la capacité de ces résolutions à favoriser la 
négociation avec les dirigeants, en les incitant à vouloir accepter un dialogue ou à promettre 
d'adopter la politique à condition que les actionnaires retirent la résolution de la circulaire de 
sollicitation de procurations de la firme. 
Cadres d'analyse et hypothèses du travail 
La recherche précédente sur la soumission de résolutions d'actionnaires dites de « gouvernance 
d'entreprise» est basée sur la théorie de l'agence développée par Jensen et Meckling (1976). En 
concordance avec cette approche théorique, une relation conflictuelle est envisagée entre les 
actionnaires activistes et les managers de compagnies ciblées. Dans cette relation conflictuelle, 
les actionnaires qui soumettent des résolutions cherchent à empêcher les managers, par exemple, 
d'isoler la firme des mécanismes disciplinaires du marché ou, en général, d'adopter des mesures 
contraires à la maxim isation des rendements des firmes dans lesquelles ils ont investi. Dans leurs 
démarches, les actionnaires, dits «activistes» qui soumettent des résolutions aux firmes, 
cherchent à cibler des firmes avec certaines caractéristiques, facilitant J'obtention de leurs 
objectifs. Notre recherche adopte aussi cette approche confl ictuelle entre les deux parties. 
Néanmoins, on prend en considération que dans le cas des résolutions à caractère social, bien 
qu'une partie des actionnaires activistes puissent avoir comme objectif la maximisation de la 
richesse des actionnaires, une autre partie (dont on ne connaît pas l'étendue) pourrait vouloir aussi 
la maximisation d'autres objectifs. La relation est toujours conflictuelle, mais la prise en compte 
des différences d'objectifs conduit à l'introduction des nouveaux cadres théoriques, issus du 
domaine de la stratégie, notamment ceux relevant du domaine de la responsabilité sociale de 
l'entreprise (RSE), ainsi que de l'approche basée sur les ressources de la société (<< Resource­
based view of the finn »). Tel qu'annoncé précédemment, étant donné l'absence d'un cadre unifié 
pour comprendre cette problématique, notre recherche est donc de nature exploratoire. 
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Notre thèse ne vise pas à étudier si l'activisme des actionnaires pourrait nuire ou pas à j'atteinte 
de l'objectif de maximisation de la richesse des actionnaires. Baron (2001) a soutenu que dans la 
perspective du pluralisme, les attentes de la société sont celles des individus et leurs intérêts, et 
que la réponse des firmes à ces intérêts est la clef pour comprendre la responsabilité sociale des 
erttreprises. Le pluralisme permet la transmission des demandes à la firme. Ces dernières sont 
basées sur la concurrence entre elles et sont structurées par institutions publiques et actions 
privées, c'est-à-dire par ce qu'il appelle la politique « publique» et la politique « privée ». La 
politique privée, i.e. l'interaction des activistes qui poursuivent l'adoption des actions dites de 
RSE, peut aboutir à la conformation d'un ordre privé (qui n'est pas basé sur les lois approuvées 
par les parlements ni appliqué par des fonctionnaires des gouvernements.) Dans certains cas, cet 
ordre privé pourrait augmenter le bien-être de la société. Feddersen et Gilligan (cité par Baron, 
2003) examinent la possibilité que les activistes divulguent aux consommateurs de l'information 
sur des attributs de RSE des produits qui ne sont pas directement observables (appelés en anglais 
«credence goods »), ce qui pourrait mitiger des formes de défaillance du marché. D'un autre 
côté, Baron (2001) dans son étude théorique sur les conséquences des menaces de boycotts à la 
firme pour qu'elle adopte des politiques de RSE, montre que l'adoption de ces politiques par les 
dirigeants peut réduire la valeur marchande de la firme. En dépit de ce fait, selon Baron le marché 
de contrôle ne peut discipliner l'entreprise car une nouvelle équipe de dirigeants se verra 
confrontée aux mêmes pressions provenant d'activistes. 
A. Rôle des caractéristiques de la firme dans la relation entre actionnaires activistes et 
dirigeants 
La 1ittérature sur l'activisme dit de gouvernance d'entreprise conçoit la relation entre activistes et 
dirigeants comme une confrontation. Les actionnaires activistes ciblent des compagnies avec 
certaines caractéristiques, primordialement celles qui ont adopté des mesures qui vont à 
l'encontre de la maximisation de la richesse des actionnaires et qui affichent des rendements 
financiers décevants (Carleton et al., 1998). Étant donné qu'il arrive très rarement que les 
dirigeants demandent un vote en faveur des résolutions à caractère social, nous envisageons 
également une relation de confrontation entre actionnaires activistes et dirigeants de la firme. 
Dans cette confrontation avec les dirigeants, il paraît plausible que les actionnaires cherchent des 
firmes avec un certain nombre de caractéristiques, celles favorisant, par exemple un dénouement 
de la résolution qui leur soit favorable. Par exemple, il est possible que les actionnaires activistes 
soient particulièrement attirés par les firmes plus performantes socialement, ce qui pourrait être 
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un indicateur d'une réaction rapide et positive de la part des dirigeants concernant leurs 
demandes. 
Pour avancer la recherche sur ce terrain, il faudra reconnaître que l'activisme d'actionnaire, à la 
différence de l'activisme dit de gouvernance d'entreprise, ne cherche pas uniquement la 
maximisation de la richesse des actionnaires. Les actionnaires soumettant des résolutions à 
caractère social pourraient être également intéressés par d'autres caractéristiques de la firme. 
Néanmoins, pour avancer dans l'identification de ces caractéristiques, il faudra avoir recours à 
diverses approches théoriques, notamment celles provenant du domaine de la stratégie et de la 
responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise. 
Ces cadres théoriques nous suggèrent d'autres hypothèses possib les concernant les 
caractéristiques de firmes qui favorisent l'adoption des résolutions. Par exemple, McWilliams et 
Siegel (200\) ont avancé que la taille de la firme favoriserait l'adoption de politiques sociales 
plus progressistes, car il découlerait des économies d'échelle de l'introduction d'attributs RSE 
dans la production de la firme. Aussi, il est possible d'envisager que les firmes plus rentables 
auront la possibilité d'investir davantage pour améliorer leur performance sociale (Waddock et 
Graves, 1997; Seifert et al., 2004; Orlitzky et al., 2003), ce qui nous amène à envisager que les 
compagnies plus rentables auront tendance à être plus proactives face aux demandes des 
actionnaires activistes. 11 est également possible d'envisager que les firmes considérées comme 
plus performantes sur le plan social, tel que suggéré entre autres par Rehbein et al. (2004), 
affichent une probabilité plus élevée d'adopter les propositions suggérées par les actionnaires 
activistes. Finalement, il a été suggéré que les firmes qui possèdent des marques facilement 
reconnaissables par le public, pourraient souffrir davantage de la dissémination de nouvelles 
pratiques considérées comme étant peu « socialement responsables ». Selon l'approche basée sur 
les ressources de la société (Runyan et Huddleston, 2006; Balmer et Gray, 2003), les ressources 
telles que les marques et l'image organisationnelle, par exemple, sont à la base de la compétitivité 
de la firme, donc on pourrait s'attendre à ce que les compagnies qui possèdent des marques de 
grande valeur puissent être plus favorables à satisfaire les demandes des actionnaires engagés. 
En conclusion, il semble plausible que les actionnaires activistes cherchent à cibler des firmes 
avec les caractéristiques contribuant à un dénouement qui leur soit favorable. En conséquence, 
nous examinons si certaines des variables considérées pourraient accroître la probabilité qu'une 
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firme soit ciblée par une résolution d'actionnaire à caractère social. Cela nous amène à formuler 
une première hypothèse: 
Hypothèse 1 : Certaines caractéristiques des firmes augmentent la probabilité de recevoir des 
résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social. 
B. Les limitations de l'utilisation du marché de capitaux comme outil pour promouvoir la 
RSE auprès de compagnies, et les caractéristiques des firmes et des résolutions qui peuvent 
favoriser les actionnaires dans les négociations avec les dirigeants 
Angel et Rivoli (1997) argumentent, en citant Hirschman, que les investisseurs qui désirent des 
changements dans la politique sociale des firmes qu'ils possèdent peuvent avoir recours soit au 
désinvestissement, soit à la prise de parole auprès des dirigeants, comme pourraient l'être par 
ex:emple les résolutions d'actionnaires (la formulation originale d 'Hirschman utilise les termes 
«exit)} et « voice )}). Selon une analyse théorique, Angel et Rivoli (1997) concluent que les 
boycotts dans les marchés de capitaux des titres des firmes non performantes d'un point de vue 
social, n'ont qu'une capacité très limitée de forcer les dirigeants de ces firmes à changer leurs 
politiques. 
Teoh et al. (1999) analysent empiriquement l'impact des mesures contre l'Apartheid en Afrique 
du Sud et arrivent à des conclusions cohérentes avec les travaux d'Angel et Rivoli (1997). Selon 
Teoh et aL, l'annonce des fonds de retraite qui se départissent de leurs actions dans des 
compagnies opérant en Afrique du Sud n'a pas eu d'effets détectables sur la valeur marchande de 
ces compagnies. Teoh et al. notent que certaines compagnies se sont départies de leurs filiales en 
Afrique du Sud à cause de la pression des investisseurs. Dans ce cas, la valeur marchande a 
enregistré une augmentation, bien que d'une façon réduite et statistiquement non significative. 
Pour leur part, Davidson et al. (1995) concluent que les annonces de désinvestissement ont une 
capacité très limitée d'influencer la valeur marchande des firmes ciblées, tandis que les marchés 
financiers réagissent à des annonces de boycott dans les marchés de produits de firmes. 
Heinkel et al. (2001) analysent la capacité des investisseurs dits «verts)} de changer la politique 
environnementale des firmes. À l'équilibre, le modèle prend en considération le coût du boycott 
ou d'exclusion des firmes polluantes par des investisseurs engagés, mais aussi le coût pour la 
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:firme d'adopter les nouvelles technologies non polluantes, le pourcentage des investisseurs verts, 
ainsi que la tolérance des investisseurs au risque. Les chercheurs ont choisi des valeurs 
raisonnables pour les paramètres du modèle. Selon ces simulations, si le coût pour rendre la 
technologie de la firme plus verte représente un pourcentage réduit du cash-flow espéré, alors très 
peu d'investisseurs engagés pourraient forcer les dirigeants à adopter la nouvelle technologie. 
Mais si ce coût grimpe à 10 pourcent du cash-flow espéré, il serait nécessaire que les investisseurs 
verts arrivent à constituer au moins 60 pourcent du total des actionnaires pour que la réforme soit 
possible. En comparaison, Heinkel et al. (2001) estimaient que les investisseurs socialement 
responsables ne détiennent pas plus que 10 pourcent du total des investissements. 
11 est plausible que les deux mécanismes à la disposition des actionnaires aient une certaine 
interdépendance. Les actionnaires ayant recours à la prise de parole seraient davantage écoutés si 
éventuellement ils pouvaient menacer les dirigeants de procéder à des désinvestissements 
s'avérant coûteux pour la firme dans les marchés financiers. Hoffman (1996) évoque cette 
possibilité dans son étude de cas sur l'émergence de la coalition d'investisseurs Ceres et des 
principes du même nom. Étant donné la limitation des processus de désinvestissement comme 
mécanisme pour réformer la politique sociale des firmes, il est possible de formuler l'hypothèse 
que la prise de parole rencontrera les mêmes difficultés. La soumission des résolutions 
d'actionnaires sera donc un mécanisme qui risque de rencontrer des limites importantes. 
Cette discussion nous amène à formuler notre deuxième hypothèse: 
Hypothèse 2: La soumission de résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social présente des limites 
importantes en termes d'un dénouement favorable aux actionnaires l'ayant soumise. 
Afin de poursuivre notre étude des résultats des résolutions, nous avons décidé de nous concentrer 
sur les résultats à court terme des résolutions. Ce choix est motivé par le raisonnement que, bien 
qu'il soit plausible de concevoir que les résolutions puissent avoir un effet dans le long terme 
(voire des décennies, selon Proffitt et Spicer), il nous semble également que cela n'empêche pas 
la possibilité que les actionnaires activistes arrivent à obtenir des résultats dans le court terme, 
avec certaines compagnies qui ont un nombre de caractéristiques qui facilitent ce dénouement. 
Par la suite, d'autres compagnies, à cause de la pression exercée par de multiples sources (y 
compris la possibilité d'intervention étatique), adopteront les nouvelles politiques sociales dans le 
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long terme, tel qu'envisagé par Proffitt et Spicer et autres (Hoffman, 1996; Logsdon et Van 
Buren, 2009). 
Quels seront les aspects qUI pourraient jouer à la faveur des actionnaires? Pour avancer la 
recherche sur ce cas particulier, nous devrons, dans un premier temps, avoir recours à la 
littérature précédente sur l'activisme dit de gouvernance d'entreprise, qui suggère que l'identité 
des actionnaires qui soumettent des résolutions, le type de demande à l'entreprise contenu dans la 
résolution, ainsi que certains aspects de cette dernière (comme le fait d'avoir été votée l'année 
précédente) peuvent augmenter la probabilité que la résolution soit adoptée par les dirigeants. À 
ces aspects on devra ajouter des caractéristiques de la firme qu i pourraient conduire à un résultat 
de la résolution favorable aux actionnaires activistes. Ces aspects ont été envisagés dans la 
littérature sur la responsabilité sociale de la firme, et nous les avons déjà mentionnés comme 
éléments capables d'attirer l'attention des activistes, précisément à cause de leur capacité 
d'influencer positivement la performance sociale de la firme. Il s'agit des variables reliées à la 
taille de la firme, sa rentabilité, les mesures de sa performance sociale et la possession des 
marques reconnues. 
En conclusion, nous formulons une troisième hypothèse: 
Hypothèse 3 : un dénouement ou résultat de résolutions favorable pour les actionnaires activistes 
pourrait être affecté par des caractéristiques des propositions elles-mêmes, ainsi que par certaines 
caractéristiques des firmes. 
Plan de la thèse 
La présente thèse compo11e trois parties majeures. Dans chacune de ces parties, nous allons traiter 
un aspect relié à la soumission de résolutions à caractère social. Afin d'avancer ces trois parties, 
nous avons d'abord répertorié toutes les résolutions à caractère social en ayant été soumises aux 
firmes états-uniennes entre 1997 et 2004, et nous les avons saisies électroniquement. Nous avons 
alors bâti une base de données dans laquelle nous avons fusionné les informations sur les 
résolutions d'actionnaires, avec des données financières et comptables extraites de Compustat et 
des données de performance sociale colligées dans la base de KLD. Cette base de données 
originale nous a permis de valider empiriquement trois problématiques de recherche visant à 
contribuer à l'avancement des connaissances sur l'activisme actionnarial à caractère social. 
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Dans une première partie, et à l'aide de techniques reposant sur le maximum de vraisemblance, 
nous examinons si certaines caractéristiques des firmes augmentent la probabilité de recevoir des 
résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social. 
Dans une deuxième partie, nous examinons en détail le fonctionnement de la Règle 14a-8, 
mettant l'emphase sur la capacité des actionnaires d'influencer les décisions de dirigeants. Nous 
développons dans cette partie une estimation du pourcentage des résolutions qui arrivent à 
provoquer une réaction positive de la part des dirigeants de compagnies ciblées, soit une 
promesse de dialogue, soit une promesse d'implémenter les demandes contenues dans les 
résolutions. La littérature existante sur les résolutions demandant des changements de la 
gouvernance d'entreprise suggère que le type d'actionnaires qui soumettent ainsi que le type de 
demande pourraient jouer un rôle important dans le dénouement de la résolution. En conséquence, 
nOLIs développons des typologies appropriées pour ces deux aspects. 
Dans L1ne troisième partie, et à l'aide de techniques d'estimation reposant sur le maximum de 
vraisemblance, nous examinons J'hypothèse selon laquelle certaines caractéristiques des firmes et 
des résolutions elles-mêmes pourraient influencer le dénouement du processus de différentes 
façons. 
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Le schéma suivant facilite une vue globale de la thèse et de ses composantes: 
Article l Article II Article III 
Types de Types d'acteurs Facteurs ayant 
-----.compagnIes et sujets une influence sur 
ciblées contenus dans les résultats des 
les résolutions résolutions: 
Résultats Caractéristiques 
favorables aux des firmes 
actionnaires 
(( succès») Caractéristiques 
des résolutions 
(type d'acteurs, 
sujets, évolution 
résolution ... ) 
Contributions 
La présente thèse contribue à la littérature sur les résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social à 
pl usieurs niveaux. 
La première pattie de cette thèse étudie les caractéristiques des compagnies ciblées par les 
actionnaires activistes. Nous examinons si certaines caractéristiques des firmes augmentent la 
probabilité que la firme soit choisie pour recevoir une résolution d'actionnaire à caractère social. 
Pour examiner cet aspect, nous comparons un groupe de compagnies ciblées avec d'autres qui 
n'ont pas reçu de résolutions pendant un celtain nombre d'années. À notre connaissance, aucun 
autre article n'a étudié cette question selon notre approche. Rehbein et al. (2004) n'ont étudié que 
12 
les entreprises ayant été la cible de résolutions à caractère social en examinant les déterminants du 
nombre de résolutions reçues par les compagnies ciblées. Thomas et Cotter (2007) présentent de 
l'information descriptive sur les différences dans des variables financières entre firmes recevant 
des résolutions de gouvernance d'entreprise et d'autres qui ont reçu des résolutions à caractère 
social. Notre analyse se situe en amont des études précédentes, car nous comparons, tel que déjà 
mentionné, les caractéristiques des firmes qui ont été effectivement ciblées avec d'autres qui ne 
l'ont pas été. 
Dans la deuxième partie de notre thèse, nous avons étudié les résultats possibles à court terme des 
résolutions. Selon les dispositions de la Règle 14a-8, il y a trois résultats possibles pour chaque 
résolution: elles peuvent être incluses dans la circulaire et votées par les actionnaires; la 
compagnie peut décider de ne pas inclure la résolution dans la circulaire, si la SEC l'autorise à cet 
effet; finalement, les actionnaires peuvent décider de la retirer. Fait à noter, les dirigeants peuvent 
décider de ne pas mettre en œuvre les décisions soumises aux votes des actionnaires, même s'ils 
obtiennent plus de 50 pourcent de votes. Chidambaram et Woidtke (1999) ont avancé l'hypothèse 
que la résolution relève d'un processus de négociation et que les résolutions votées reflètent en 
fait un échec de la pa11 des actionnaires les ayant soumises, au même titre que celles qui ont été 
omises de la circulaire. Tkac (2006), entre autres, a assimilé le retrait des résolutions à un succès: 
si les résolutions sont retirées, ce serait parce que les dirigeants ont accordé assez de concessions 
aux actionnaires les ayant soumises. Notre recherche questionne cette formalisation du succès ou 
conception du succès, car nous proposons une série de raisons suggérant que dans certaines 
cond itions les actionnaires qui soumettent des résolutions pourraient les retirer. Parmi ces raisons 
citons J'omission de la résolution par la SEC et la volonté des actionnaires d'éviter un échec, à 
savoir l'obtention d'un pourcentage de votes favorables inférieur à celui requis pour permettre à 
la résolution d'être présentée de nouveau (dans un tel cas, ceci empêcherait la résolution d'être 
soumise à nouveau pendant cinq ans). Notre interprétation réduit considérablement les 
estimations du nombre de résolutions ayant la capacité d'extraire des managers une promesse 
d'action, soit d'implémenter la résolution ou d'initier un dialogue. 
Dans la troisième partie de notre thèse, nous avons regroupé les résolutions selon les différents 
résultats à court terme. Ensuite, nous avons estimé la probabilité qu'un nombre de variables 
caractérisant les firmes (tai Ile, rentabi 1ité, performance sociale, propriété des marques 
reconnaissables) ainsi que les résolutions eJles-mêmes (type de résolution, type d'actionnaire, 
vote reçu par la résolution l'année antérieure) puissent également avoir un impact sur cette 
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probabilité. À notre connaissance, aucun autre article n'a étudié cette question. Chidambaram et 
Woidtke (1999) ont comparé les caractéristiques de firmes ayant expérimenté des retraits de 
résolutions sociales avec d'autres qui n'ont pas reçu de résolutions pendant une certaine période. 
Notre recherche se différencie de celle des ces auteurs. Tout d'abord, nous nous concentrons sur 
les différents résultats de résolutions parmi les firmes qui ont été effectivement ciblées, ce qui 
rend la comparaison plus significative. En outre, notre recherche L1ti 1ise une définition plus 
contraignante de « succès» que le simp le retrait. 
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Summary 
We compare traits of companies targeted with social policy shareholder resoJutions during the 
years 2000 to 2004 to those of a set of matching firms. On the basis of univariate and multivariate 
analysis, we show that targeted firms tend to be much larger than their counterparts. They also 
tend to be less profitable, riskier, and less socially perfonning. We provide suggestions to explain 
those results. Our analysis suggests that different types of filers do not differ greatly in tenns of 
the characteristics of the finns that they select for targeting. 
Key words: Social policy shareholder activism, firm targeting, types of filers 
Résumé 
Nous comparons les caractéristiques des firmes ciblées par des résolutions d'actionnaires à 
caractère social avec celles d'un groupe témoin de firmes. Les analyses univariée et multivariée 
montrent que la taille des firmes ciblées a tendance à être beaucoup grande que celle des 
compagnies témoins. Elles ont aussi tendance à être moins profitables, plus risquées, et moins 
socialement performantes. Nous présentons un nombre d'explications possibles pour ces résultats. 
Notre analyse suggère que les différents types des actionnaires activistes n'affichent pas de 
différences importantes en termes des caractéristiques des firmes qu'ils choisissent de cibler. 
Mots clés: Activisme de l'actionnariat à caractère social, compagnies ciblées, types 
d'actionnaires activistes 
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Introduction 
Stockholders of firms with poor financial or social performance, make use of a number of tools to 
compel managers to cbange course. We deal in this article with a particular mechanism to voice 
concerns to management, the so-called Rule 14 a-8, enacted in 1942 by the United States' 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This rule allows shareholders of public companies 
ta file under certain circumstances, at no cost for them, non-binding succinct resolutions (i.e. less 
than 500 words) that should be included in the solicitation materials of the finn to be voted by 
shareholders; if management itself seeks shareholder voting proxies. This is something 
management frequently does, because corporate law of most states in the United States provides 
that shareholders elect the directors who manage the corporation and vote to approve certain 
fundamental corporate transactions, such as mergers (Ryan, 1988; Brownstein and Kirman, 
2004). Shareholder-initiated proposaIs filed under the Rule 14 a-8 are considered to fal! in two 
groups. A first group of shareholder-initiated proposaIs are those intended to solely enhance the 
corporation's financial performance. These are the so-called corporate governance proposaIs, and 
they are related to the external control of the corporation (as it could be calls to repeal anti­
takeover devices or other managerial attempts to insulate the firm from the market of corporate 
control); internaI governance mechanisms (including functioning of boards); executive 
compensation; and in general actions related to the financial performance of the firm 
(Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). A second group of proposaIs ai ms at improving corporations' 
social performance. They are referred to as social policy shareholder resolutions and they are the 
subject of this paper (we also employ henceforth interchangeably the terms social proxies or 
corporate social responsibility-CSR- resolutions to refer to this type of resolutions). Requests to 
firms contained in social proxies are very broad, vis-à-vis corporate governance resolutions. For 
instance, some of these proxies demand companies to increase ethnic minority and female 
representation in their boards. Other shareholder social resolutions suggest actions to reduce the 
environmental impact of firms' operations; to produce repolis about this impact; or policies to 
deal with actllal or eventual risks arising from environmental aspects of firms' operations and 
prodllcts. Other proxies suggest management to adopt international codes of conduct, such as the 
McBride Principles (intended to overcome workplace sectarian discrimination in NOlihern 
Ireland), or the Ceres PrincipJes, a ten-point code of corporate environmental conduct to be 
pu bl icly endorsed by compan ies that strive to improve their performance. In other cases, 
companies are requested to develop their own guidelines to assure respect of labor rights upheld 
by international conventions in their operations abroad, or in the operations of their foreign 
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suppliers; and to guarantee independent monitoring of compliance. At the domestic level, social 
policy resolutions frequently ask management to provide a discrimination-free workplace 
environment, regarding aspects such as ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation. 
Most scholarly research falls into the realm of corporate governance shareholder activism 
activity. Among other things, researchers have examined what types offirms are targeted by filers 
(for instance, Bijzak and Marquette, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998; John and Klein, 1995; Karpoffet 
aL, 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; and Smith, 1996). Articles have also studied factors affecting 
vote turnovers received by these proposais (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Thomas and Cotter, 2007).1 
Prevost and Rao (2000) also analyze the wealth effects of publ ic pension fund shareholder 
activism. Other articles have examined as weIJ the wealth effects and long term consequences of 
proposais sponsored by various types of actors. Among these stud ies we can cite Wahal (1996), 
GiIJan and Starks (1998) and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999). Carleton et al. (1998) examines 
as weil finns' characteristics that couJd influence a settlement between the activist institution (a 
large institutional investor, TIAA-CREF) and targeted firms. 
We beJieve that social policy shareholder proposai filing deserves further academic attention. To 
begin with, social proxy fil ing is a persistent phenomenon, a fact that in itself invites reflection 
from researchers. Campbell et al. (1999) estimate that nearly a third of these resolutions fall into 
the social policy category in the 1997 proxy season. Chidambaran and Woidtke studied a sample 
of 1522 resolutions filed during the period 1989-1995. They classified roughly 40 percent of them 
as social proxies. Thomas and Cotter (2007) analyze corporate governance and social policy 
resolutions submitted to vote during the proxy seasons of 2002,2003, and 2004. Roughly a third 
of them (403 out of 1454) were classified as social policy shareholding resolutions. Rojas et al. 
(2009) report that institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, are increasingly 
active as filers of social proxies. These types of actors possess larger stockholdings, and have 
access to specialized resources, which can enhance their ability to influence management 
decisions concerning CSR. Moreover, recent developments suggest that the weight of CSR 
resolutions is not likely to fade away in the years to come. In 2006 specialized bodies of the 
United Nations launched the Principles for Responsible Investment, an initiative intended to 
stimulate investors to give appropriate consideration to environmental, social and governance 
issues that can affect the performance of investment portfolios. They are not prescriptive, but 
1 Thomas and Cotter (2007) also consider in their analysis social policy shareholder resolutions, although they focus on 
corporate governance resolutions. 
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instead provide a menu of possible actions for incorporating environmental and social issues into 
mainstream investment decision-making and ownership practices. Exercising voting rights or 
monitoring compliance with voting policy (if outsourced), and filing shareholder resolutions 
consistent with long-term environmental and social considerations are explicitly encouraged in 
the principles. Major institutional investors, such as CalPERS in the U.S. and the Universities 
Superannuation Scheme in the United Kingdom are among those that have adopted the principles 
(Princip les for Responsible Investment, 2009). 
Moreover, it has been recorded that firms are responsive to social activist requests (including 
those contained in social proxies), even though this can be costly for them. For example, Innes 
(2004) reports that more than 100 large corporate retai lers and users of timber prod ucts since 
1999 have agreed to phase out ail products of old growth forests and to give preference to wood 
that is certified as "environmentally friendly" by the Forest Stewardship Council. O'Rourke 
(2003) repOlis that The Gap had created a vendor compliance department with over 100 staff; 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the company's code of conduct throughout its 
global supply chain. Whether the abovementioned actions are detractive for firm market value or 
not -still a matter of debate among researchers- is irrelevant for a positive analysis of the 
social proxy filing phenomenon. As Baron (2001) has argued, from the perspective of pluralism, 
where society's expectations are those of individuals and their interests, responding to interests is 
the key to social responsibility. Pluralism places demands on firms based on a competition of 
interests as structured by publ ic institutions and private actions, that is, through pu bl ic and private 
politics. "Private politics," the interaction of activist pursuing CSR interests and firms, may result 
in a "private order" (i.e. not based in laws approved by parliaments and enforced by government 
officiaIs). ln some cases, the resulting private order of this interaction may expand society's 
welfare. Feddersen and Gilligan (cited by Baron, 2003) have examined the possibility tbat social 
activists provide consumers with information about product CSR attributes that are not directly 
observable (the so-called "credence goods"), mitigating in fact a form of market failure and thus, 
expanding society's welfare. Baron (2001) on the other hand, presents a formai model which 
predicts that CSR actions imposed to firms by social activists menacing with boycotts are 
detrimental of market value. Altruistic firms, promoting CSR without pressure from activists are 
even more penal ized by the market. However, in the case of management being compelled by 
activist pressure or menace, he argues that the market of corporate control will not impose 
disciplinary action against the finn. A new team of managers taking over the firm will be 
confronted to the same kind of threats. Anecdotal evidence (Manheim 2001) suggests that social 
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proxies are part of a larger arsenal of tools used by activists to pressure firms in order to advance 
desired CSR actions. If so, proxy filing will likely be strengthened in the future. Baron (2003) 
argues that the choice between public and private politics is strategic, and that activists may 
increasingly be choosing private politics. Lobbying governments can be expensive; but also 
technological change may have contributed to this change in strategy, because the Internet 
enables politics on a worldwide scale. Given the persistency exhibited by social proxy filing, and 
its theoretical possibility to coexist with an active market of corporate control, even if they were 
detrimental to finn market value, we believe that it is worth to expand knowledge about the 
operation of this legal device as mechanism to transmit societal demands to finns. One key aspect 
of the functioning of social proxy filing is the type of companies that activist target. And that is 
the su bject of the present article. 
To the best of our knowledge only Rehbein et al. (2004) and Thomas and Cotter (2007) present 
evidence about the kind of companies targeted by CSR resolution filers. Rehbein et al. (2004) 
examined social policy shareholder resolutions received by firms that are constituents of the S&P 
500 index. These researchers used regression analysis to study the effect of CSR ratings of 
campan ies (taken from Socrates, a database elaborated by the research firm KLD Research 
Analytics), and firm industry, s.ize and profitability (control variables) on the number of 
resolutions received by targeted companies during the period 1991 to 1998. These resolutions 
were related to four types of stakeholder relations: employees, communities, customers, and the 
environment. Thomas and Cotter (2007) present descriptive evidence regarding a number of 
financial traits of firms targeted with corporate governance and CSR proxies, that were 
effectively voted by shareholders. Our article adds to this literature by approaching the topic in a 
different way. We do not pose ourselves questions about what factors influencing how frequently 
firms have been targeted, as Rehbein et al. do, or if firms receiving social proxies and corporate 
governance differ, as in Thomas and Cotter. Instead, we go a step backwards; examining the traits 
of firms that have been effectively targeted by social resolutions vis-à-vis those offirms that have 
not been targeted at ail during the period. We also examine this question separately for certain 
types of filers; and we believe that this approach constitutes a second contribution to the literature 
on how filers choose the firms that they target with social policy shareholder resolutions. 
The rest of the aliicle goes as follows. The following section discusses results of previous 
literature on corporate governance firm targeting decision, as weil as literature presenting the 
theoretical underpinnings of our research. In this part we also state the hypotheses for the study. 
24 
A third section presents the methodology for the study, including sources of data. A fourth 
section presents and discusses results. A final section closes the paper and suggests possible 
avenues for future research. 
Discussion of previous literature and hypotheses 
Most Jiterature about how shareholders use Ru le 14 a-8 to voice their concerns to management 
has been confined to the corporate governance realm. It is also the case for the topic of this 
article, firm target selection. A number of articles have examined how filers of corporate 
governance resolutions choose their targets (for instance, Bijzak and Marquette, 1998; Carleton et 
al., 1998; John and Klein, 1995; Karpoff et al., 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; and Smith, 1996). 
Bijzak and Marquette (1998) examined resolutions to rescind shareholder rights plans, more 
commonly known as poison pi Ils, a legal device intended to prevent hostile takeovers. Carleton et 
al. (1998) examined shareholder resolutions sponsored by TIAA-CREF, a large institutional 
investor. These resolutions were intended to limit companies' ability to issue blank-check 
preferred stock as a takeover defense without shareholder approval (blank check preferred stock 
allows companies to issue stock with greater voting power); enact confidential voting; and 
increase board diversity.2 John and Klein (1995) analyzed the probability that S&P 500 
constituent firms receive corporate governance shareholder resolutions. Karpoff et al. (1996) 
examined corporate governance sharehoJder resolutions filed during the 1987-1990 proxy 
seasons, related to external and internai corporate governance issues; compensation-related 
issues; other miscellaneous issues; and mixed issues. Prevost and Rao (2000) examined 
shareholder resolutions fil ing by publ ic pension funds. Smith (1996) examined corporate 
governance shareholder resolutions submitted to CaIPERS, a large pension fund. 
In most of the abovementioned articles, authors compare the traits of the originally targeted firms 
with those of finns in a matching sample that have not received sharehoJder resoJutions,3 using 
univariate and multivariate logistic analysis. Overall, these studies present evidence that firms 
attracting corporate governance shareholder-initiated resolutions tend to present distinctive traits 
2 The later type of resolution is frequently classified as a social policy resolution, but Carleton et al.
 
included it in their analysis because TIAA-CREF considers that a diverse board is [ess 1ikely to be beholden
 
to management.
 
3 Prevost and Rao (2000) focuse in the distinctive differences between firms that are single and multiple
 
tm"gets of shareholder proposais.
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vis-à-vis their counterpatis in the matching firm sample, although in some cases these differences 
can be statistically insignificant. Among other aspects, it has been unearthed that targeted firms 
tend to be larger (Bijzak and Marquette, 1998; John and Klein, 1995; Karpoff et aL, 1996; Smith, 
1996). They tend to be also to exhibit poor stock returns (John and Klein, 1995; Karpoff et al., 
1996), although autllors report a non significant correlation between previous financial 
performance and the fact of being targeted. 4 Several authors suggest that at least some aspects of 
ownership structure -namely stock ownership by executives and directors; percentage of the 
firm owned by 5 percent block-holders, as weil as greater percentage of institutional ownership-­
, tend to characterize firms receiving corporate governance resoJutions (Carleton et aL, 1998; 
Karpoff et aL, 1996; Smith, 1996). Neveliheless, not ail articles point in the same direction. John 
and Klein (1995), for instance found that there is a negative correlation between targeting and 
institutional ownership (the coefficient is significant), a result that they interpret as an indication 
that companies with greater outside monitoring will be less subject to shareholder proposais. 
Moreover, they found no significant relation between targeting and the degree of director 
ownership. Prevost and Rao (2000) discovered that firms targeted jllst once during the sample 
period exhibit a higher proportion of blockholder ownership and a higher propotiion of outside 
directors, two characteristics associated with stronger corporate governance. However, the 
percentage of institutional shareholdings was higher for the firms that have been targeted two or 
more times, an indicator that Prevost and Rao associate with looming corporate governance 
problems. These results suggest to the authors that most types of institutional shareholders are 
unwilling or lInable to monitor firms effectively. 
Literature has unearthed other types of evidence. Bijzak and Marquette (1998) found that the 
characteristics of the poison pill adopted, or the type of reaction from the market were correlated 
with the decision to target. John and Klein (1995) unearth evidence showing that S&P 500­
constituent firms are more 1ikely to receive corporate governance shareholder resolutions if they 
have more directors serving in other S&P 500 finns, and indicator of poor functioning of the 
internai governance mechanisms of the firm. Karpoff et al. (1996) results indicate that the 
probability of attracting a corporate governance proposai increases with firm size, but also with 
4 Bijzak and Marquette (1998) found that the level of operating income scaled by total assets for the three 
years before the shareholder proposai was similar between samples; Carleton et al. 1998 report that probit 
regression coefficients for three year cumulative industry-adjusted returns were positive and statistically 
insignificant, leading them to conclude that this performance measure is not relevant to TIAA-CREF's 
targeting decision. 
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leverage, and institutionaJ shareholdings. The probability decreases with the market-to-book ratio, 
operating return on sales and recent sales growth. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Thomas and Cotter (2007) and Rehbein et al. (2004) present 
evidence about the kind of companies targeted by CSR resolution filers. Thomas and Cotter 
(2007) present descriptive evidence regarding a number of financiaJ traits of firms targeted with 
corporate governance and CSR proxies, that were effectively voted by shareholders. These 
researchers examined both corporate governance and social poJicy shareholder resolutions, with 
the later absorbing nearly a third of the total number of sampled resolutions (403 out of 1454 
resolutions). Thomas and Cotter present descriptive evidence suggesting that firms targeted with 
social policy shareholder resolutions tended to be larger than the average finn contained in tbeir 
sample. Firms receiving what they labelled as "EnvironmentaIlSocial" shareholder resolutions (a 
sub-sample comprising 106 firms) were larger (as measured by total assets) than the average firm, 
although another, more numerous subset of 297 firms receiving "Other Social Responsibility" 
resolutions) were in fact smaller than the average [inn in the sample. However, market value was 
considerably higher for both sub-samples of firms targeted with social proxies, vis-à-vis the 
average exhibited by firms from ail samples considered in the study. Finns targeted with social 
policy shareholder resolutions tended to be profitable (as it is the case of the rest of firms in the 
overall sample) as measured by accounting indicators such as net proflt margin and return on 
assets. Raw returns for the period -250 to -1 days before the mailing date for the average offirms 
in the sampJe were 8.55 percent. However, when these returns were adjusted by the market for 
the same period, it came out that they were strongly negative and significantly different from 
zero. However, the sub-samples of firms receiving Economic/Social Environmental resolutions 
and those being targeted with Other Social Responsibility resolutions do not appear to differ 
greatly from the entire sample (market-adjusted returns were -24.07 percent for the sub-sample 
receiving Environmental/Social resolutions; -22.73 percent for those receiving Other Social 
Responsibility resolutions, and -22.14 percent for the full sample). Institutional ownership tended 
to be relatively high for ail targeted [irms and insider ownership appears to be relatively low, for 
any group of firms. 
Rehbein et al. (2004) examined social policy shareholder resolutions received by firms that are 
constituents of the S&P 500 index, and other companies not belonging to this group but that 
included in the socially screened Domini Social Fund. Sample years range from 1991 to 1998. 
Rehbein et al. argue that there are two possible perspectives that can provide a rationale for social 
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proxy filing aetivity. These activist shareholders can either be motivated by an interest 111 
transforming the CSR performance of the corporation -the interest-based perspective-, or 
alternatively, they can be motivated to act by the intention of solidifying the group that is 
pursuing aetion- the identity-based perspective. In the first case, they reason, filing shareholders 
wi Il target pOOl' social performing firms. By doing this, they can play a l'ole in identifying 
problems for management, a first necessary step in ameliorating corporate treatment of specifie 
stakeholders. Moreover, by filing social proxies they can attract support from other stockholders, 
increasing pressure on management. If the identity-perspective prevails, they reason that filers do 
not expect to have an impact on corporate actions; the objective is rather j ust to take action to 
express an identity. Ifthis perspective motivates action by filers, Rehbein et al. (2004) argue that 
they would emphasize firms able to attract greater attention. They will do so, by targeting larger 
firms, more profitable firms that draw more publicity. 
Ta further examine these arguments, Rehbein et al. (2004) regroup shareholder resolutions in the 
sample, in accordance to corporate treatment of four stakeholders: employees, communities, 
eustomers and the environment. Separate finn ratings for eaeh of the abovementioned 
stakeholders were taken from Socrates, a database elaborated by the research finn KLD Research 
Analytics, intended to assess corporate social performance. Socrates database, aecording to 
Rehbein et al. has been widely used in studying issues pertaining to CSR. Researchers used 
ord inary least squares regression analysis to study the effect of ratings of performance of 
companies regarding treatment of these stakeholders; with size and profitability as control 
variables. Separate regressions were l'un for each type of stakeholder. Size was proxied by the 
number of employees; profitability was measured as total return to shareholders. The dependant 
variable in the regression model was the number of shareholder resolutions submitted to the 
company that were related to the particuJar stakeholder category. Results were not conclusive, 
and they varied according to the stakeholder group. Three models were l'un to study the effect of 
independent and control variables on firm targeting in the case of shareholder resolutions related 
ta employment issues (each model considered as dependent variable the number of different types 
of employee-based resolutions). Coefficient for the size variable was positive and significant in 
ail three models. KLD ratings were negatively related to targeting decision, but the coefficient 
was significant in just one case. The coefficient for profitability was positive, though statistically 
insignificant. 
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Four models were run to analyze firm targeting ln the context of community shareholder 
resolutions. These models show separate results for different definitions of community-based 
resolutions, i.e. they differ in the definition of the dependent variable. A negative reJationship was 
observed between the number of community-related shareholder resolutions and KLD community 
ratings for the firms (in two cases, the estimated coefficient was statistically significant, 
suggesting, as in the case of empJoyee-related resolutions that filers prefer to target 
underperforming firms. The estimated coefficients for firm size were positive and statistically 
significant in ail four models. Estimated coefficients for profitability were equally positive, 
although they were statistically significant in just two cases. A model was ran for product-related 
stockholder resolutions (these resolutions expressed stockholders demands to firms in the areas of 
tobacco, military contracting, animal rights, infant formula, alcohol, dairy, firearms and 
gambling. These issues were deemed by researchers to reflect firms' insufficiency in dealing with 
their customers). The estimated coefficient for KLD customer rating was positive and significant. 
As in previous cases, the coefficient for firm size was positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient for profitability was positive, but not significant. The model fitted for environment 
and energy resolutions exhibited a positive and statistically significant coefficient for KLD's 
environmental rating. Coefficient for firm size was positive and significant. However, the 
coefficient for profitabiJity was negative and insignificant. 
Our article expands literature on social proxy finn targeting. Rehbein et al. (2004) and Thomas 
and Cotter (2007) anaJyze filer targeting decisions once they have been made. We do not pose 
ourselves the question of what kind of firms are more frequently targeted, as Rehbein et al. do, or 
if firms that have already received social proxies differ from those that have been targeted by 
corporate governance resolutions. Instead, we move the analysis a step backwards; examining ex 
ante the traits of firms that have been effectiveJy targeted by social resoIutions vis-à-vis those of 
firms that have not been targeted at ail, at least during a certain period. We are convinced that this 
approach can shed add itional light on the discussion about what type of firms are chosen by social 
proxy filers. We also present separate resuJts for different types of sponsors. Previous literature 
(Rojas et aL, 2009) suggests that different types of filers differ in the capacity to negotiate with 
management. The enhanced capacity of several types of filers may be associated with different 
patterns in terms of their firm selection. Therefore, we also examine the question of what kind of 
firms attract social policy shareholder resolutions separately for different relevant actors active as 
filers of social policy shareholder filers. 
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Corporate governance literature depicts social proxy filer and finn management as adversarial. 
John and Klein (1995) illustrates this by pointing out that, while shareholder proposais may be 
and always are accompanied by statements of opposition or agreement by management in the 
proxy statement, only one shareholder proposai in their sample -caJling for a voluntary 
reduction in irrelevant shareholder proposals-, was supported by management. Previous 
literature on corporate governance targeting summarized above has centered confrontation 
between management and filers around shareowner dissatisfaction with firm financial 
performance. Poorly performing firms are thus targeted. Active shareowners, by means of the 
proxy machinery propose resolutions to improve financial performance of the firm. For instance, 
these resolutions aim to prevent management entrenchment and promote better functioning of 
internai corporate devices. Outlined literature suggests that in advancing their cause, active 
shareowners move strategically. They target underperforming firms, but these firms are also 
greater than matching finns not receiving resolutions. Targeted firms also exhibit a larger 
proportion of institutional ownership, and less insider ownership. Larger firms provide potential 
spin-offs effects. Minor competitors, out of mimesis or to avoid damages to reputation, may adopt 
the proposed policies after bigger players in industry have done it. Large institutional ownership 
may assure higher vote turnover if the resolution is finally put to vote, white insiders are more 
likely to vote with managers. 
In advancing our research, we also conceive social proxy filing activity as an adversarial process 
between management of firms and filers, in a way akin to the corporate governance shareholder 
resolution filing. Thus, in our perspective, actors interacting in the social proxy filing process 
tend to act strategically as weil. Ifthis perspective is true, filers may have an interest in targeting 
the "right" firms. But how can be best described these finns? In elaborating hypotheses about 
factors playing a l'ole in filer strategic decision, we argue that two major elements should be taken 
into account. First, filers may be inclined to target firms presenting particular traits that make 
them more likely to abide to their requests. Secondly, we recognize that financial gain of 
targeting firms can yield no or negligible financial return to filers of social proxies (a point 
stressed by Rehbein et aL). If so, filers may be interested in picking firms that can maximize other 
objectives that are plausible in the case of social filers. Let us take a closer look to each of these 
elements. 
There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that social activists of all sorts (including those filing 
shareholder proposaIs) have the ability to force firms to alter their policies regarding their 
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treatment of stakeholders. For instance, Innes (2004) reports that more than 100 large corporate 
retailers and users of timber prodllcts since ]999 have agreed to phase out ail products of old 
growth forests and to give preference to wood that is certified as "environmentally friendly" by 
the Forest Stewardship Council. He also reported that food retailers limited transgenic content to 
avoid boycott by Greenpeace and other groups. O'Rourke (2003) reports that The Gap had 
created a vend or compliance department with over 100 staff; responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the company's code of conduct throughout its global supply chain. Rojas et al. 
(2009) suggest that in a small, but nonetheless non negligible nllmbers of cases, firms accept to 
implement requests from social proxy filer requests, particularly those coming from mutual funds 
and pension funds. 
While some firms abide to social activists (and social proxy filers in particular) and others do not, 
filers should target firms that exhibiting traits that increase their propensity to abide to social 
requests. Four aspects may play a heightened role in this propensity offirms: profitability offirms 
and their risk; previous social performance of firms; and their size. 
Larger firms could be a target of choice for social policy shareholder resolution filers. Previous 
research about firm targeting -in both domains corporate governance and social policy 
shareholder resolutions-, suggest that large firms are preferred by activist investors. Thomas and 
Cotter (2007) found, as it has been noted above, that companies targeted by corporate governance 
shareholders are relatively large, but those targeted by social policy shareholder resolutions could 
be even larger. We argue that three reasons could explain social proxy filers' preference for large 
firrns. First, large firms can be the leaders in the industry. Innovative social policies can spin-off, 
if smaller competitors adopt the m, either by mimesis or out of fear of losing an important 
segment of the consun-ier base. Secondly, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) conjecture that there are 
economies of scale and economies of scope in firms provision of goods with CSR attributes. A 
large, diversified firm can spread the costs of CSR provision over many different product and 
services; for example, the goodwill generated from firm-Ievel CSR-related advertising, can be 
leveraged across a variety of firm' brands. Larger firms, thus, can be arguably more likely to 
abide to shareholders requests, because they are more prone to deploy resources to CSR. But 
larger firms have also other interesting aspect for filers of social proxies. They are more visible, 
they are more likely to have global operations, and consequently they attract media attention. 
Because filers are unlikely to benefit financially from their activism, they can benefit in other 
forms. Baron (2003) suggests various motivations for activists (using or not the proxy machinery 
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to further their causes). Some activists, he asselt, may have as the objective protective the 
environ ment and securing human rights. But they may also want to attract new members and 
contributions, or becoming the leader of a broader movement or simply exercising power. If these 
motivations apply in the case of social proxy filer, clearly larger firms are more likely to provide 
higher rewards. Moreover, the advance of political careers, by means of the use of the proxy 
machinery (pmticularly by public pension officiais) has been suggested as a possibility by 
Romano (2001) and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999). If po1itical or personal careers can also be 
furthered by social policy shareholder activism, there is an additional motivation to target large or 
very large firms. 
This discussion leads us to state a final hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Larger firms have more probabiJity to be targeted by fiJers of social policy 
shareholder resolutions. 
There is reason as weil to hypothesize that firms with higher profits may attract social proxy 
filing. Some students of CSR have pointed out to the possibility that weil performing firms have 
slack resources enabling them to ameliorate their social performance (Waddock and Graves 
1997). In this way, they can go beyond the obI igations of the law, offering for instance better 
conditions to their workers, or employing less polluting technology. Seifert et al. (2004) found 
support for the slack resource view of corporate social performance. They examined data for 157 
constituent firms of the FOItune 1000, and found that corporate giving is dependant on slack 
resources. Doing weil, as they summarize the findings, enable firms to do good. 5 Meta-analytical 
studies published by Orlitzky et al. (2003) were not able to reject the slack resources hypothesis, 
although they are also consistent with the existence of concurrent bidirectionality between 
financial and social performance; or of a virtuous cycle with quick cycle times. One may build a 
similar argument in the case offirm risk. Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) present findings that are 
consistent with the view that, akin to the slack resources view, managers of low risk firms face 
less uncertainty and can rely on more reliable financial and cash-flow projections, allowing them 
to devote more resources to social issues not directly related to survival of the finn. 
5 Charity giving is just one dimension of CSR. However, there seems to be no restriction to extent the 
argument to other dimension. Advocates and critics of CSR will agree that firm involvement in CSR is 
certainly not free, but costly. 
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In accordance to discussion above, we state the following hypotheses:
 
Hypothesis 2: Profitable firms or firms with greater financial slack are more likely to receive
 
social policy shareholder proposais.
 
Hypothesis 2a): Firms that exhibit lower risk tend to attract more social policy resolutions,
 
because management has more room to satisfy this sort of requests.
 
Previous social performance offirms renders Jess c1ear-cut predictions. On the one hand, Rehbein
 
et al. (2004) have found statistically estimates suggesting that bad social performance (as
 
measured by Socrates ratings, transformed by Rehbein et al.) may be linked to incidence of social
 
policy shareholder resolutions, at least in the case of some groups of social policy resolutions
 
(although in some cases the coefficient is insignificant). On the other hand, there is anecdotal
 
evidence pointing to the fact that firms excelling in social terms may attract attention from
 
activists. Manheim' s account of one corporate campaign that took place by mid-1960s illustrates
 
this point. The campaign sought to mobilize and represent pOOl' people in a major metropolitan
 
area of the United States. "In June 1966," says Manheim, "the group settled on one local
 
employer - Eastman Kodak- as a special target. Kodak was selected not because it was a bad
 
corporate citizen, but precisely because it was a model corporate citizen" (... ). The underlying
 
rationale for the action being "to push to the company's value structure to its very limits and then
 
using Kodak's example as a way to pressure such other local employers as Xerox, Bausch and
 
Lomb, General Dynamics, and General Motors" (Manheim 2001: 12, emphasis added). Rehbein
 
et al. (2004) also presented anecdotal evidence pointing in the same direction. At a certain
 
moment, Operation PUSH, an organization intended to promote black people's advancement
 
decided to target Anheuser Busch, because of its lack of minority distributors. The company was
 
targeted, Rehbein et al. c1aim, to maximize publicity about diversity issues, even if the company
 
exhibited an aboye-average record regarding diversity issues.
 
Following this discussion, we state the folJowing hypothesis:
 
Hypothesis 3:
 
Previous CSR-performance plays a role in social policy shareholder resolution filers' decision to
 
target a specific finTI. Nevertheless, we don't have previous expectations about the sign of the
 
relationship.
 
33 
Data sources and methodology 
We focus our analysis on social policy resolutions received by US firms during the period 2000 to 
2004. We create a database containing ail social policy shareholder-initiated resolutions received 
by US firms during this period. Firms receiving these proposaIs constitute our main sample. Our 
purpose is to compare the characteristics of firms that have been effectively targeted with others 
that have not been targeted, in order to test the hypotheses set up for the study. Social policy 
proposais were retrieved from the Investor ResponsibiJity Research Center (IRRC)'s yearJy 
publication Social Policy Shareholder Resolutions. In the process of choosing matching firms, 
however, we take into consideration that fi lers of social proxies can spread targeting of firms 
concerning a topic over a number of years, as suggested by Proffitt and Spicer (2006). Filers do 
this to mobilize support from other investors and stakeholders of the firm for their agenda and 
increase their chances of exerting pressure on management of targeted firms. Thus, in order to 
properly select a sample of matching firms, we keep in mind that finns that have not been 
targeted during the years 2000-2004 (and that in principle could be acceptable to be included in 
the matching sample), cou Id have received a social proxy before or after this period. Thus, we 
decide not to choose finns in the matching sample that have been targeted three years before or 
after the period under study. This time frame is arbitrary, for we do not have a precise idea of the 
appropriate boundaries. To check if a finn has received a social proxy during the proxy seasons 
of 1997-1999, we also consult the same publication from IRRC. To check out this aspect during 
the proxy seasons of 2005 to 2007, we have consulted information published by the firm 
RiskMetrics Group, which continues IRRC's tracking of social policy shareholder filing activity. 
Oftentimes, companies are targeted more than once in a given year. We look for a comparable 
firm for each resolution. 
During the years 2000-2004 firms received a total of 1486 social policy resolutions. For each of 
these resolutions, we sought for a company matching the finn, using for that purpose information 
011 sales for the year of targeting and industry, retrieved from the Compustat database. We sought 
for a firm that has not been previously targeted, as described above, operating in the same 
industry and having a close size in tenns of net sales. Large firms seem to be targeted by social 
poiicy shareholder resoiution filers, thus we have difficulties in flllding comparable firms in terms 
of size. We deal with this issue in the following manner. First, we looked for a company in the 
same four-digit SIC classification, and with sales in the range of +/- 90 percent of sales exhibited 
by the targeted company. If no company appears in the four-digit classification, we tried to find a 
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matching firm in the same three-digit classification, within the abovementioned range of sales. If 
still no suitable companies were found, we will look for the company that was closest in sales to 
the targeted finn in the four-digit classification. We follow this procedure to select ail firms in the 
matching finn sample, with the only exception of General Electric. This company, which has 
been repeatedly targeted in the sample, develops a large number of activities, ranging from media 
content production and distribution, to finance and manufacturing of many diverse products. As a 
consequence, the company appears in Compustat in the SIC code 9997, which comprises 
conglomerates. Because not many companies appear in that classification, and General Electric is 
one of the most targeted firms in the sample, we cannot find appropriate matching in the same 
category or even in the same two digit classification for ail resolutions received by the company. 
To avoid loosing very important information, we devised the following procedure to choose 
matching firms to General Electric. First, we select companies appearing in the same four-digit 
classification, and which have not received social proxies during the period 1997-2007. Once we 
exhausted possible matching firms .Iisted under the SIC category 9997, we sought for matching 
firms among the list of competitors appearing in the Mergent database and impose the same 
restriction regarding previous targeting that apply to other firms in the matching sample. For 
resolutions concerning media activities, we sought for companies in the 4833 and 4841 SIC 
classifications, with sales close to an average of sales of General Electric's media division, as 
reported by Mergent. 
In forming our matching finn sample, we excluded some types of companies from consideration 
because a number of reasons. First, we excluded from the matching sam pie ail privately held 
firms, because the rule 14 a-8, governing shareholder resolution filing only applies to public firms 
(Brownstein and Kirman 2004). We also excluded from the matching sample ail firms traded in 
United States stock exchange markets under any type of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) 
program. Our rationale to do so is two-fold. First, observers have raised questions about the legal 
ability of investors holding ADR certificates (which imply ownership of the underlying shares) to 
sponsor resolutions within the Rule 14 a-8 (ADR Subcommitee, International Corporate 
Governance Network, 2002). Secondly, we found evidence of one case where management of a 
targeted company excluded a social poJicy shareholder proposaI from the proxy materials. 
Management reportedly did so, on the grounds that US owners of ADRs do not have the same 
rights to file shareholder resolutions as investors of ordinary with shares have in the United 
Kingdom (Anonymous, BP Amoco Excludes Artic Refuge Shareholder Resolution, 2001). 
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However, we consider for inclusion in the matching ftnn ail foreign ftrms whose common shares 
are traded in United States stock exchanges. 
Moreover, we sought information from a variety of sources in order to verify that common shares 
of ftrms were effectively being traded during the period under study. We thus eliminate from the 
list of potential matches, ail firms that sought for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, or 
those that faced suspension in share trading during an appropriate time frame (two years before 
and after the filing year). Likewise, we did not consider as possible matching firms, ail those 
companies that started to be traded in the US stock exchanges, two years before or after the year 
that their counterparts firms in the original sample were targeted. FinaJly, in order to constitute 
our matching firm sample, we did not consider two firms that were publicly owned, but that were 
controlled by a parent company holding 90 percent of more of share value. We also eliminate 
from consideration as matching ail firms that were traded in the so-called OTC (Over the 
Counter) markets two years before or after a given year of targeting. These companies are not 
likely to be owned by many institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds which 
were important actors in the social proxy filing scene. In order to identify ftrms to be excluded 
from the matching sample, we used multiple sources, such as company websites, newspapers 
databases contained in ABI/lnform, Hoover's company records (also contained in ABI/lnform), 
the New York Stock Exchange website, as weil as Google searches. 
In a few cases, Compustat provided no sales information about particular targeted finns in a given 
year. If sales figures were reported for the previous year, we use that information to find a 
comparable firm in the year of targeting. In a restricted number of cases, there was no report of 
the sales figure that we used to select matching firms and we deleted the targeted firm altogether 
from the original sample. In the end, we kept 1424 firms in the original sample oftargeted firms. 
We use Compustat to retrieve accounting information about ftrms as weil as information on 
firms' financial returns and market value. We use KLD's Socrates database to obtain information 
about social performance of firms. KLD rates firms' social performance along a number of axes, 
and gives also an overail rating. We use this later figure to gauge companies' social performance. 
It is important to bear in mind that the so-called proxy season covers a number of months. 
Karpoff et al. (1996) stated that shareholder proposai resolutions included in their sample, which 
covered the years 1987-1990, started to be filed in March 1986. In other words, decisions about 
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which company to target are made during the year before the filing takes place effectively. For 
that reason, we paired information on firms targeted in one given year (and companies matched to 
them) to financial and social performance of firms one year before. 
Social policy shareholder resolutions filed during the years 2000 to 2004 coyer a wide spectrum 
of issues (see Table 1). However, these resolutions are also heavily concentrated. A quarter of ail 
proxies were classified as being related to the environment performance of the firm and energy 
issues. One resolution in five was connected with corporate policies related to labor rights and 
human rights in operations overseas. Roughly one in ten contained calls to improve corporate 
guarantees of a discrimination-free working environment in their domestic operations. Slightly 
more than seven percent of ail resolutions called for adoption of corporate policies intended to 
increase fairness in society (Annex 1 provides a detailed definition of these categories and 
concrete examples). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERB 
Re ligious investors were responsible for most of the proxies of the period under study. Roughly a 
thi rd of ail social proxies received by companies during the years 2000 to 2004, as Table 2 shows, 
were filed by this type of investors. They were followed by mutual funds (17.6 percentage of ail 
resolutions); individual investors (17.2), public pension funds (13.0), asset managers (7.6), and 
advocacy groups (7.0). Other types of fiJers were of marginal importance. Appendix 2 contains 
additional information on each of these categories of filers and gives concrete examples of 
investors appertaining to them. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
ln order to develop our analysis, we resort to univariate analysis of proxy variables in a first step. 
ln a further step, we apply a logistic model to study the probability of a firm of being targeted by 
social proxy filers during the years 2000-2004, following Green (1993), who points out that 
ordinary least squares regression is not appropriate in the case of models with non continuous 
dependent variables. The same approach has been also followed by previous articles examining 
finn targeting decisions in the context of corporate governance shareholder resolutions (Bijzak 
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and Marquette, 1998; Carleton et aL, 1998; John and Klein, 1995; Karpoff et aL, 1996; Prevost 
and Rao, 2000; and Smith, 1996). Thus, in our regression mode l, the dependent variable assumes 
two discrete values (1 if targeted, 0 if not). lndependent variables are variables proxying for firm 
size, risk, and social performance. At this point, it is impoliant to highlight that firms that have 
been targeted were matched to other firms not receiving social proxies on the basis of industry 
and size. However, because targeted firms tend to be the larger in the SIC codes were they have 
operations, the matched firms were significantly smaller, this allowing us to test the incidence of 
firm size in social policy shareholder resolution filer decision-making. Detailed results for our 
study are presented in next section. 
Discussion of results 
Univariate analysis suggests that, in accordance to hypothesis l, larger firms tend to be preferred 
by filers of social proxies. Our proxy for finn size -market value of firms-, shows a very large 
gap between the original sample of targeted firms and those in the matched firm sample. Targeted 
firms had a market value, on average, of nearly US $ 64.2 billion. On average, matched firms had 
a value of US $ 6.0 billion, i.e. Jess than a tenth of the targeted firms' figure. That difference was 
statistically significant at 99 percent (see Table 3). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Results concerning hypothesis 2 (slack resources hypothesis), however, are less clear-cut. Our 
accounting proxy for profitability, return on equity, supports hypothesis 2. An nuai return on 
equity was on average 20.0 percent in the case of targeted firms and it reached 7.8 percent, on 
average, in the case of matched firms. This difference was statistically significant, with a 95 
percent of confidence. Another accounting proxy for slack resources, free cash flow (scaled by 
assets) was also higher on average for targeted firms, vis-à-vis their counterparts in the matched 
firm sample. The difference, however, was not statistically significant at any of the common 
thresholds. Univariate analysis of market-based proxies of slack resources tells a different story. 
On average, the one-year total return was in fact much higher (18.4 percent) for matched firms 
than for firms in the original sample of targeted firms. The difference was statistically signiflcant. 
The three- year total retU1l1 reveals a similar pattern as weil. Even the five-year total return was 
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higher in the case of matched firms, although the difference in means was In this case was 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Univariate analysis does not allow us either to arrive to conclusive results regarding hypothesis 
2a). If our hypothesis holds, less risky firms, tend to attract more social policy resolutions, 
because management of these firms can count of more predictable sources of revenue. Four 
ind icators were incJuded in the analysis to proxy firm l'isle beta coefficient; total 1iabi lity to 
assets; Jong term debt to capital; and long term debt ta assets. The later indicator, long term debt 
to assets, gives support to hypothesis 2a). On average, long term debt to assets was 19.4 percent 
in the case of targeted firms, a Jower percentage vis-à-vis matched firms (the difference was 
statistically different from zero at a 99 percent of confidence). Likewise, the beta coefficient was 
lower in the case of targeted firms, although this difference was not statistically significant. 
However, other indicators of risk, namely total 1iabi 1ity to assets and long term debt to capital, do 
not give support ta hypothesis 2a). Targeted firms exhibited in fact, a higher percentage of total 
liability to assets, on average, than matched firms. Moreover, the difference was statistically 
significant at a 99 percent level. Another proxy, long term debt to capital, was on average higher 
for targeted firms, although the difference was statistically insignificant. 
Regarding hypothesis 3, lInivariate results suggest that socially underperforming firms were more 
likely ta be targeted with social proxies. The difference was statistically significant at 99 percent. 
In order to shed additionaJ light on the potential raie of a number of firm traits that might play a 
l'ole in firtn being targeted by social policy resolution filers, we carried out multivariate analysis. 
We retain for multivariate analysis only those variables included in the univariate analysis 
showing statistically significant differences between the two groups of firms. Thus, on those 
grounds we dl'Op from the multivariate analysis the beta coefficient, the long term debt ta capital 
and five-year total return. We kept free cash flow to assets, because its [-value was very close to 
be statistically significant (-1.6) and because it seems to us an intuitively attractive way to 
measure the slack resources available for management discretion. We also dropped from the 
analysis three year total retllrn, because although differences were significant concerning this 
variable, it presented information that was very likely contained in the one-year total returns. 
A total of six models were run using logit regression (the dependant variable assuming the value 
1, if the company was targeted and 0 otherwise). Results are repolted in table 4. Overall, these 
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results provide a clearer picture of the type of companies selected by social proxy fiJers. The 10git 
regressions confirm univariate analysis regarding finn size (hypothesis 1). Firm size increases the 
probability of a finn being targeted in ail models, without exception. Ail coefficients for the 
natural logarithm of market value are positive and significant. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Un like univariate analysis, logit regression resu lts tend to contrad ict hypothesis 2. Coefficients 
for one year-total return (models 1 and 2) are negative and significant at 99 percent of confidence. 
Also negative and significant were the coefficients for free cash flow to assets (models 3 and 4). 
Return on equity, on the other hand, present positive estimated coefficients (models 5 and 6); but 
these coefficients are not significant. Also, contrary to our hypothesis 2a), evidence from our 
multivariate analysis suggests that higher levels of risk tend to increase likelihood of receiving 
social proxies. Total liability to assets and long term debt to assets exhibit positive coefficients in 
ail models, although in just one case (model 3) the estimated coefficient for totalliability to assets 
is significant. Coefficients for long term debt to assets are positive and significant in ail models 
where the variable was incJuded, namely models 2, 4, and 6. We do not have a ready-made 
ex.planation for rejection of hypotheses 2, and 2a). However, we specu late that filers would prefer 
to target financially underperforming firms, because they hope that other unsatisfied investors 
could vote for their social proposais as a way to express dissatisfaction to management. It is also 
plausible that scrutiny of potential negative impact of social issues on firms' valuation could be 
higher when the economic fortunes of the firms are low. Likewise, firms with higher risks may 
attract more scrutiny from stockholders, making these firms more interesting for social proxy 
targeting. In any case, more research is warranted concerning possible explanations for our resu[ts 
about the impact of profitability and risk on decision targeting of firms by social proxy filers. 
Our logit regresslons confirm lInivariate results sllggesting that firms receiving lower KLD 
ratings have a greater likelihood of being targeted by filers of social proxies. Coefficients for this 
variable are negative and significant in ail the six models. Although we expected this variable to 
play a l'ole in filers' targeting decision-making, we did not have a prior on the sign of that 
relationship. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that some filers, at least, such as socially­
screened mutual funds, may have a vested interest in pushing socially underperforming firms to 
reform, because that would be noticed by potential customers, increasing their business revenues. 
On the other hand, as we have mentioned above, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
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campan ies regarded as progressive in their social pol icies have been targeted in the past; with the 
purpose of force them to set new trends that can be adopted afterwards by less socially 
"progressive" competitors. The unearthed evidence leads us to think that the idea of pushing 
progressive firms to become champions of innovative social policies belongs to the infancy of 
shareholder activism and corporate campaigns. The examples that we provided of corporate 
campaigns targeting above average firms in terms of social performance, took place in fact during 
the 1960s and the 1980s. We reason that the growing of socially responsible investing since the 
1990s have brought more financial power and professional resources to activist shareholders, and 
thus, the possibility of exerting pressure even on socially-underperforming firms to become trend 
setters of new social policies. 
Our paper also explores potential heterogeneity among filers of social proxies, in tenns of the 
types of companies that they target. Previous literature (Rojas et al., 2009) suggests that some 
types of filers (such as mutual funds and pension funds) are more successful than others in 
dealing with managers, withdrawing a higher proportion of resolutions in exchange of adoption of 
the suggested pol icies. We reason that this differential rate of success could be the result of 
different types of firms being selected. In order to further explore heterogeneity among social 
proxy filers we l'un separate estimations of the six models presented in table 4 for five types of 
filers: individual investors, advocacy groups, mutual funds; pension funds; and religious 
investors.6 
Overall, evidence from these regressions suggests that filers somehow differ in the type of firms 
they selected for targeting, but not in a remarkabJe fashion. On all six models, firm size increases 
the probabi lity of being targeted, for ail five types of fi lers. Moreover, coefficients are invariably 
statistically significant. Evidence is more fragmented when it comes to test separately our 
hypotheses concerning profitability and other measures of slack resources. When models 1 and 2 
are run separately, coefficients for one-year total return are negative in aIl cases. However, 
coefficients are not significant in the case of individual investors and pension funds in the case of 
model l, and pension funds in the case of model 2. A similar picture arises from models 3 and 4. 
Estimated coefficients for the variable free cash tlow to assets are negative for ail actors, although 
6 I-Ioetker (2007: 337-339) presents objections against the procedure of introducing a dummy variable for 
group membership and estimating the resulting equation for ail observations. Instead, the author proposes a 
separate estimation for each group contained in the sample, which al10ws the researcher to compare (at a 
minimum) the statistical significance of the coefficients across groups. He asserts that this possible because 
the coefficients and standard errors are consistent within each group. 
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they are not always significant. Coefficients for return on equity (models 5 and 6) are positive, 
but only in one case they were significant. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
More heterogeneity is observed regarding the l'ole of risk in targeting decision. Coefficients for 
the variable total liability to assets change sometimes of sign, depending on the type of filer. 
However, when negative coefficients appear (signaling a departure from results presented in 
Table 4), they are not significant. Coefficients for long term debt to assets are consistently 
positive across the different types of filers (as they appear in table 4). Sometimes, though, they 
are not significant. 
Il is important to highlight that individual investors differ from other filers in one important 
aspect: the l'ole of KLD rating in the decision to target a finn. When the regressions are l'un 
separately, KLD rating still shows a negative coefficient, signaling that the probability of being 
targeted increases for socially underperfonning finns. This holds trlle throughout the different 
models and filers. One notable exception is the group of individual investors. In only one model 
(model 5) the coefficient for this variable was negative (as it was for the ensemble of other filers) 
and significant. In ail other models, the estimates of the coefficient for KLD rating are 
insignificant when the logit regression is l'un separately for individual investors. In some cases 
(model 3 and model 4) the sign of the coefficient becomes even positive. We do not have a ready­
made explanation for this finding. We speculate that individual investors may have a more 
"ideological agenda" than other filers, focusing for instance in targeting large firms to gain 
pu bl icity for their causes. However, this explanation is very provisory and the issue caUs for 
additional research. 
Conclusion 
A number of articles have examined how filers of corporate governance resolutions choose their 
targets (for instance, Bijzak and Marquette, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998; John and Klein, 1995; 
Karpoff et al., 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; and Smith, 1996). To the best of our knowledge, 
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only Thomas and Cotter (2007) and Rehbein et al. (2004) present evidence about the kind of 
companies targeted by CSR resolution filers. 
Thomas and Cotter (2007) repolt descriptive evidence regarding a number of financial traits of 
firms targeted with corporate governance and CSR proxies that were effectively voted by 
shareholders. These researchers examined both corporate governance and social policy 
shareholder resolutions, with the later absorbing nearly a third of the total number of sampled 
resolutions (403 out of 1454 resolutions). Thomas and Cotter's evidence suggests that firms 
targeted with social policy shareholder resolutions tended to be larger than the average firm 
contained in their sam pie, at least in terms of market value. They also unearthed evidence that 
firms targeted with social policy shareholder resolutions tend to be profitable (as it is the case of 
the rest of firms in the overall sample) as measured by accounting indicators such as net profit 
margin and return on assets. Raw returns for the period -250 to -1 days before the mailing date for 
the average of firms in the sam pie were 8.55 percent. However, when these returns were adjusted 
by the market for the same period, it came out that they were strongly negative and significantly 
different from zero. However, the sub-samples of firms receiving Economic/Social 
Environmental resolutions and those being targeted with Other Social Responsibility resolutions 
do not appear to differ greatly from the entire sample (market-adjusted returns were -24.07 
percent for the sub-sample receiving Environmental/Social resolutions; -22.73 percent for those 
recejving Other Social Responsibi lity resolutions, and -22.14 percent for the ail sample). 
Institutional ownership tended to be relatively high for ail targeted firms and insider ownership 
appears to be relatjvely low, for any group of firms. 
Rehbein et al. (2004) examined social policy shareholder resolutions received by firms that are 
constituents of the S&P 500 index, and other companies not belonging to this group but included 
in the socially screened Domini Social Fund. Sample years range from 1991 to 1998. Rehbein et 
al. (2004) regroup shareholder resolutions in the sample, jn accordance to corporate treatment of 
four stakeholders: employees, communities, customers and the environment. Separate firm 
ratings for each of the abovementioned stakeholders were taken from Socrates, a database 
elaborated by the research fifln KLD Research Analytics, intended to assess corporate social 
performance. Researchers used ordinary least squares regression analysis to study the effect of 
ratings of performance of companies regarding treatment of these stakeholders; with size and 
profitability as control variables. Separate regressions were run for each type of stakeholder. Size 
was proxied by the number of employees; profitability was measured as total return to 
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shareholders. The dependant variable in the regression model was the number of shareholder 
resolutions submitted to the company that were related to the particular stakeholder category. 
Results were not conclusive, and they varied according to the stakeholder group. 
Our article expands literature on social proxy firm targeting. Unlike Thomas and Cotter (2007) 
and Rehbein et al. (2004), we don 't pose ourseIves the question of what kind of firms are more 
frequently targeted, as Rehbein et al. do, or iffirms that have already received social proxies (that 
were subsequently voted) differ from those that have been targeted by corporate governance 
resolutions, as Thomas and Cotter (2007). Instead, we move our examination a step backwards; 
examining ex ante the traits of firms that have been effectively targeted by social resolutions vis­
à-vis those offirms that have not been targeted during a certain period. Our results show that this 
approach can shed additional light on the discussion about what type of firms are chosen by social 
proxy filers. 
Our univariate results were consistent with our hypothesis l, showing that large firms are targeted 
by social proxy filers. The average targeted flrm was in fact more than 10 times larger, in market 
value terms, than the average matched finn. Less clear cut were the univariate results regarding 
the role of slack resources (hypothesis 2) and risk (hypothesis 2-a). Our accounting proxy for 
profitabil ity, return on equity, supports hypothesis 2. Annual return on equity was on average 
20.0 percent in the case of targeted firms and it reached 7.8 percent, on average, in the case of 
matched firms. This difference was statistically significant. Another accounting measure of slack 
resources, free cash f10w (scaled by assets) was also higher on average for targeted firms, vls-à­
vis their counterparts in the matched firm sample; although the difference was not statistically 
significant at any of the common thresholds. Contrary to these results, our market-based measures 
of profitability (one, three, and five year total return) suggest that targeted finns were less 
profitable than matched finns. Differences between the two groups of firms were significant for 
one year and three year return. 
Univariate analysis does not allow us either to arrive to conclusive results regarding the role of 
risk. Hypothesis 2-a) implies that less risky firms tend to attract more social policy resolutions, 
because management of these firms can count on more predictable sources of revenue. Four 
illdicators were included in the analysis to proxy firm risk: beta coefficient; total liability to 
assets; long term debt to capital; and long term debt to assets. One of these indicators of firm 
risk, long term debt to assets, gives support to hypothesis 2a). On average, long term debt to 
assets was significantly lower for targeted firms, vis-à-vis matched firms. The beta coefficient 
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was also higher for matched firms, although the difference was insignificant in this later case. The 
other two indicators of risk, namely total liability to assets and long term debt to capital, do not 
give support to hypothesis 2a). Targeted firms exhibited in fact, a higher percentage of total 
liability to assets, on average, than matched firms. Moreover, the difference was statistically 
significant at a 99 percent level. Another proxy, long term debt to capital, was on average higher 
for targeted firms, although the difference was statistical!y insigniflcant. Univariate analysis 
shows that socially underperforming firms were more likely to be targeted with social proxies. 
The difference was statistically significant at 99 percent. 
Our multivariate analysis sheds additional light on the types of companies targeted by social 
proxy filers. To begin with, logit regressions confirm univariate analysis regarding firm size. Finn 
size increases the probability of a firm being targeted in all models, without exception. Ali 
coefficients for the natural logarithm of market value are in effect, positive and significant. 
Multivariate results contradict hypothesis 2 and 2-a). When we introduce one-year total return in 
the regressions, the resulting coefficients for this variable are negative and significant. Aiso 
negative and significant were the coefficients for free cash flow to assets. Return on equity, on the 
other hand, exh ibits positive estimated coefficients; but these coefficients are not significant. 
Also, contrary to our hypothesis 2a), evidence from our multivariate analysis suggests that higher 
levels of risk tend ta increase likelihood of receiving social proxies. Total liability to assets and 
long term debt to assets exhibit positive coefficients in ail models, although in just one case the 
estimated coefficient for total liability to assets is significant. Coefficients for long term debt to 
assets are positive and significant in al! models where the variable was included, namely models 
2, 4, and 6. We do not have a ready-made explanation for rejection of hypotheses 2, and 2a). 
However, we speculate that filers wou Id prefer to target financially underperforming firms, 
because they hope that other unsatisfied investors could vote for their social proposais as a way to 
express dissatisfaction to management. It is also plausible that scrutiny of potential negative 
impact of social issues on firms' valuation could be higher when the economic fortunes of the 
firms are 10w. Likewise, firms with higher risks may attract more scrutiny from stockholders, 
making these firms more interesting for social proxy targeting. In any case, more research is 
warranted concerning possible exp1anations for our results about the impact of profitability and 
risk on decision targeting of firms by social proxy fi lers. 
Our multivariate analysis a1so confirm univariate results suggesting that 10wer KLD ratings 
illcrease the likelihood of being targeted by filers of social policy shareholder resolutions. 
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Estimated coefficients for this variable are positive and significant in ail the six models. We did 
not have a prior for the sign of this coefficient. We recognize the possibility that actors involved 
in the proxy filing activity may have a vested interest in targeting firms that are widely perceived 
as performing poorly in social issues. Mutual funds, for instance, may gain notoriety (and 
potential clients) if they force a finn that disregards the environment or workers rights to change 
course in its policies. Officiais in pension funds trying to promote their professional or political 
careers by promoting social issues using the proxy machinery would gain additional notoriety, if 
they arrive to refonn firms perceived as particularly reluctant to adopt more progressive policies. 
On the other hand, we pointed out to anecdotal evidence suggesting that companies regarded as 
progressive in their social policies have been targeted in the past; with the idea of making them 
setting new trends that can be adopted afterwards by less progressive competitors. The evidence 
that we have unearthed leads us to think that the idea of pushing finns to become champions of 
innovative social policies belongs to the infancy of shareholder activism, in patiicular, and 
corporate campaigns in general. The examples that we provided of corporate campaigns targeting 
above average firms in tenns of social performance, took place in fact during the 1960s and the 
1980s. The arrivaI of actors to the social proxy scene with more financial power and access to 
professional resources has brought to activist shareholders, perhaps, the possibility to exert 
pressure even on socially-underperforming finns to become trend setters. 
Our paper also explores the possibility that different groups of filers could differ in terms of the 
firms that they select. In order to examine this aspect, we run again a1l models, separately for 
individual investors, advocacy groups, mutual funds, pension funds, and religious investors. 
Overall, evidence from these regressions suggests that filers somehow differ in the type of firms 
they selected for targeting, but not in a remarkable fashion. On ail six models, firm size increases 
the probability of being targeted, for ail five types of filers. Moreover, coefficients are invariably 
statistically significant. Evidence is more fragmented when it cornes to test separately our 
bypotheses concerning profitability and other measures of slack resources; although in general, 
our separate analysis holds previous conclusions. More heterogeneity is observed regarding the 
role of risk in targeting decision. A major depaliure from homogeneity is observed in the case of 
the role of previous performance of KLD ratings. Coefficients for ail types offilers are negative, 
in ail the six models run. However, in the case of individual investors, the coefficient is not 
significant in all but one of the six models. We speculate that this may ref1ect that individual 
investors, having more freedom of action than other actors; could also be more "ideological 
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types," pursuing narrow causes. If that reasoning is right, they would focus on targeting large 
finns, in order to gain publicity, regardless of firm previous performance. We recognize, 
however, that this possible explanation could be subjected to criticism. More research on the issue 
is warranted. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Social policy resolution proposaIs, 2000-2004, according to the category of issues raised 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000-04 % 
Energy and environment 65 59 77 78 83 362 25.4 
International labor and human rights 44 71 71 55 46 287 20.2 
Equal employment 28 24 31 30 32 145 10.2 
Faimess in society 26 27 13 10 26 102 7.2 
Human heaJth issues 12 II 20 28 26 97 6.8 
Involvement in partisan politics II II 10 4 51 87 6.1 
Charitable giving l / 14 5 14 35 18 86 6.0 
Tobacco issues II 9 10 18 16 64 4.5 
Involvement in the military & national security issues2/ 13 14 Il 12 11 61 4.3 
Board diversity 8 12 10 12 13 55 3.9 
Local or indigenous communities' human rights 5 4 4 1 2 16 1.1 
Animal rights 1 1 1 3 9 15 1.1 
Abortion & contraception issues3/ 6 3 1 1 1 12 0.8 
Product/service quality service, safety/reliability 0 1 2 3 2 8 0.6 
Restriction/removal of eqLIai employment practices 1 3 2 2 0 8 0.6 
Workplace issues 3 1 0 2 2 8 0.6 
Ethnie or nationality-based discrimination 0 0 5 0 0 5 0.4 
Historical violations of human rights 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.1 
Sub-total 250 256 282 294 338 1420 99.7 
TOTAL 251 256 283 295 339 1424 100.0 
1/ Includes calls to curb corporate dependency of govemmental assistance ("corporate welfare") and potential involvement in cOlTUption.
 
2/ Includes corporate involvement in gun production and distribution for other consumers than the military.
 
3/ Includes rejection of corporate involvement in pomography production or distribution and promotion of corporate adoption of conservative stands on
 
cultural values.
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Table 2: Number of resolutions filed by type of first sponsor, 2000-2004 
Type of sponsor 
Religious investor ll 
Mutual fund 
Ind ividual 
Public pension fund 
Asset manager 
Advocacy group 
Trade union21 
Unknown 
University/college 
Total 
1/ Church-based pension funds are also included in tbis category.
 
2/ Trade union-based pension fund are included in this category.
 
No. of 
resolutions % 
469 32.9 
249 17.5 
246 17.3 
185 13.0 
109 7.7 
99 7.0 
56 3.9 
10 0.7 
1 0.1 
1424 100.0 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of targeted and matched firms 
Selected variables, 2000-2004 Ct statistics within parentheses) 
Variable 
Market Value (millions US $) 
Ali sample 
Matched firms 
Targeted firms 
Mean difference2/ (1*= -22,09) 
Return on Equity (%) 
Ali sample 
Matched firms 
Targeted firms 
Mean difference2/ (1**= -2,16) 
One-year total return (%) 
Ali sample 
Matched firms 
Targeted firms 
Mean difference2/ (/*= 5,6) 
Three-year total return (%) 
Ali sample 
Matched firms 
Targeted firms 
Mean difference2/ (t *= 4,4) 
Five-year total return (%) 
Ali sample 
Matched firms 
Targeted tirms 
Mean difference2/ (t= 1,46) 
Free cash flow to assets (%) 
AIl sample 
Matched firms 
Targeted firms 
Mean difference2/ (t= -1,6) 
No. observations 
2741 
1373 
1368 
2268 
1344 
1344 
2739 
1375 
1364 
2649 
1340 
1309 
2511 
1198 
1313 
2388 
1190 
1198 
1/ Ct statistic calculation assumes different variances). 
2/ Mean matched firms- targeted firms. 
*, **= significant at 99% and 95% of confidence, respectively. 
Mean 
35088.9 
6037.2 
64246.8 
-58209.6 
13.9 
7.8 
20.0 
-12.2 
13.5 
18.4 
8.4 
7.4 
9.4 
5.5 
3.9 
11.5 
12.1 
11.0 
1.0 
3.3 
3.1 
3.6 
-0.5 
St. 
deviation 
74734.4 
8877.3 
97043.1 
146.6 
173.4 
113.6 
47.0 
53.6 
38.5 
10.0 
22.7 
24.7 
20.5 
17.8 
19.1 
16.5 
7.8 
8.7 
6.9 
Minimum Maximum 
0.03 602432.6 
10.20 137964.9 
0.03 602432.6 
-5490.2 1362.1 
-5490.2 1362.1 
-2669.6 1274.1 
-97.0 396.7 
-97.0 396.7 
-95.3 289.8 
-84.9 163.8 
-84.9 163.8 
-69.7 113.2 
-50.3 153.7 
-46.1 153.7 
-50.3 103.151 
-63.0 46.3 
-59.8 46.3 
-63.0 39.9 
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Table 3 (co nt.) 
No. Standard 
Variable observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum 
Beta (coefficient) 
Ail sample 650 0.794 0.609 -0.464 3.583 
Matched finns 322 0.802 0.626 -0.396 3.305 
Targeted firms 328 0.787 0.593 -0.464 3.583 
Mean difference2 / (t= 0,30) 0.ü15 
Totalliability to assets (%) 
AIl sample 2748 64.7 -6.7 5.8 618.9 
Matched firms 1380 62.3 22.2 10.6 201.3 
Targeted firms 1368 67.1 27.3 5.8 618.9 
Mean difference2 / (t*= -5,08) -4.8 
Long term debt to capital 
AIl sample 2747 39.8 34.7 -0.015 732.6 
Matched firms 1379 39.4 38.7 -0.015 732.6 
Targeted firms 1368 40.3 30.1 0 401.1 
Mean difference2 / (t = -0.67) -0.9 
Long term debt to assets (%) 
Ail sample 2744 20.3 16.1 0 156.7 
Matched firms 1376 21.2 17.6 0 117.3 
Targeted firms 1368 19.4 14.5 0 156.7 
Mean difference2 / (t* = 3,07) 
KLD rating 
Ali sample 1991 -0.038 0.250 -0.846 0.692 
Matched firms 760 0.014 0.173 -0.462 0.615 
Targeted firms 1231 -0.070 0.283 -0.846 0.692 
Mean difference2/ (t*= 8,22) 0.084 
Il Ct statistic calculation assumes different variances). 
21 Mean matched firms- targeted firms. 
*, **= significant at 99% and 95% of confidence, respectively. 
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Table 4: Determinants of targeting
 
Logit regressions for the aIl sample, dependent variable 1= targeted, 0 otherwise (z statistics within parentheses)
 
Madel 1 Madel 2 Madel 3 Madel 4 Madel 5 Madel 6 
Ln (market value) 0.839 0.862 0.867 0.884 0.840 0.884 
(z*=19.45) (z*=19.33) (z*=18.17) (z*=17.60) (z*=18.93) (z*= 19.00) 
One-year total return -0.006 -0.007 
(z*= -4.51) (z*= -4.65) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.001 
(z= 0.56) (z= 0.57) 
Free cash tlow/assets -0.030 -0.036 
(z*=-3.16) (z*= -3.50) 
Total liability ta assets 0.004 0.011 0.0054 
(z = 1.19) (z*= 2.89) (z= 1.59) 
Long term debt ta assets 0.010 0.009 0.019 
(z*** = 
(z** = 2.20) 1.79) (z*= 3.97) 
KLD rating -1.854 -1.750 -1.220 -1.214 -2.017 -1.837 
(z*= -7.79) (z*=-7.31) (z*= -4.78) (z*= -4.70) (z*= -7.94) (z*= -7.20) 
Constant -7.44 -7.61 -8.02 -7.63 -7.66 -8.07 
(z*= -16.33) (z*=-16.75) (z*= -15.57) (z*=-15.10) (z*=-16.27) (z*= -16.94) 
Number of observations 1933 1933 1659 1659 1895 1895 
Pseudo R2 0.241 0.243 0.257 0.2527 0.2417 0.29 
*,**, *** significant at 99%,95% and 90%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Determinants of targeting, separate regressions for several types of filers 
Table 5: Logit regressions for separate types of filers, dependent variable: targeted = l, 0 otherwise (z statistics within 
parentheses) 
Modell 
Indiv. investors Advoc. groups Mutual funds Pension funds Religious invest. l /
 
Ln (market value) 0.895 1.402 0.759 0.640 1.218
 
(z*= 9.17) (z*= 6.12) (z*= 7.53) (z*= 5.55) (z*= 10.11)
 
One-year total return -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.013
 
(z= -1.37) (z***= -1.73) (z**= -2.13) (z= -1.09) (z*= -3.78)
 
Return on equity 
Free cash flow/assets 
Total liability/assets 0.0 Il -0.006 -0.003 0.010 0.034 
(z= 1.32) (z= -0.38) (z= -0.49) (z= 1.40) (z*= 4.98) 
Long term debtlassets 
KLD rating -0.612 -4.591 -2.659 -1.547 -3.047 
(z= -1.41) (z*=-3.13) (z*= -3.39) (z**= -2.26) (z*= -5.60) 
Constant -8.73 -12.33 -5.72 -5.52086 -13.12 
(z*= -7.63) (z*= -5.53) (z*= -6.34) (z*= -4.84) (z*= -9.37) 
No. of observations 344 136 320 231 568 
Pseudo R2 0.267 0.466 0.201 0.178 0.360 
*, **, *** significant at 99%,95% and 90%, respectively. 
11 Excludes church-based pension funds. 
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Table 5: (cont.) 
Model2 
Indiv. Advocacy Religious 
investors groups Mutual funds Pension funds invest. l ! 
Ln (market value) 0.948 1.406 0.785 0.662 1.171 
(z*= 8.44) (z*= 5.93) (z*= 7.64) (z*= 5.70) (z*= 10.82) 
One-year total retUrl1 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 
(z***= -1.66) (z* *= -1.66) (z**= -2.44) (z= -1.20) (z*= -4.22) 
Returl1 on equity 
Free cash flow/assets 
Total liability/assets 
Long term debtlassets 0.013 0.020 0.024 0.021 0.018 
(z= 1.05) (z= 0.67) (z***= 1.84) (z***= 1.93) (z**= 2.00) 
KLD rating -0.518 -3.982 -2.444 -1.507 -2.826 
(z*= -1. 17) (z*= -2.82) (z*=-3.12) (z**= -2.17) (z*= -5.29) 
Constant -8.73 -13.15 -6.57 -5.535981 -10.82 
(z*=-7.11) (z*=-5.12) (z*= -6.40) (z*= -5. (5) (z*= -9.87) 
No. of observations 344 136 320 231 568 
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.469 0.213 0.186 0.321 
*, **, *** significant at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
1/ Excludes church-based pension funds. 
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Table 5: (cont.) 
Model3 
Indiv. Religious 
investors Advoc. groups Mutual funds Pension funds invest.lt 
Ln (market value) 1.079 1,275 0,722 0,748 1,262 
(z*= 7.56) (z*= 6,86) (z*= 7,11) (z*= 5,84) (z*= 9,44 ) 
One-year total return 
Return on equity 
Free cash flow/assets -0.0529914 -0,000767 -0,0055199 -0,0123384 -0,05081 
(z=-1.41) (z= -0,02) (z*= -0,37) (z= -0,53) (z**= -2,25) 
Total liability/assets 0.013 0,008 0,0 Il 0,015 0,044 
(z= 1.18) (z= 0,44) (z***= 1,88) (z***= 1,88) (z*= 5,10) 
Long term debtlassets 
KLD rating 0.220 -3,947 -2,473 -0,495 -2,141 
(z= 0.44) (z*= -2,66) (z*= -2,90) (z= -0,64) (z*= -3.83) 
Constant -10.40 -12,08 -6,34 -6,56 -13,88 
(z*= -6.56) (z*= -5,55) (z*= -6,26) (z*= -5,47) (z* = -8,51) 
No. of observations 262 124 293 203 494 
Pseudo R2 0.339 0,450 0,194 0,207 0,385 
*, **, ~'** significant at 99%,95% and 90% respectively. 
1/ ExcJudes church-based pension funds. 
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Table 5: (cout.) 
Model4 
Indiv. Religious 
investors Advoc. groups Mutual funds Pension funds invest.l/ 
Ln (market value) 1.131 1,293 0,732 0,790 1,142 
(z*= 7.49) (z* = 6,62) (z*= 5,28) (z*= 6,08) (z*= 10,72) 
One-year total return 
Return on equity 
Free cash flow/assets -0.066 -0,005 -0,009 -0,018 -0,078 
(z***= -1.89) (z= -0,13) (z= -0,50) (z= -0,70) (z*= -3,82) 
Total liabil ity/assets 
Long term debt/assets 0.012 0,012 0,019 0,030 0,012 
(z= 0.83) (z=0,41) (z= l,3O) (z**= 2,39) (z=I,19) 
KLD rating 0.268 -3,829 -2,246 -0,415 -2,293 
(z=0.51) (z*= -2,64) (z*=-2,81) (z= -0.53) (z*=-4,08) 
Constant -10.21 -12,01 -6,09 -6,61 -10,11 
(z*= -6.63) (z*= -5,46) (z*= -4,44) (z*= -5,70) (z= -9,46) 
No. of observations 262 124 293 203 494 
Pseudo R2 0.336 0,450 0,190 0,223 0,322 
*, **, *** significant at99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
1/ Excludes church-based pension funds. 
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Table 5: (cont.) 
Model5 
Indiv. Religious 
investors Advoc. groups Mutual funds Pension funds invest.lt 
Ln (market value) 0.905 1.418 0.750 0.634 1.161 
(z*= 9.00) (z= 6.06) (z= 7.11) (z*= 5.40) (z*= 9.81) 
One-year total return 
Return on equity -0.001 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.006 
(z= -1.32) (z= 1.12) (z* **= 1.65) (z= 1.34) (z= 1.19) 
Free cash flow/assets 
Total liability/assets 0.0110888 -0.0028842 -0.0076141 0.0071048 0.0349857 
(z= 1.3 0) (z= -0.18) (z= -0.99) (z= 0.86) (z*= 5.41) 
Long term debtlassets 
KLD rating -0.749 -5.424 -2.835 -1.591 -3.306 
(z***= -1.74) (z*= -3.42) (z*= -3.40) (z**= -2.11) (z*= -5.66) 
Constant -8.86 -13.05 -5.65 -5.45 -12.86 
(z= -7.65) (z= -5.48) (z*= -6.06) (z*= -4.78) (z= -9.42) 
No. of observations 339 133 316 225 558 
Pseudo R2 0.268 0.481 0.206 0.179 0.353 
*, **, *** significant at 99%,95% and 90% respectively. 
li Excludes church-based pension funds. 
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Table 5: (cont.) 
Model6 
Indiv. Religious 
investors Advoc. groups Mutual funds Pension funds invest. l ! 
Ln (market value) 0.965 1.447 0.786 0.653 1.102 
(z*=8.21) (z*= 5.57) (z*= 7.52) (z*=5.61) (z*= 10.64) 
One-year total return 
Return on equity -0.001 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.007 
(z=-1.33) (z= 1.03) (z= 1.28) (z= 1.28) (z= 1.34) 
Free cash flow/assets 
Total liability/assets 
Long tenn debt/assets 0.015 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.018 
(z= 1.19) (z= 0.90) (z**= 2.39) (z**= 2.42) (z**= 1.91) 
KLD rating -0.665 -4.880 -2.466 -1.428 -3.157 
(z=-1.51) (z*= -3.06) (z*= -2.83) (z* *= -1.92) (z*= -5.49) 
Constant -8.96 -14.00 -6.86 -5.76 -10.43 
(z*= -6.94) (z*= -4.94) (z*= -6.87) (z*= -5.30) (z= -9.73) 
No. of observations 339 133 316 225 558 
Pseudo R2 0.267 0.487 0.218 0.198 0.315 
*, **, *** significant at 99%,95% and 90% respectively. 
11 Excludes church-based pension funds. 
APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: Categories of issues raised in social policy shareholder resolutions 
Category/description Examples of action requests 
Abortion, contraception, and commercial Endorse Pro Vita principles 
and research use of foetuses. Seek to limit or Disclose giving to pro-abortion political parties 
terminate corporation's involvement ln Discontinue research using human foetal tissue 
contraceptive products and/or use of human Don't buy or use human foetuses 
foetuses in research or productive activities, or 
any form of perceived support for groups, 
politicaJ parties or countries that promote 
abortion and/or contraception rights. 
Animal rights. Seek to promote, in general, a Adopt anti-vivisection policy 
better treatment of animaIs in corporations' Review animal welfare standards 
research and productive activities, or the ban Stop animal testing not required by law 
or strict limitation of using animaIs in those Use non-animal test methods 
activities, particularly for testing products or 
methods. 
Board diversity. Seek to enhance diversity of Commit to/repOli on board diversity 
corporate boards, 111 tenns of an increased Increase efforts to diversify board 
presence of women, ethnie minorities, and to a Union member on the board 
lesser extent, union members. 
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Charitable giving. These proposaIs are 
related to termination, limitation, regulation of 
charitable donations (including calls to make 
cllaritable contributions subject to shareholder 
approval, or making donations for particuJar or 
unidentified groups). ProposaIs related to 
giving to political parties are included 111 
Involvement in Partisan Poli tics. Those 
calling for termination of donations to pro­
abortion groups or political parties or 
candidates are included under Abortion, 
contraception, and commercial and 
research use of foetuses. 
Corporate welfare and governmelltal links. 
Seek to encourage corporations to report to 
shareholders on tax burden and/or subsidies 
received from government. 
Corruption. Seek to constraint or eliminate 
possible corporate involvement III illegal 
activities, such as fraud, money laundering; 
and/or to enhance respect of an ethical code. 
Energy and environment. Seek to enhance 
the environmental performance of the firm. 
This category excludes proxies that seek to 
tmprove simultaneously corporations' 
environ mental performance and respect of 
other local or indigenous' communities rights. 
Disclose charitable contributions 
Don't make charitable donations 
shareholders vote on donations over $ 10,000 
stop support for NPR 
Include tax burden figures in annual report 
Repol1 on corporate tax benefits and subsidies 
Adopt policy against money Jaundering 
Form committee to oversee anti-fraud 
compliance 
Report on "conflicts of interest" legal 
compliance 
Repol1 on ethics policy and record 
no financial aid for convicted executives 
Clean up toxic waste sites 
Conduct annual pollution prevention review 
Develop energy efficiency plans 
Endorse CERES principles 
Repol1 on old growth logging policy 
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Equal employment. Seek to promote 
discrimination-free workplace environments, 
which may prevent certain groups of people to 
obtain employment in the corporation or to get 
access to equal opportunities of promotion or 
benefits, as a consequence of their gender 
identity, ethnicity, religious confession, sexual 
orientation, or age. 
Ethnie or nationality-based discrimination. 
Seek to eliminate corporate actions, outside the 
workplace that may be perceived as promoting 
discriminatory attitudes against celtain groups 
in society. 
Fairness in society. This category involves a 
vast array of proposais seeking to promote 
corporate policies that are consistent with 
fairer access to wealth and well-being for 
disadvantage groups or communities, at 
domestic or international levels. Calls to 
corporations to adopt anti-globalization 
initiatives are included in this category, at it is 
frequently argued by the promoters of these 
proposais that globalization can be linked with 
negative impacts for workers, pOOl' people and 
disadvantaged communities. 
Family/conservative values. Proxies seeking 
to engage corporations (particularly those in 
the media industries) to promote family­
centered values; exclude depiction of explicit 
sexuality or alternative lifestyles. 
Adopt sexual orientation anti-bias policy 
Extend benefits to domestic partners 
Improve hiring and promotion of minorities 
Increase minority representation 
management 
Guard against negative images in marketing 
NBC should comply with TV Code on ethnic 
material 
Report on using only non-racist 
logos/trademarks 
Stop TV stereotypes of Polish-Americans 
Adopt fair lending pol icy in emerging markets 
Adopt social guidelines regarding deregulation 
Adopt strict criteria for emerging market loans 
Ask DüA to set raw milk "floor price safety 
net" 
Become industry leader on fair lending 
Comply globally with community investment 
act 
Create plant closings committee 
Returt1 to family values 
Don't l'un ads that offend heterosexuals 
No favourable portrayal of illicit sex on TV 
Prohibit unbiblical programming 
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Guo production/distdbution. Seek to 
term inate corporate involvement in production 
or marketing of guns, which are not conceived 
primarily for military purposes. 
Histo"ical violations of human rights. Seek 
to involve corporation in redressing historical 
grievances to human rights, whether related to 
its past business activities or not. 
Human health issues. Proxies seeking to 
promote corporate invoJvement in initiatives 
that improve access to healthcare or healthier 
products or working environments at domestic 
and international levels. 
Don't sell guns in company's stores 
Report on steps against gun violence 
Divest from firms in former Axis countries 
No services to Swiss pending Holocaust 
settlement 
Adopt drug accessibility policy 
Adopt drug price restraint policy 
Consider supporting national health care 
Develop ethical criteria for patent extension 
Disclose countries/guidelines for c1inical trials 
Make AlDS drugs available in pOOl' countries 
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International labour and human rights. 
Seek corporate adoption of higher standards of 
conduct regarding respect of human rights and 
workers' rights at the international level. The 
category's proxles are meant to terminate 
corporate partnerships with governments or 
groups that aUegedly are linked at the moment 
of the proxy filing, to human or labour rights' 
violation at the international level. ProposaIs 
linked to historic (i.e. non-contemporary) 
events of human rights violations, implying or 
not the targeted firm are c1assified elsewhere. 
The present category concerns also the 
adoption of standards conceived to eliminate 
rel igious discrimination against workers 111 
company CaUs to divest or pullout activities 
from paliicular countries (for unspecified 
reasons, but where accusations of human rights 
violations have been detected) are included 111 
this category. 
Involvement in partisan poli tics. Seek: to 
limit or terminate corporate involvement 111 
partisan politics or political activity. When 
specifie partisan positions on controversial 
issues are targeted (Iike halting donations to 
pro-choice paliies, for instance) proposais are 
classified in the category that is closest to the 
issue (Abortion, Tobacco, etc). 
Involvement in the military and national 
security issues. Seek: to reduce or stop 
corporate involvement in defense, or celiain 
types of defense projects, such as baIl istic 
missiles or space weapons. 
Adopt code of conduct for China operations 
Implement ILü standards and third party 
monitoring 
Implement McBride principles 
Report on maquiJadora operations 
Suspend payments to Indonesian military 
Affirm political non-partisanship 
Create/report on pol itical contribution 
guidelines 
Disclose political contributions in newspapers 
DiscJose prior government service 
Develop military contracting criteria 
Repoli on foreign offset agreements 
Report on space weapons 
Stop producing nuclear weapons 
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Local or Indigenous Community Rights. 
Include the right to a healthy environ ment, 
particularly ln the case of energy-based 
projects, respect of ancestral lands and respect 
of fair compensation to local or indigenous 
communities. Proxies addressing the issue of 
human rights violations are included under 
International Labor and Human Rights. 
Pornography. Proxies seeking to 
terminate/limit corporate involvement 111 
production/distribution of pornography 
Product or service quality, safety and/or 
reliability. Seek to assure that products or 
services sold by the corporation, or support 
activities such as R&D meet higher standards 
of quality, reliability and safety. 
Restriction or removal of equal employment 
practices. Seek to reverse corporate pol icies 
intended to provide benefits for domestic 
partners of workers; to protect homosexual 
workers, or to support affirmative action 
programs 
Tobacco issues. CaH tobacco-based 
corporations to discourage smoking among 
paliicular groups; to increase awareness about 
risks associated to smoking; and to eliminate 
practices or add itives that make tobacco to 
increase presumed risks to consumers' health. 
Proposais cali ing non-tobacco-based 
corporations to divest from tobacco firms are 
included in this category. 
Conduct risk analysis of developing tribal land 
Limit use of Hopi water supply 
Obtain power supply without harming Cree 
Review Chad-Cameroon pipeline project 
Review social criteria in financial ventures 
Report on sites' impact on indigenous peoples 
Adopt bylaw to eliminate adult entertainment 
Report on involvement 111 pornography 
industry 
Stop marketing pornograplw 
Create safety policy and repoli 
Ensure customer privacy 
Report on train safety program 
Don't extend benefits to domestic paliners 
Drop sexual orientation from EEO policy 
Issue statements opposing affirmative action 
End employee benefits for gay partners 
Compensate tobacco disease victims 
Apply US prevention programs to aIl youth 
Discourage smoking by pregnant women 
Discourage youth smoking ln developing 
countries 
Divest tobacco holdings 
Link exec. pay to reduction in teen tobacco use 
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Workplace issues. Proxies seeking to protect Adopt employee bill of rights 
workers rights at the domestic level. This Ailow workers one hour for lunch 
category excludes proxies seeking to redress Take steps against workplace violence 
inequalities confronted by particu lar groups Take steps to resolve disputes with AFL-Clü 
(regrouped under Equal Employment) 
Other Adopt due process review for NBC 
Bar Japanese horse owners from races 
Appendix 2 : Categories of filers 
Category of filer Description and or examples 
Advocacy group Groups or NGOs, promoting the advancement 
of particular (often single) causes. Ex. Global 
Exchange, Friends of the Earth, GE 
Stockholders Alliance, Pride Foundation, 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animais. 
Asset manager/advisor Company offering financial services, but not 
identified as a socially-screened mutual fund in 
the 2003 Report on SRI Trends. Ex. 
Harrington Investments, Christian Brothers 
investment Services, Mercy Consolidated 
Asset Management, Northstar, Boston CAM, 
Progressive Asset Manager. 
Cburch-based pension fund Pension fund created for employees of a 
specifie church. Ex. Brethren Benefit Trust, 
General Board of Pension and Health Benefits 
of the United Methodist Church. 
Individual Any filer identified by family name and 
initiais. This category includes "gadfly" 
activists, such as Evelyn Davis. 
Mutual fund (socially-screened) Socially-screened mutual funds, included 111 
the 2003 repoli on SRI Trends. Ex. Domini, 
Calvert, Catholic Funds, Walden, MMA 
Praxis, Trillium, Green Century, LongView, 
Ethical Funds, Citizens Funds. 
Mutual fund (conventionaJ) Ex. Tocqueville Gold Fund. 
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Public pension fund 
Religious investor 
Trade union 
Trade union-based pension fund 
University 
Pension funds operated by city or state 
governments. Ex. New York City funds, such 
as New York City Employees' Retirement 
System (NYCTRS, Teachers' Retirement 
System (TRS), New York City Police Pension 
Fund, New York City Fire Department Pension 
Fund and Board Education retirement System 
(BEARS). Other examples in the category are 
the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds, the Minnesota State Board of 
Investment and the New York State Common 
Retirement Fund. 
Religious orders or religious-based healthcare 
or educational organizations, as weil as the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 
(ICCR) are included ln the category. Ex. 
Catholic Healthcare West, School Sisters of 
Notre Dame, Sisters of Loretto, Mercy 
Investment. 
Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), Communication Workers of America 
(CWA), American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees. (AFSCME), PACE 
Workers, Teamsters, International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers (IBEW), Hotel 
Employees and Restaurant Employees 
(HERE), AFL-CIO, Du Pont Workers, 
Carpenters. 
Central Laborers' Fund. 
Swarthmore. 
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Abstract 
We examine sbareholder initiated social policy proposaIs' capacity to exert pressure on 
management and to adopt the suggested changes in policy. We show that social proposais, filed 
under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)'s Rule 14 a-8, have a more limited 
capacity to change corporate social policy that it has been previously reported. However, the 
capacity to exert pressure on firms can be substantially higher for some types of filers, notably 
pension funds and mutual funds. The analysis also suggests that the capacity to influence 
management is higher for some types of issues presented in the resolution, su ch as those related to 
board diversity, energy and environment, and international labor and human rights. We also 
provide suggestions explaining why shareholder activism is a persistent practice despite its 
limited results. 
Key words: Corporate governance, social policy shareholder activism, corporate social 
responsibility 
Résumé 
Nous examinons la capacité des résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social d'influencer les 
dirigeants afin qu'ils adoptent les changements suggérés dans la politique sociale des firmes. 
Nous montrons que les résolutions à caractère social qui sont soumisses dans le cadre de la Règle 
14a-8 de la Commission des valeurs mobilières des États-unis (SEC), ont une capacité de changer 
la politique sociale des firmes plus limitée que celle que suggèrent les reports disponibles dans la 
littérature. Néanmoins, la capacité d'influencer les firmes peut être substantiellement plus élevée 
dans les cas de certains acteurs, notamment les fonds de retraite et les fonds communs de 
placement. Notre analyse suggère aussi que la capacité d'influencer les dirigeants est plus élevée 
dans le cas de celiains types de sujets présentés dans les résolutions, comme par exemple ceux 
reliés à la diversité dans le conseil d'administration, l'énergie et l'environnement, et les droits 
internationaux de la personne et du travail. Nous présentons également certaines propositions 
pour expliquer pourquoi l'activisme de l'actionnariat est une pratique persistante, malgré ses 
résultats limités. 
Mots clés: Gouvernance de l'entreprise, activisme de l'actionnaire à caractère social, 
responsabi 1ité sociale de J'entreprise 
Introduction 
Dissatisfied investors and other stakeholders, offinns with a poor financial or social performance, 
make use of a number of tools to make managers change their course. They can threaten firms to 
boycott them in their capital or product markets, and go ahead with the menace if there is no 
affirmative response from leaders of the concerned organization; they can also communicate 
about the apprehension to managers in behind-the scene conversations; target the firm with letter 
campaigns; release damaging information to the media; lobby governments to endorse legislation, 
or initiate lawsuits (Hoffman 1999; Bansal 2000; Manheim 2001; den Hond and de Bakker 2007). 
In analyzing the capacity of investors and other stakeholders to promote corporate change, we 
deal with a particular mechanism to voice concerns. The so-called Rule 14 a-8, enacted in 1942 
by the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), allows shareholders under 
certain circumstances, to file non-binding, succinct resoJutions (a Iso referred to as proxies or 
proposais) that should be included in the proxy materials of the firm to be voted in by 
shareholders. 
The purpose of this study is to examine who makes use of the Rule to promote a course of action 
in corporate social responsibility (CSR)'s policy of companies, what kind of issues are promoted, 
and with what degree of success. In doing so, we contribute empirically to the understanding of 
how shareholder activism is an influential factor of corporate social change activities. Throughout 
the period we examined (1997-2004), firms in the United States received nearly 300 social policy 
shareholder resolutions per year. These proxies summoned companies to adopt a very wide range 
of actions, such as making their boards more diverse, adopting the standards of the International 
Labor Organization in their international operations, forcing their suppl iers abroad to respect 
those standards in their operations and to secure independent monitoring of the compliance. 
Some other proposais also called upon management to avoid discriminating against employees 
because of sexual orientation or to prepare and disseminate reports on the environmental impact 
of their firms' operations, not to mention the requests to pull out from certain countries where 
massive violations of human rights are suspected. In 1952 the SEC gave management the power 
ta exclude proposaIs made "primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, 
racial, religious, social or similar causes" (Ryan 1998: 114). This exclusion dates at least from 
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1948 when the company Greyhound excluded a proposaI to desegregate its buses on the grounds 
that it was not a "proper subject" (Proffitt and Spicer, 2006). The SEC fonnally reversed its 
decision to allow the exclusion of social proxies in 1976, although it has been in practice allowing 
such resolutions to get into proxy materials from early 1970s, when the Medical Committee for 
Human Rights obtained in court the possibility to file a shareholder proposai at Dow Chemical, 
requesting the manufacturer to stop producing napalm for military use in Vietnam (Ryan, 1988; 
Vogel, 1978). 
Since then, reflecting changes in public perception of the role of corporations, social proxies are 
part of the corporate landscape, as the nearly 300 social proxies received by US companies during 
1997-2004 can attest and it certainly does not seem likely that it would return to the times when 
these types of issues were routinely excluded from proxy materials by the SEC. On the contrary, 
the rise of socially responsible investing (SRI) in the United States and Canada, will probably 
reinforce the use of the proxy machinery to advance social causes. What is more, in 2007 
impoliant public pension funds and other institutions have signed the United Nations Principles 
for Responsible Investment, an international protocol for institutional managers pledging to adopt 
responsible investment policies and practices. Adherence to these guidelines is believed to 
increase awareness of SRI tools such as proxy voting (Social Investment Forum, 2005; Social 
Investment Organization, 2007). 
Understanding the capacity of filers of social policy resolutions is critical for tluee reasons. 
Firstly, many of the corporate actions promoted by means of these resolutions are of major 
concern for company decision making. Orlitzky et al. (2003) aggregated results of 52 studies, 
employing meta-analytic techniques and found that CSR, in particular environmental 
responsibiJity, is likely to pay off. It is important to recall to this effect that the proposai received 
by Dow Chemical in 1970 not on ly addressed an ethical problem for a portion of Dow's 
shareholders: the company trumpeted at the time that it was continuing production out of patriotic 
duty, in spite of incurring financial losses as a consequence (Ryan 1988, footnote 76). Thus, 
social policy resolution filing can be synonymous ofbetter financial performance of the firm, and 
not a hindrance to it. Furthermore, Spicer (1978) proposed that low-CSR companies can be riskier 
investments, the risk arising from adverse regulatory or legislative actions, judicial decisions, or 
from consumer retaliation. Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001), lIsing meta-analytical techniques found 
empirical support for the view that corporate social performance has a negative relationship with 
risk. Second ly, previous literature suggests that boycotting finns in capital markets can have 
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limited results in terms of reforming poor social performance. If so, voicing dissatisfaction cou Id 
be an interesting possibility for socially concerned shareholders who want to promote better 
social performance in the companies they own. Angel and Rivoli (1997), Heinkel et al. (2001), 
and Teoh et al. (1999) have suggested that divesting firms perceived as socially irresponsible by a 
fraction of its shareholders' base can only engender limited consequences in terms of capital costs 
for targeted firms. Davidson et al. (1995) concluded that divestments have a very limited capacity 
to impact market valuations of firms, while financial markets tend to react to announcements of 
boycotts in the firms' product markets. 
Thirdly, previous research on the use of the Rule 14 a-8 focuses on shareholder attempts to 
reform mechanisms of corporate governance aimed at improving financial performance of firms, 
such as those related to the external control of the corporation, like repealing the adoption of anti­
takeover devices. This literature has been surveyed by Karpoff (1998) and Gillan and Starks 
(1998). On the contrary, the subject of our paper has only attracted a limited attention from 
researchers. We expand knowledge accumulated so far, by proposing a more thorough approach 
in measuring the capacity of filers of social policy to induce changes in corporate policy. Our 
analysis suggests that filing social policy resolutions has a much more limited capacity to exert 
pressure on managers than Proffitt and Spicer (2006), and Tkac (2006) suggest, not to mention 
the heightened capacity exhibited by some large institutional investors to influence management 
of firms to adopt measures envisaged to accrue targeted flr1ns' financial performance (Carleton et 
al., 1998; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996). 
Rule 14a-8 and filing of social proxies 
Investors in the United States are entitled by the SECs Rule 14a-8 to submit proposais for 
inclusion in the proxy materials of the firm, at no cost to them and for subsequent presentation at 
the annual general meeting. If such resolutions are properly presented at the annual general 
meeting, they will be voted on (Ryan, 1988). In 1952, the SEC amended the rule to permit 
management to exclude proposaIs made primarily for the purpose of promoting general 
economic, racial, religious, social or similar causes. This policy was later amended as a 
consequence of the emergence of the social movements in the 1960s and 1970s which mirrored in 
public corporations' life. The decision to allow social policy proposais into proxy materials was 
later codified in a 1976 reform of the rule (Ryan, 1988). 
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The rule limits the number of proposaIs that a shareholder may submit (one pel' firm in his or her 
portfolio) and provides that these submissions must be timely and succinct, in order to avoid 
interference with management's own solicitation. The rule provides that management may refuse 
to incJude certain types of proposais. If the SEC concurs with the fi fin , a proposai can be 
excluded from the proxy materials sent to shareholders. There are thilteen grounds for exclusion 
of a proposaI, one frequently cited is that a proposai dealing with substantially the same subject 
matter has been included in the proxy materials during the last 5 five years and that it failed to 
pass the required voting thresholds: 3 percent of the vote if it has been incl uded once; 6 percent if 
it has been included twice; and 10 percent if it has been included three or more times (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2001). 
These restrictions and other factors favor management in the operation of the rule. For instance, 
the typical rule 14a-8 proposai is precatory in nature (Ryan, 1988). Even if a proposai receives 
more than 50 percent of the votes, management may decide not to implement it, the only general 
exception being binding bylaw amendments (Brownstein and Kirman, 2004). Davis and 
Thompson (1994) point out a number of other factors favoring management in the operation of 
the proxy machinery. However, the importance of sharehoJder proposais shall not be 
underestimated. Ryan observed that by means of proposais, shareholders can put management on 
notice of their expectations. Moreover, unlike other sources of information available to 
management, shareholder proposais are infrequent and harder to overlook or misinterpret. 
Discussion of literature: Outcome of sharehoider-initiated proposaIs and definition 
of success 
Silarehoider initiated proposais have basically three possible outcomes: they can be voted by 
shareholders, i.e. be present in the proxy materials forwarded to them by management for the 
annual general meeti ng of the company; they can be withdrawn by the shareholder, therefore 
placing them outside the consideration of shareholders; or be omitted by the regulator, i.e. the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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This paper's main objective is to shed light on the capacity of activist shareholders to induce 
changes in corporate social policy. Thus, what can be said of the possible outcome in terms of 
adoption of suggested policies? 
Voted proposais, given the non-binding nature of the Rule 14a-8 are not necessarily conducive to 
any sort of changes in corporate policy. Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) sustain in fact that 
proposais being submitted to vote._ represent a failure in negotiations and are those that the 
manager believes will not receive widespread support from shareholders. Omitted proposaIs, for 
their part, are a clear forlll of failure, whatever the reason that SUPPOltS the exclusion. In this case, 
management doesn 't have to negotiate any withdrawal with filers, and stockowners don't even 
have to vote on the issue. 
Less clear is the case of withdrawal resolutions. Observers tend to connect withdrawal, almost 
automatically, with resolution success. Tkac (2006: 13) for instance, indicates that "( ... ) a 
withdrawal resolution usually signs some type of action on the part of the corporation ­
dialogue, agreement to resolution, or some other compromise. Withdrawal can be viewed as 
indicating some level of success." She searched for information about the 859 withdrawn 
proposais in her database, by means of websites of proponents and firms, Google searches, 
newspapers databases and direct contact with proposa] sponsors. Although Tkac found 
information only about 298 of the withdrawn proposals,8 she concludes that "( ... ) 30 percent, the 
percentage of withdrawn proposais in the entire data set, is a reasonable lower bound on the rate 
of success of socially responsible shareholder activists." (Tkac, 2006: 17). Proffitt and Spicer 
(2006), although focusing on the long term impact of a particular type of proposais, estimated 
success as the percentage of proposais withdrawn plus those voted and receiving more than 10 
percent of votes. 
For a number of reasons, we are at odds with Tkac's proposition on the quasi-equivalence of 
withdrawal with success. Chidambaram and Woidtke (1999) have noted that a larger percentage 
of social issue proposais is withdrawn vis-à-vis those dealing with corporate governance. In fact, 
43,5 percent of social poJicy proposais in their sample were withdrawn, but only in I7,6 percent 
8 rn 79 percent of the 298 withdrawn resolulions for which follow-up information was obtained by Tkac, the final 
outcome was a concrete action on the part of the firm. Another 19 percent of the resolutions resulted in dialogue 
between acti vists and the firll1 without any commitment to action on the part of the later. 
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of those related to corporate governance did their sponsors agree to do so. This higher rate, the 
authors c1aim, might reflect the fact that social proposais are less costly for the manager to accept. 
They also suggest, following Campbell et al. (1999) that this higher withdrawal rate could result 
from social policy proposais calling, in some cases, for policies that are already in place. 
We do not find Chidambaran and Woidtke explanation satisfactory. In fact, prima facie many 
requests contained in social policy shareholder proposais could be considered expensive, as they 
may imply considerable changes in technology for the involved firms, or other key aspects of the 
business operation. This is the case, for instance, of companies in the manufacturing and energy 
sectors receiving requests to reduce their levels of carbon emissions, or pharmaceutical 
campanies facing demands to voluntarily shorten the lifespan of the patents they hold, or to 
reduce the price of the anti-HIV drugs that they produce and market, requests that arrive very 
often to finns in our sample. On the other hand, we found just a few cases where management of 
a targeted finn contended that the requested policy was already in place. Therefore, we hint that 
withdrawal rates must be higher in social policy filing than in corporate governance as a result of 
filers' attempt to avoid failure, ifthey anticipate very Iow SUPPOlt from other investors. 
Other aspects of the operation of the Rule 14-a motivate us to raise serious questions about the 
passibility to consider ail withdrawals as successes. There are reasons to believe that in many 
cases filers may anticipate extremely low levels of vote for the resolutions that they have 
presented to the companies. These anticipations can be built while filers lobby major institutional 
and individual shareholders of the companies that they approach during the time that elapses 
(months in many cases) beh-veen the filing of the resolution and the actual moment of the annua! 
general assembly of the company. If proponents have a tendency "to trumpet successes and hide 
failures" as Tkac acknowledges, we must question ourselves about the meaning of proposaIs that 
have been withdrawn for ignored reasons. We hypothesize that this type of withdrawals reflects 
rather a failure in negotiations and anticipation by filers of very poor vote turnovers, something 
that leads them to withdraw unilaterally their resolutions. In fact, akin to managers who foresee a 
large turnover that may affect their reputation and capacity to react, some filers act pre-emptively 
and withdraw before the actual vote takes place. Therefore, these withdrawals are in alllikelihood 
an indication offailure. Our analysis, as we discuss more in detail later on, gives SUPPOlt for this 
passibility. The more impoltant group of filers for which no information is available on their 
withdrawals, exhibit, by large, more cases of proposaIs not attaining the minimum levels required 
far resubmission. 
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There is support as weil in previous literature to the view that social proxies gather considerably 
less vote turnovers than corporate governance, making them more vulnerable for being unable to 
resubmit in subsequent years the same resolution. Campbell et al. (1999) while studying the 1997 
proxy season, report that corporate governance proposais generally received a level of support 
with an average of 23.6 percent of the votes cast in favor vis-à-vis 6.6 percent for social policy 
proposa ls (medians were 19.4 percent and 6.1 percent respectively). Under these cond itions, filers 
of social proposais facing managers who are unwilling to compromise may be fearful of obtaining 
vote turnovers lower than those needed for resubmission, an outcome which filers of corporate 
governance resolutions can easily avoid. 
There is also the possibility that social policy filers confront a greater likelihood of having their 
proposais omitted by the regulator, vis-à-vis filers of corporate governance proposais. Campbell 
et al. (op. cit.) found that 34.1 percent of social policy proposais were omitted in 1997, in contrast 
with only 22.3 percent in the case of corporate governance. Furthermore, Graves et al. (2001) 
argue that shareholder activism follows fads and fashions, with new issues coming to the proxy 
machinery, while others loose their importance. New issues that sometimes can be contentious 
may imply a greater possibility of omission than the more established patterns that one can 
assume in the corporate governance resolution filing activity. 
In summary, in our view, activist shareholders may withdraw some resolutions unilaterally, 
without disseminating information about the fact that their resolutions confronted blatant fonns of 
failure. We also argue that these activist stockholders may accept minimum gestures of 
management, in exchange of withdrawing their resolutions. Most notably, they can accept, and 
publicize the opening of dialogue with firms, on the grounds that it constitutes a positive step and 
it leads to potential changes in corporate behavior, a possibility defended by Proffitt and Spicer 
(2006). We also unearth examples showing that some firms in our sample are targeted repeated Iy 
with the foreseeable outcome of withdrawal in exchange of dialogue. Counting each one of these 
withdrawals as a "success" will lead us to overestimate the efficacy of filing resolutions as a 
mechanism to promote change in corporate social policy at a given time. Thus, we prefer to treat 
differently these withdrawals and those leading to actual changes in corporate policy. 
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Data sources 
In order to analyze the effectiveness of social policy shareholder proposaI filing, we have created 
a database. In a first step, we put together aIl social policy shareholder initiated proposaIs 
received by firms in the United States during the 1997-2004 years. These proposais (a total of 
2,310) were retrieved from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)'s yearly 
publication Social Policy Shareholder Resolutions. For each proposai, IRRC provides a checklist, 
containing the name of the company; the summarized title of the resolution; the sponsor's name; 
as weil as the status of the resolution, i.e. withdrawn, omitted, not in proxy or voted (in this later 
case, turnover is reported in percentage of shares). The publication also contains additional 
information and analysis about an impOliant number of proposai withdrawals, omissions and vote 
tallies. 
In a second step, the abovementioned information was complemented. First, a number of sources 
were used to establish the outcome of negotiations for each withdrawn proposaI. We visited the 
websites of filers and targeted companies and we also used Google searches and the data base 
ABI/Inform in order to collect information on the outcome of the negotiations Jeading to 
withdrawals. 
On the basis of the information compiled throughout these sources, we assigned a code to each 
withdrawn proposai, according to the types of outcome of the withdrawn proposaI. Thus, a first 
code was assigned to proposais that were withdrawn in exchange of implementation of the 
request (i.e. what we labeled as 'successes'), another code was given to those that were 
withdrawn in exchange of actions other than those requested or because management has agreed 
ta initiate a dialogue with the sponsor of the proposai ('dialogue'); a third code was applied to 
those proposais for which the IRRC explicitly reported that the filer wanted to avoid likely 
olnission by the regulator; another to those proposais that were withdrawn because the targeted 
company merged or it was acquired since the proposaI was filed; and finally, a separate code went 
ta the proposais that have been withdrawn in recognition that the requested policy was already in 
place. 
It is important to highlight that we have no possibility to check out effective implementation of 
the request. We assigned a code for the outcome of the negotiation according to the results 
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reported in the press or in the internet. In some cases, filers of withdrawn proposais labeled them 
as successful, without adding any other additionaI information. If the information of the 
withdrawal was published by the filer of the resolution, and if it does not distinguish 
systematically between withdrawals motivated by dialogue, from those motivated by effective 
implementation of the requested policy, we Iabeled the withdrawaI as motivated by dialogue. 
Codes were also assigned to the different categories of filers and issues that were developed 
following an inductive approach. 
Can social policy proposaI filing change corporate behavior? Discussion of results 
Targeting repeatedly large firms 
An examination of our sample suggests that filers tend to repeatedly target large corporations. A 
number of reasons may contribute to expiain this behavior. First, large firms control global brands 
and thus, they can be wary of possible threats to their reputation that may even further evolve into 
organized boycotts. Secondly, large firms cou Id be more visible. Activists may target those firms 
to l'aise awareness about a specifie social cause (Rehbein et al., 2004). Thirdly, Rehbein et al. also 
claim that larger firms are more likely to have more complex operations and possibly be involved 
in more lines of business, making them more socially vulnerable. Jt is possible to reason as weIl 
that targeting very large firms, presumably the leaders in their industry may also facilitate 
spillover effects in corporate social policy. Other players in the same industry may decide to 
follow the leader adopting the new practice, or bigger firms may lobby governments seeking 
changes in regulation. 
As Table 1 shows, 19 firms were targeted 20 or more times during the years 1997-2004. AlI 
together, these firms received 558 proposais, i.e. almost one in four of the total 2310 proposais 
filed during the period. With the exception of Unocal and RJR Nabisco, two firms that are no 
longer distinct entities, ail 19 most targeted firms were included in the index Standard & Poor's 
500 as of August, 2007.9 A group of 32 other companies was targeted between 10 and 19 times. 
9 ln preparing Table l we tracked name changes of firms using the database ABl/lnform. We added the proposaIs 
received by a firm and its Sllccessor, if there is a change of name in the company. 1n case of takeover or merge, we add 
the number of proposais of the resulting new firIn to those received by the firIn that figures tirst in the new name or that 
prevailed in the name. 
82 
Many of these companies are household names in the United States and in many cases; they also 
belong to the S&P 500. Among them, we found companies such as McDonald's, Procter & 
Gambie, PepsiCo and Caterpillar. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
From the environment to human rights: Requests are varied but heavily concentrated 
Demands contained in social policy proposais are varied, and evolving over time. Table 2 
presents the number of proxies appettaining to each category of requests that we have created 
inductively to classify the 2310 proxies under observation. We started with a set of categories 
proposed by Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) and we expanded them in order to define 
categories for social issues for each of the 2310 proxies. In the end, we created 23 categories of 
issues (see Table 2). Iwo facts are striking about the type of requests received by companies. 
First, they can be extrel11eJy varied, as the number of categories attests. Firms, for instance, are 
requested to advance actions as diverse as protecting animal rights, encouraging diversity in the 
board room, or to respect local or indigenous rights. Secondly, in spite of this diversity, the 
demands concentrate in a few big items. Roughly one in four proxies (Energy & Environment) 
seeks to better up the environmental petformance of firms, requesting the companies to better 
repolting on the environmental impact of their operations, or to abandon projects that are deemed 
extremely dangerous for ecosystems, or to reduce carbon emissions. A proxy in five (18 percent), 
demands corporate action to ensure respect of labor and human rights in corporations' overseas 
operations. One proxy in ten requests corporations to advance actions able to assure that firms 
offer a discrimination-free environment for their employees (equal employment). Similarly, 
slightly lower proportions were observed for requests intended to favor corporate contribution to 
the achievement of fairer societies (such as voluntarily shortening the lifespan of the drugs that 
companies produce, promoting the use of ceLtified fair coffee in commercial operations, or 
promoting access of economically disadvantaged populations to bank credit). This group of 
requests, that we labeled "Fairness in society" absorbed roughly 9 percent of ail proposais 
received. Resolutions requesting tobacco companies to adopt self restraining policies in 
marketing and production decision making, or termination of involvement with tobacco industry 
in the case of suppliers of goods and services to this industry, absorbed nearly 7 percent of 
proxies filed during the period. Ail together, these five categories are responsible for two thirds of 
proposais filed during the period under examination. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Using the proxy machinery to promote social change: rising and declining stars 
among filers 
As it is the case of categories of issues, few categories of sponsors absorb most of the social 
policy resolutions in the sample. In fact, four among them (individual investors, mutual funds, 
public pension funds, and religious investors)lo absorbed nearly four in five resolutions included 
in our sample. The rest of actors identified, i.e. advocacy groups promoting particular causes, 
such as People for the Ethical Treatment of AnimaIs, asset managers not running mutual funds 
(such as Harrington Investments, Christian Brothers Investment Services, Mercy Consolidated 
Asset Management), church and trade union-based pension funds, trade unions, universities, and 
a residual category filers for which we could gather no information (Iess than 1 percent of cases), 
on Iy captured, together, the remaining fifth of the reso lutions. ll This concentration of the proxy 
tiling activity is in line with the observation by Ryan and Schneider (2002; 2003) that 
heterogeneity of institutional investors (in terms of size of the investment, investment time 
horizon, percentage of finn stock, and legal constraints) has an impact on their shareholder 
activism behavior in terms of proposai filing and voting. 
fNSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
10 Religious investors are churches and religious orders. We also included in this category all proxies filed by the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), an association of 275 faith-based organizations. We labeled as 
mutual funds ail filers appearing in Appendix 4 of Social Investment Forum (2003). 
Il In many cases, shareholder proposaIs are filed by multiple shareholders, sometimes appertaining to different 
categories of investors. When the proposaI has been filed by multiple investors, we assigned to it a code for the first 
sponsor. It seems to us that this is an appropriate procedure, because we suspect that the first reported filer is the 
initiator of the proposaI. Besides, the IRRC source for 2004 only reports a single sponsor for each one of the proposaIs. 
We created separate categories for church and trade union based pension funds, given the constraints that their financial 
commitments to their beneficiaries and regulation may imply. Church based pension comprises basically the Brethren 
Benefit Trust, and the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church. 
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Concentration in four categories of filers is compounded by a strong concentration within some of 
those categories. For instance, roughly 90 percent of ail social policy resolutions filed by public 
pension funds were generated by funds that we can collectively termed New York City Funds 
(data not shown in the tables for lack of space). These funds are presumably controlled by a 
single agent, the City of New York, which runs a number of pension fllnds for its employees, 
including, among others, NYC Police, The New York City Employees' Retirement System 
(NYCERS), and NYC Fire. We observed also that few investors concentrate a large portion of the 
resolutions fi led by ind ividuals. Three of them, J. Crapo, E. Davis and A. Epstein, were in fact 
responsible for nearly one in four resolutions filed by individuals in our sample. 
Some actors tend to gall1 importance 111 the proxy filing scene, while others become more 
predominant during the examined period. Religious investors, for instance, filed a much larger 
number of proposais during the early years of the under study period than towards the end of it. 
Conversely, mutual funds and public pension funds gained in importance throughout the years. 
We cannot fu Ily identify at this point in time explanations for these trends. It has been reported 
(Social Investment Forum, 2005) that social screened investments controlled by mutuaJ funds 
increased from US $12 billion in 1995 to US $ 179 billion in 2005. These funds, gaining attention 
from investors may use social policy resolution filing as a way to attract and retain clients in this 
growing and presumably competitive niche market, a possibility suggested by Tkac (2006). It is 
less apparent however, the heightened importance of pension funds as filers of social policy 
shareholder proposaIs. The accrued importance of public pension funds in the social policy 
resolution filing scene may reflect an internai decision of a family of funds that are controlled by 
a single agent, the City of New York which files nine out of ten social proxies attributed to 
pension fllnds. It is unclear for us which could be the incentive driving up this decision. Romano 
(2001) suggests that some private benefits could accrue to some investors as a consequence of 
proposai filing, such as enhanced political careers for public pension fund managers. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to think that social policy resolution filing is under-supplied 
as a consequence of limitations of collective action, derived from the fact that the cost of action in 
this case can be greater than the shareholder's pro rata benefit, although less than the aggregate 
gain to shareholders. A large public pension fund with large stakes in companies may have a 
vested interest in taking action, while other actors foJlow by just voting their shares in favor of 
those proposais. 
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Do social proxies promote change in corporate policies? 
Table 4 gives an overview of the outcome of the 2310 proposais filed during the period under 
study, as repolied by the IRRC. Data presented in the table points to an overall picture suggesting 
a relatively modest capacity of shareholder filers to influence management. To begin with, 
roughly half of the proxies (1172 resolutions) were submitted to vote, which can be seen as a 
signal of failure in the negotiations between the filer and finn management, a view proposed by 
Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999). Voted propositions, on the other hand, gather a modest 
turnover (9 percent in average for ail the period). The modest average level of turnover explains 
why an important number of proxies did not attain the minimum vote turnover needed for 
resubmission. One in four of the voted proxies (278 out of 1172) in fact did not pass the minimum 
threshold established by SEC for resubmission. 
Apart from the fact that roughly one in two social proxies was submitted to vote, signaling, in this 
way, the presence of an uncompromising management, the SEC also omit 429 proposaIs, i.e. 19 
percent of the total sample. In a marginal number of cases, the proposai was repolied by the IRRC 
as not being presented; not being in the proxy, the meeting was cancelled or a takeover or merge 
took place during the proxy season. A total of 657 proposaIs were withdrawn, slightly less than a 
third of ail cases. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
If most proposais are voted or omitted -finding in effect a dead end in terms of capacity to 
influence management-, we should examine next to which extent withdrawn proposaIs reflect in 
fact a change (or at least, an announcement of a forthcoming change) in corporate social pol icy. 12 
Thus, we sought information posted by fllers, companies or other paliies, on the nature of the 
dealings motivating each withdrawal. For that purpose we relied on Google searches, filers and 
targeted firm websites, the ABI/Inform database, and the IRRC's publication Social Policy 
Shareholder Resolutions, which also reports the motivation of sorne withdrawals. 
12 Vote turnover gathered by social proposais has been increasing along the period. As a consequence, the number of 
voted proposais gathering more than a 20 percent turnover has noticeably increased as weil. 
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We have already discllssed the reasons for our disbelief in any automatic connection between 
withdrawals and concessions to filers. Accordingly, we sought information on the outcome of 
each of the 657 withdrawn proposais. The codes that we assigned them were: "success", if the 
company accepts to fully implement the suggested policy; "dialogue", if the company accepts to 
initiate a dialogue with proponents, or if management accepts to implement measures not 
contained in the original request, but that were deemed worthy by the activist shareowner; or 
"unknown outcome/failure" if no information could be retrieved on the motivation of the 
withdrawal. In this Jater case, we reasoned that the filing shareholder anticipated very low 
turnovers, and withdrew the resolution to avoid faiJure. Of marginal numerical importance are 
three other outcomes: the proposition was explicitly identified by the IRRC as a case where the 
filer tried to avoid likely omission from SEC, it was withdrawn because of merger or takeover of 
the finn, and the company or the filer stated that the suggested policy was already implemented. 
In the case of "successful" withdrawals we were able to find an annOllncement of any party 
claiming that the requested policy will be implemented. These examples range from Avon 
accepting to phase out dibutyl phthalates from its products (because of the alleged Jink of the 
chemical component with health problems, an action that was reqllested in 2004 by Trillium, a 
socially-screened mlltual fund) to CenterPoint Energy abiding to a New York City pension fund 
request to amend its equal employment opportunity policy to explicitJy prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. 
In more than a third of the cases, the outcome of the withdrawal proposaJ was labeled as a 
"dialogue." By accepting a dialogue, these filers can show that sorne progress towards to the 
llitimate goal of reforming the company's social policy. Our rationale not to treat these 
withdrawals as a success follows the same reasoning leading us to consider unknown results of 
negotiations as failures: filers could have an interest in accepting dialogue, as a way to save the 
face, instead of putting their resolutions to vote and obtaining extremely low levels of vote. In 
numerous cases, proposais that have been withdrawn in exchange of dialogue with the firm are 
resllbmitted the following years. In many cases, when resubmitted, the resolutions are simply 
voted, an indication of uncompromising management. Furthermore, even if the proposai is finally 
adopted by management, our procedure leads us to count the success one single time, i.e. when 
the proposai was finally withdrawn in exchange of impJementation. 
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Some examples can illustrate the rationale of our procedure regarding dialogue established in 
exchange of withdrawal. Sears, Roebuck received in 1997 a shareholder proposaI asking the firm 
to endorse the Ceres Principles, a ten-point code of environmental conduct. The proposaI was 
withdrawn in 1997, as in many other firms that received the same shareholder resolution, not 
because the targeted firms actually joined the principles, but because, as the IRRC reported, 
executives of the firms agreed to talks with the proponents on joining the Ceres effort. In 1999, 
Sears Roebuck received the same proposai, which was submitted to vote. We can hardly classify 
the withdrawal in the 1997 proxy season as a success, and thus, we labeled it instead as 
'dialogue.' 
The case of CSX, a rail and shipping gives also support to our approach. After sustained pressure 
from filing shareholders, the company reportedly agreed in 2002 to post on its website the 
greenhouse gas emissions from its rail operations dating back to 1999. This successful withdrawal 
followed previous ones deemed advisable by filers, given the "company willingness to report" (as 
the IRRC put it in one of those events). We classified the outcome of the resolution received in 
1999 by CSX as a dialogue, and as success in 2002. In other cases in our sample, withdrawals in 
exchange for dialogue did not even end up with any implementation at ail. In 1999, TRW, a 
defense contractor (later acquired by Northrop Grumman Corporation) received a resolution 
requesting it to prepare a repolt on its involvement in the ballistic missiles defense projects. The 
resolution was resubmitted from 2000 to 2003. Ali suggests that it was never implemented. In 
2002, for instance, the IRRC reported that "( ... ) TRW agreed, for the fourth year, to keep meeting 
with the proponents to discuss space weapons and ballistic missile defense." 
Table 5 illustrates our argument that it is not possible to assume that aIl withdrawn proposais can 
be automatically considered a 'success', or put it in another way, that they lead to a precise action 
on the part of management. According to our research on the 657 withdrawn proposais, 234 
proposais, (or 35.6 percent of withdrawals) could be labeled as "successes"; 239 of them were 
withdrawn in order to initiate a dialogue with management, or in exchange of actions other than 
those requested, but that were deemed acceptable by fi lers (36.4 percent). In 22 cases (3.3 
percent), the IRRC reported that the filer wanted to avoid likely omission by the reglilator. Of 
marginal importance were two other possible olltcomes of withdrawn proposais: the company 
merged or it was acquired since the proposai was filed (2 resolutions); or because the policy 
suggested was already in place (6 resolutions, 0.9 percent). 
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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
 
We were not able to retrieve any information via the internet or the IRRC yearly publication 
about 154 resolutions (23.4 percent of withdrawn resolutions). We concluded that filers of these 
proposais confronted an uncompromising management and envisaged a very low vote turnover. 
Ta avoid clear messages of failure, these proponents preferred to quietly withdraw their 
proposais. 
After further investigation, we found that data arising from our sample substantiated our 
treatment of withdrawn proposaJs of unknown outcome. Firstly, we sought a response for the 
possible counter argument that proposais of unknown outcome rather reflect under-monitoring of 
smaller or less visible firms. If it was the case, we reasoned, the large, most targeted 19 firms 
presented in Table 1 shouid present a larger percentage of successfui withdrawals in Table 5. In 
fact, it is possible to see that the opposite occurs. We characterized roughly 36 percent of 
withdrawals as successes in the larger sample (234 proposais out of 657), but we did so only in 
17.5 percent of the withdrawals in the sub-sample of the 19 most targeted firms. 
We also investigated what type of investors filed proposais for which no information on the 
withdrawal could be retrieved. We found that 60.4 percent of ail withdrawn proposaIs for which 
no information on the outcome of the negotiation cou Id be collected -and that we treat as 
fai1ures-, were filed by religious il1vestors; mutual funds and public pension funds coming at a 
very distant second place with 8.4 percent. We also found that religious investors are responsible 
for a1most half (47.8 percent) of resolutions failing to gather enough vote turnover for 
resubmission, followed by individual investors (22.7 percent), a particular ineffectual group in 
tenus of negotiating deals with management in exchange of withdrawals (caiculations not 
presented because of lack of space). Moreover, religious investors are also the second group in 
importance in terms of omitted proposais, contributing to almost one in five of ail omitted 
proposais, the first being individual investors, who were responsible of almost 56 percent of 
omitted resoJutions. Percentages for the ensemble of firms and for the sub-sample of the 19 most 
targeted firms do not seem to differ greatly. We conclude from this information that re1igious 
investors and other investors, facing a great likelihood of not gathering enough votes for 
resubmission (a clear fOrln failure in the use of the proxy machinery) or possible omission in the 
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SEC are tempted to withdraw unilaterally resolutions, without announcing publicly the decision, 
or may accept the initiation of dialogue with companies, even if they do not envisage eventual 
im plementation of their requests. 
Our criteria to assess success in social policy proposai filing yield the vision of a very mitigated 
capacity ofthis activity to bring changes in corporate social policy, vis-à-vis previous estimations. 
For instance, if Tkac's (op. cit.) approach was applied to our sampIe, nearly 28 percent of aIl 
proposais (657 resolutions out of 2310) wou Id be considered as successful. We come forward 
instead with a percentage of success that approaches 10 percent of ail social policy resolutions 
contained in our sample. Even if we add the 82 voted resolutions that obtained more than 20 
percent of vote turnovers to the count of successful resolutions, still we obtained an estimation of 
success (approximately 14 percent) that is far lower than that offered in previous literature. 
The 10 percent of successful withdrawn resolutions represents a modest, although not negligible 
capacity to change corporate social policy. Success in the social policy filing scene is, however, 
much lower than the level attained in its corporate governance counterpart by large institutional 
investors. Sm ith (1996) for instance, unearthed evidence that nearly 72 percent of firms targeted 
by CalPERS during the period 1989-1993 (26 out of 36) abided to its requests. Carleton et al. 
(1998) exam ined the so-called 'behind-the-scenes' negotiations between cornpan ies and the 
pension fund TIAA-CREF on corporate governance issues (blank check preferred and 
confidential voting) as weil as social policy issue, namely board diversity. They assert that of the 
45 firms contacted by TIAA-CREF during the period from 1992 to 1996, 32 (71 percent) reached 
an agreement prior to TIAA-CREF's proxy resolution being voted, and 13 (29 percent) firms 
resisted and had TIAA-CREF's resolutiol1 voted. Ultimately, TIAA-CREF reached agreements 
with 42 of the 43 firms that were not acqllired during the course ofnegotiations (97.7 percent). 
Secondly, capacity to extract compromises from management is not unifonn across the different 
groups of filers, or among the types of issues considered in resolutions. Previous studies 
suggested that both filer identity and type of issue play a significant role in voting turnovers 
(Gordon and Pound, 1993) and on the adoption by management of new policies (WahaI, 1996) as 
weil as on withdrawal of resolutions (Tkac, 2006). Our results show that some types of filers 
stand out in their capacity to negotiate implementation of their requests in exchange of proxy 
withdrawal. For instance, mutllal funds filed only 13 percent of ail 2310 proposaIs in the sample, 
but they were responsible for a third of aIl successfully withdrawn proposaIs. Likewise, public 
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pensIOn funds filed 9.6 percent of al\ proposais, but they were responsible for a fourth (24.4 
percent) of aIl successfully withdrawn proposais (see Table 6). As a consequence, nearly one out 
of four resolutions presented by these filers ended up with a promise of management to adopt it. 
Religious investor presents a more mixed picture. They are among the most successful filers, 
being able to negotiate 30.8 percent of successfully negotiated withdrawals. However, they also 
accounted for 38.2 percent of al! proposaIs filed during the period under examination. The 
mitigated capacity of religious investors cannot be the attributed entirely to lack of financial 
power, given that many religious investors are members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR), an organization alJowing its constituents to obtain support from a large 
pool of like minded investors when they file proxies. Arguably, other factors may play a role in 
explaining this limited capacity to exert pressure on management of targeted firms. Rel igious 
investors were indeed the most prolific type of filer during the 35-year sample analyzed by 
Proffitt and Spicer (2006), but also the most innovative, the authors argue, coming up with the 
first proposais in most topic areas and in battling the companies and the SEC for acceptance of 
issues. Championing new causes can imply higher levels offailure because it may take time to be 
able to create a critical mass of support among the shareholder base over an issue. In sharp 
contrast to publ ic pension funds, and mutual funds, ind ividual investors and advocacy groups 
exhibited an extremely limited nlllnber of successful withdra'vvals. Individuals, for instance, were 
responsible for roughly one resolution in five, and of only 1.3 percent of successful withdrawals. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERB 
Issues raised in the resolutions also show a connection with successful withdrawal. For instance, 
according to our calculations (not shown in separate tables because of lack of space) board 
diversity resolutions accounted for 13.2 percent of ail successful resolutions, while this type of 
issue represented only 4.5 percent of ail proposais according to Table 2. Equal employment 
resolutions represented on\y 9.3 percent of resolutions, but accounted for 28 percent of ail 
successful withdrawals. Aiso outstand ing in terms of successfu1withdrawals were issues such as 
energy and environment and international labor and human rights. This heightened power of 
sorne groups of fi Jers and issues can explain the fact, already noticed, that proposais received by 
the group of 19 most targeted firms, exhibited a half the percentage of success, vis-à-vis 
resolutions received in the larger sample including ail types of firms. Table 2 shows that the 
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group of the 19 most targeted companies received a Jower percentage of proposais dealing with 
board diversity, equal employment, and international labor and human rights, the most successful 
issues, and a higher percentage of some of the least successful groups of issues, such as tobacco 
issues. Likewise, the most targeted finns seem to disproportionately attract the least ski lied types 
of filers in terms of capacity to influence on management (individuals and advocacy groups) vis­
à-vis the larger sample. 
The heightened power of some types of filers is compounded by their choice of issues. The 
analysis of our sample indicates that the most successful types of activist shareholders, such as 
mutua! funds, public pension funds and to a lesser extent, religious investors, tend to concentrate 
their resolutions in some of the most successful issues. For instance, board diversity is the 
privi leged domain of religious investors and mutual funds. Energy and envi l'on ment proposais are 
mainly filed by religious investors and mutual funds; religious investors and mutual funds are the 
main filer of proposais related to equal employment; while public pension funds are particularly 
active in the domain of international labor and human rights. Individuals, in the other hand, are 
connected with relatively 'unsuccessful' issues, such as proposais calling companies to terminate 
their involvement with partisan po!itics, tobacco production and distribution, or abortion and 
. 13 
co ntraceptlün. 
If not particularly successful, why is social policy shareholder resolution filing so 
persistent? 
If effectiveness of social policy filing looks rather reslraint, vis-à-vis corporate governance 
activism, it is worthy to question why some groups of filers, notably individuaJ investors or 
advocacy groups, the least able to successfully negotiate with management, and other groups with 
a mitigated capacity, such as religious investors, continue to file social policy proxies. Above ail, 
as Tkac (op. cit.) recalls, these investors may rely on other tools to exert pressure on firms, such 
13 An additional confirmation of the l'ole in of filer identity and issue as determinants of success co mes from 
examination of voting patterns (not shown tables for lack of space). Overall, the same groups of issues and filers that 
encounter success in their dealings with management also gather higher vote turnouts. Mutual funds and pension 
funds' tend to obtain higher than average support for their resolutions when they are submitted to vote. In faet, both 
types of filers garnered more support for their resolution than the average proposai during ail the years in our sample. 
Moreover, filers that we previously eharacterized as 'unsuccessful' (i.e. advocacy groups, individual investors) in terms 
of their capacity to withdraw resoiutions in exchange of managerial action, tend also to gather lower vote turnovers for 
the resolutions that they sponsor. 
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as disruptive demonstrations during annual general assemblies and in other venues, or initiating 
other forms of pressure (Mannheim, 2001). We propose a nllmber of factors that may contribute 
ta explain why sorne fiJers, such as individuals and advocacy groups, continue targeting firms, in 
spite of being reJatively unable to get their suggested policy adopted. 
In the first place, we must note that even if social proxy filing is not very effective, it is also not 
very costly. Other fonTIS of corporate campaigns could imply relative large expenses. For 
instance, Mannheim (2001) reports that the media campaign that Made in USA Foundation 
(MUSA) set up against shoe manufacturer Nike in 1992, urging it to establ ish factories in tlle 
United States had a cost of roughly one million dollar per year. In comparison, filing a 
shareholder resollltion may imply only an investment in company stock of $2000 (held for at least 
one year by the date of submitting the proposai) and the capacity to lobby important shareholders 
ta vote favorably for the resolution. Moreover, Romano (200]) suggested that filers of both 
carporate governance and social policy resolutions benefit from an implicit subsidy in the 
operation of the Rule 14 a-8, because they do not have to pay the costs of printing and mai 1ing 
proxy resollltion to stockowners. 
Secondly, Romano (2001) also argued that advancement of careers of people involved in filing 
decision could lead to over-supply of the activity. Those gains are private to the actors pushing 
far shareholder activism in the funds that they manage, white costs are distributed across the 
stockowner base. 
Thirdly, our sample suggests that large firms tend to be repeated Iy targeted by socially concerned 
investors. The decisions adopted by very large firms, arguably the leaders in their industry, may 
be adopted by other competitors, by mimesis or out of fear of loosing reputation and 
cansequently, considerable segments oftheir client base. In other words, it is possible that there is 
a spi II-over in adoption of social pol icies. Thomas and Cotter (2005) present evidence that firms 
targeted during 2002-2004 by religious investors and what they cali 'social activists' tend to be 
statistically larger (in terms of their market capitalizations) than those targeted by other groups of 
filers focusing on corporate governance issues. This finding is certainly consistent with our 
reasoning. 
Fourthly, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) repolted thatin many cases, corporate governance 
resolutions going above the threshold 20 percent or more (which is modest by the standards of 
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corporate governance activism) made management uncomfortable enough to satisfy shareholder 
demands. Also, Romano (2002) studied adoption by firms of confidential proxy voting. She 
found that management not only is responsive to voted proposais on the issue, but also that its 
rapidity of response seems related to the level of suppOli obtained by the resolution. 
The subject of management reaction to voted social policy shareholder resoJution proposais 
c1early deserves more attention. Such research endeavor, however, will confront practical 
difficulties in the case of CSR policies. To begin with, as Vogel noted "( ... ) firms are often 
reluctant to acknowledge that public protests influenced their business judgments" (Vogel, op. 
cit.: II). This reluctance, plus the time lag implied in the corporation top level decision-making 
impose great difficulties in assessing to which extend a managerial decision constitutes a response 
ta high vote tallies. Moreover, researchers cannot rely on systematic repOliing of adoption of 
social policies requested in social proxies. Removal or creation of specific corporate governance 
devices, the object of corporate governance proxies, are systematically tracked and reported by 
specialized organizations. This makes it easier to track adoption along time. 
Fifthly, it is possible as weil that social policy filing may be reinforced by other forms of 
activism, such as demonstrations, criticism of targeted firms in the media, letter campaigns, etc. 
Manheim (2001) described shareholder activism as one of several tactics used in corporate 
campaigns, which comprise strikes and demonstrations, but also pressures generated by 
stakeholders of the corporation who are mobilized to bring pressure against the company 
management, typically by acting in their own self-interest. Indeed, highlights Manheim, it is this 
systematic exploitation of key stakehoJder relationships through communication and other 
strategies that defines the corporate campaign and sets it apart from other forms of economic, 
political and social pressure. In this context, voted proposais, even when they receive a very low 
level of support, which is combined with other forms of pressure may carry a threat to corporate 
reputation big enough to make their managers abide to shareholders' requests. We came across 
with anecdotal evidence which is congruent with this possibility. In 2007 Berkshire Hathaway, a 
financial company controlled by the renowned investor Warren Buffett sold its Il percent 
shareholding stake in PetroChina, a company that activist has accused of indirectly funding 
human right abuses in the region of Darfur, in Sudan (The Economist, 2007). Berkshire Hathaway 
received in May, 2007 a shareholder proposaI urging it to divest its shareholdings in PetroChina, 
a company with operations in Sudan. The board of Berkshire suggested stockowners to vote 
against the proposai and most of them did so. The proposai was voted and it received slightly less 
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than 2 percent of support (Berkshire Hathaway, 2007). In spite of the low turnover received by 
the proposai, the company decided to divest, effectively abiding to shareholders' request. 
Finally, it is also possible that many socially concerned investors engage in "symbolic politics", 
in other words, that they consider that push ing firms to adopt pol icies that are congruent with 
their values is an objective in itself. Rehbein et al. (2004) considered the possibility that some 
groups of investors file social proxies as a way to affirm members' collective identity and 
solidarity, instead of rational objectives related to improving CSR practices of the firm. 14 
Conclusion 
Assessing the influence of shareholders and other stakeholders on firms' policy is a difficult task, 
albeit a very intriguing and relevant one. We have attempted to address this task, while focusing 
on shareholder activism regarding corporate social poJicy. In doing so, we first had to answer the 
following question: what is a successful shareholder resolution. We have taken great 
methodological care in answering that question and we believe that our results are more accurate 
tlJan presented in previous research (see Tkac 2006). 
According to our results 234 resolutions were withdrawn sllccessfully. They account for slightly 
more than 10 percent of the total number of resolutions in our sample (2310), a much lower rate 
of success that was attributed by Tkac (2006) and Proffitt and Spicer (2006). The effectiveness of 
social policy filing looks restraint vis-à-vis corporate governance activism (Carleton et aL, 1998; 
Smith, 1996) conducted by large institutional investors. However, it is worth to note that some 
types of filers, such as mutual funds and public pension funds were able to obtain implementation 
of slightly more than a quarter of the resolutions that they filed. 
In spite of their inability to obtain results from management, other groups, most notably 
individual investors or advocacy groups (the least able to successfully negotiate with 
management), continue filing social policy proxies. It is worthy to question why they do so. We 
recognized a number of factors that may contribute to explain why some filers continue targeting 
14 The pursuit of rational motivations related to CSR does Dot imply that the suggested policies are necessarily 
enhancers of market valuation of the finn. They can be motivated by vested interests offilers. 
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tirms, in spite of being relatively unable to get their suggested policy adopted. Among other 
reasons, we pointed out the fact that filing social policy resolutions is not very costly vis-à-vis 
other forms of exerting pressure on corporations. 
Il is also possible that the social policy filing activity can be reinforced by other forms of 
activism, such as demonstrations, criticisms of targeted firms in the media or letter campaigns. 
We should consider the possibility that many socially concerned investors engage in "symbolic 
politics", in other words, that they consider pushing finns to adopt policies that are congruent 
with their values as an objective by itself. Our resuits also show that a small set of large 
companies are systematically targeted by activist shareholders. Are they doing particularly 
wrong? Not necessarily. It is possible that these firms can be targeted as leaders in their industry. 
Activist shareholders would then be seeking for a spill-over effect across the industry; minor 
players would be following adoption of newer social standards set by the dominant firms. This 
later proposition should be addressed in further research. 
Our results can be useful for filers and managers of potential targets. Filing shareholders who 
want to improve the impact of their activity can use our results as a baseline to evaluate their own 
capacity to deal with management vis-à-vis other filers. Would-be filers may draw on our results 
if they want to maximize their ability to exert pressure on management. Managers may also find 
our results useful in order to ameliorate their strategies to respond to requests contained in 
shareholder resolutions. 
The paper has examined the raie of the type of issue and identity of the filer in the capacity of 
shareholder activism to modify corporate social policy. Further research on social policy 
resolution filing can benefit from examination of role of other elements, linked to the finn and the 
industry where it operates. Among other subjects, it would be interesting to study if more 
profitable firms are more likely to yield ta shareholder pressure, or if reputation threats (no matter 
how we proxy it) plays a raie in management decisions in abiding to shareholder requests. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Companies targeted by social poliey filers, 1997-2004 
Companies 
Targeted 20 or more times 
General Electric 
Exxon Mobi] Il 
Altria G roup21 
Chevron Texac031 
Citigroup 
Wal-Mart Stores 
AT&T 
Du Pont (E.l.) de Nemours 
Boeing 
Coca-Cola 
Merck 
Unoca[ 
International Business Machines 
Johnson & Johnson 
Loews 
RJR Nabisc041 
Ford Motor 
General Motors 
Raytheon 
Targeted 10-19 times 
Targeted 5-9 times 
Targeted less than 5 times 
Targeted once 
Total proposais 
No. of proxies 
558 24.2 
73 
62 
47 
29 
28 
28 
27 
27 
23 
23 
23 
23 
22 
21 
21 
21 
20 
20 
20 
440 19.0 
584 25.3 
728 31.5 
214 9.3 
2310 100.0 
II Includes proposais received by Exxon and its successor, Exxon Mobil.
 
21 Includes proposais received by Phillip Morris and its successor, Altria Group.
 
31 Includes proposais received by Chevron and its successor ChevronTexaco.
 
41 Proxies received by RJR Nabisco are not added to those received by RJ. Reynolds Tobacco and its
 
successor, Reynolds American.
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Table 2: Social policy shareholder proposais in the V.S., 1997-2004, according to the category of issues raised 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1997-2004 % 1997-2004 % 
Ail firms 19 most 
targeted 
Abortion & contraception issues 21 7 6 6 0 1 1 0 42 1.8 5 0.9 
Animal rights 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 9 18 0.8 3 0.5 
Board diversity 15 19 14 8 12 Il 12 13 104 4.5 10 1.8 
Charitable giving 8 29 4 12 5 9 30 16 113 4.9 26 4.7 
Corporate welfare & governmental links 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 6 0.3 4 0.7 
Corruption (corporate involvement) 1 6 1 0 0 5 3 2 18 0.8 3 0.5 
Energy and environment 68 63 53 66 65 80 78 83 556 24.1 113 20.3 
Equat employment 32 16 19 29 24 32 30 32 214 9.3 40 7.2 
Ethnie or nationality-based discrimination 3 6 1 0 0 5 0 0 15 0.6 4 0.7 
Fairness in society 31 28 25 31 30 14 II 27 197 8.5 66 11.8 
Fami1y/conservative values 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 6 0.3 3 0.5 
Gun production/distribution 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 4 0.2 2 0.4 
Historical violations of human rights 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 6 0.3 0 0.0 
Human health issues 1 2 3 12 Il 20 28 26 103 4.5 28 5.0 
International tabor and human rights 35 42 44 45 74 73 55 46 414 17.9 65 11.6 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
1997­
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 % 1997-2004 % 
Ali 
firms 19 most 
targeted 
Involvement in partisan politics 13 18 13 12 12 10 5 52 135 5.8 36 6.5 
Involvement in the militalY & national security 
issues II 9 12 12 12 10 12 Il 89 3.9 29 5.2 
Local or indigenous communities' human rights 0 0 3 6 4 4 2 2 21 0.9 7 1.3 
Pornography 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 4 0.2 2 0.4 
Product/service quality service, safety/reliability 6 6 1 0 1 2 3 2 21 0.9 4 0.7 
Restriction/removal of equal employment practices 6 4 1 1 3 2 2 1 20 0.9 16 2.9 
Tobacco issues 34 25 24 15 13 13 24 19 167 7.2 76 13.6 
Workplace issues 4 3 3 3 1 0 2 2 18 0.8 8 1.4 
Sub-total 291 286 232 267 274 293 304 344 2291 99.2 550 98.6 
Other/unknown 7 7 1 1 0 1 1 1 19 0.8 8 1.4 
TOTAL 298 293 233 268 274 294 305 345 2310 100.0 558 100.0 
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Table 3: Social polie)' shareholde.- aetivism in the V.S., 1997-2004, proposais aeeording to the type of main sponsor, 
for ail firms and 19 most targeted 
1997- 1997­
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 % 2004 % 
Ali 19 most 
firms targeted 
Advocacy group 10 12 10 27 19 9 19 31 137 5.9 55 9.9 
Asset manager 14 5 5 16 18 29 24 23 134 5.8 19 3.4 
Church-based pension [und 0 1 0 12 9 10 16 11 59 2.6 6 1.1 
Individual 80 82 50 58 50 47 65 40 472 20.4 154 27.6 
Mutual [und Il 6 18 21 35 58 54 47 62 301 13.0 34 6.1 
Public pension [und 9 12 II 13 36 41 50 50 222 9.6 22 3.9 
Religious investor 167 148 128 103 78 97 80 80 881 38.1 235 42.1 
Trade union 11 14 4 4 0 6 1 25 65 2.8 25 4.5 
Trade union-based pension [und 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 15 21 0.9 2 0.4 
University 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.0 0 0.0 
Unknown/unavailable 1 1 4 0 0 0 3 8 17 0.7 6 1.1 
TOTAL 298 293 233 268 274 294 305 345 2310 100.0 558 100.0 
1/ Only one proposai was filed (in the year 2000) by a conventional, non-socially screened mutual fund. 
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Table 4: Social policy shareholder activism in the V.S., 1997-2004, proposaIs according to the outcome 
1997­ 1997­
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2004 
Ali Most 
firms targeted 
Withdrawn proposaIs 98 n 61 65 n 98 105 86 657 97 
% 32.9 24.6 26.2 24.3 26.3 33.3 34.4 24.9 28.4 17.4 
Voted 115 121 123 150 158 161 145 199 lin 329 
% of proposaIs voted 38.6 41.3 52.8 56.0 57.7 54.8 47.5 57.7 50.7 59.0 
Average turnover 7.0 7.6 7.5 7.5 8.7 9.1 11.7 11.3 9.0 7.8 
Vote 20% or higher (No. proxies) 0 4 3 6 6 18 26 19 82 16 
ProposaIs failing to passl! 28 38 42 30 29 41 34 36 278 87 
Unknown requirement 5 1 
Omitted 82 95 46 41 37 30 49 49 429 127 
% 27.5 32.4 19.7 15.3 13.5 10.2 16.1 14.2 18.6 22.8 
Not presented 21 3 4 3 12 7 5 6 II 51 5 
% 1.0 lA 1.3 4.5 2.6 1.7 2.0 3.2 2.2 0.9 
Vnknown status 1 1 
Total 298 293 233 268 274 294 305 345 2310 558 
1/ Proposais not receiving enough votes to be resubmitted the fol\owing year. 
2/ Not presented, not in proxy, shareholder meeting cancelled, or a takeover or merge took place during the proxy season. 
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Table 5: Social policy shareholder activism in the V.S., 1997-2004, withdrawn proposaIs according to the outcome 
1997­
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 % 1997-2004 % 
Ali firms 19 most targeted 
Withdrawn proposai (total) 98 72 61 65 72 98 105 86 657 100.0 97 100.0 
Success (fully implemented) 15 9 9 22 35 47 54 43 234 35.6 17 17.5 
Dialogue II 45 42 33 26 18 29 26 20 239 36.4 37 38.1 
Withdrawn to avoid omission21 0 2 1 0 2 4 7 6 22 3.3 7 7.2 
Merger/takeoverlsale 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.3 
Already implemented, not applicable 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 6 0.9 2 2.1 
Unknown outcome/failure 38 18 18 16 15 16 17 16 154 23.4 34 35.1 
Il Withdrawn in exchange of actions other than those requested in the proxy or dialogue with the firm. 
21 Omission by SEC was considered likely by the filer, according to IRRC. 
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Table 6: Successfully withdrawn social policy shareholder proposais, according to the type of sponsor 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1997-04 % % 
19 most 
AIl firms targeted 
Successfully withdrawn proposais 15 9 9 22 35 47 54 43 234 100.0 17 100.0 
Advocacy group 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 6 2.6 2 11.8 
Asset manager 0 0 1 1 1 3 6 1 13 5.6 0 
Church-based pension fund 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 1.3 0 
Individual 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 1.3 0 
Mutual fund 0 1 1 7 18 18 17 17 79 33.8 6 35.3 
Public pension fund 0 3 0 2 8 Il 18 15 57 24.4 2 11.8 
Religious investor 14 4 6 7 7 14 12 8 72 30.8 6 35.3 
Unknown/unavailable 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.4 1 5.9 
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Summary 
The article analyzes the short term outcome of social policy shareholder resolutions. Tt does so by 
focusing on different types of resolution withdrawals. The article shows that firms' size does not 
tilt negotiations in favor of filers. Less profitable firms seem to be more likely to abide to filers' 
requests and so do CSR over-performing firms. The percentage of votes received by the 
resolution the year before also increases the probability of a favorable settlement for filers. 
Moreover, when introduced in the regressions, this variable overrides many other variables' 
influence in the outcome. The article also analyzes the determinants of vote turnover. 
Key words: Social policy shareholder resolutions, outcomes of shareholder resolutions, types of 
filers, vote determinants of social policy shareholder resolutions 
Résumé 
L'article analyse le dénouement à court terme des résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social. À 
cette fin, l'article met J'emphase sur les différents types de retraits des résolutions. L'alticle 
rapporte que la taille de la firme ne favorise pas les actionnaires dans leurs négociations avec les 
dirigeants. Les firmes moins rentables ont plus tendance à satisfaire les actionnaires activistes; 
c'est le cas aussi des firmes plus performantes sur le plan social. Le pourcentage de votes reçus 
par la résolution l'année précédente augmente la probabilité d'une solution négociée 
favorablement pour les actionnaires. De plus, l'introduction de cette variable dans les régressions 
efface l'influence de celtaines autres variables. L'alticle examine également les déterminants du 
vote reçu par les résolutions. 
Mots clés: Résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social, dénouements des résolutions 
d'actionnaires à caractère social, déterminants de vote de résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère 
social 
Introduction 
The so-called Rule 14 a-8, enacted in 1942 by the United States' Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) allows shareholders of public companies to file lInder certain circumstances, 
at no cost for them, non-binding succinct resolutions (i.e. less than 500 words) that should be 
included in the solicitation materials of the firm to be voted by shareholders by proxy- provided 
that management itself is seeking shareholders to vote its own resolutions. Management routinely 
seeks shareholder to vote on its own proposais, because corporate law of most states in the United 
States requires that shareholders elect the directors who manage the corporation and vote to 
approve certain fundamental corporate transactions, such as mergers (Ryan, 1988; Brownstein 
and Kirman, 2004). As a consequence, shareholders who are dissatisfied with firms' social or 
financial pelformance are entitled to use the proxy machinery to voice their concerns to 
management and to other shareholders. 
Shareholder-sponsored resoiution proposais filed under the Rule 14 a-8 take two shapes. 
Corporate governance shareholder resolutions are those related to the external control of the 
corporation (as it could be calls to repeal anti-takeover devices or other managerial attempts to 
insulate the firm from the market of corporate control); internaI governance mechanisms 
(including functioning of boards); executive compensation; and in generaJ actions related to the 
financial performance of the firm (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). Social policy shareholder 
resolutions (we also refer to these types of resolutions throughollt this article indistinctively as 
social proxies or social resolutions) coyer a wider spectrum of issues. For instance, shareholders 
use the Rule 14 a-8 to sllggest firms to increase minority and gender diversity in their boards or to 
implement measures intended to reduce the environmental impact of corporations operations or 
products. 
One important aspect of the operation of resolutions is the ability of their sponsors to influence 
management to adopt their recommendations. ln this article we examine empirically that capacity, 
in the context of social policy proxy filing. According to the operation of the Rule 14 a-8, there 
are three possible outcomes when the finn receives a shareholder proposaI that has been properly 
submitted. It can publish and distribute the proposai to shareholders, along the proponent's 
statement of support and management's statement of opposition; it can negotiate with the 
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resolution's sponsors to get them to withdraw the proposai, putting it off the consideration of 
shareholders; or it can request to the regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), to omit the resolution from the proxy materials to be distributed to shareholders (Proffitt 
and Spicer, 2006). If the SEC concurs with the corporation officiaIs, the resolution cannot be 
placed in the proxy materials, and there is limited room to claim any possible influence on 
management (although it is possible that the resolution can successfully pass SEC's hUl'dles if 
resubmitted in another moment and with a different wording). More difficult to assess is the 
capacity of voted and withdrawn resolutions to influence management decisions. In fact, 
corporate officiais may quietly accept to implement policies advised by a social proxy that has 
been voted, if the vote tally signais that an impoliant segment of shareholders supports the 
request. They can also decide to implement (partially or in full) a policy suggested by filing 
shareholders, in exchange of withdrawal of the proposai by the filer; if they anticipate high vote 
turnovers, which may signal a wide gap between their policies and desires of an important 
segment of shareholders. However, filers can also withdraw a proposai if they anticipate that it is 
bound to receive a very low vote turnover. When resolutions are voted for the first time, vote 
turnover should be 3 percent if sponsors want to resubmit them during the following five years. 
The figures rise to 6 and JO percent if the proposaI is presented for a second or a third time during 
the last five years. Not attaining these minimum thresholds can be widely perceived as a failure 
and it is a scenario that fi lers have an interest to avoid. 
An important corpus of empirical literature on shareholder filing activity deals with the capacity 
of shareholder resolution filers to influence managerial decisions. A substantial part of this 
Iiterature deals exclusively with the ability of filing shareholders outcomes of resolutions related 
ta corporate governance. For instance, Bijzak and Marquette (1998) studied the probability that a 
firm restructures its shareholder rights plan to revise or rescind adoption of a poison pitl, after 
receiving a shareholder resolution asking it to do so. Smith (1996) has examined the capacity of a 
large pension fund, CaIPERS, to negotiate settlements with firms that it has targeted with 
numerous types of corporate governance proposaIs. Strickland et al. (1996) studied the ability of 
an association of shareholders, the United Shareholders Association (USA) to negotiate adoption 
of its resolutions. Thomas and Cotter (2007) examined boards' decisions to adopt requests 
contained in proxies submitted to vote and having received more than 50 percent of vote tally, aIl 
of tbem related to corporate governance, because no social proxy attained that level in their 
sample. 
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Other researchers have examined both types of proxies. Carleton et al. have examined the 
capacity ofTIAA-CREF, an important institutional investor in the U.S. to induce management to 
implement two corporate governance policies that TIAA-CREF considered desirable, instituting 
confidential voting and limiting the use of blank check preferred stock as an antitakeover device; 
as weil as a social policy, increasing board diversity. Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) have 
examined the impact of a number of variables connected with size and profitability on 
withdrawals of social policy proposais. Their results suggest that social activist shareholders are 
more 1ikely to strike deals for withdrawal with management of larger and more profitable firms. 
To the best of our knowledge, only three previous articles have focused exclusively at the 
empirical level on the influence of shareholder resollltion filers on management. Hoffman (1996) 
presents a case study of the interactions between the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES) and Amoco, a large chemical, gas and oil firm that merged with British 
Petroleum (now BP) in 1998 (History of Amoco, 2009). These interactions included the filing of 
social proxies by socially responsible investors associated to CERES, calling Amoco to endorse a 
ten-point code of corporate environmental conduct promoted by CERES and intended to be 
publicly endorsed by companies that strive to improve their environmental performance. Proffitt 
and Spicer (2006) examine the evolution of shareholder proposais on the topics of international 
and labor human rights, filed over the years 1969 to 2003. They draw on the social movement 
perspective to analyze the influence of shareholder fi lers on policies of targeted firms. Within this 
perspective, they assert that social movement activists deploy efforts to shape collective attitudes 
and beliefs over a long period, while trying to force change immediately through case-by-case 
struggles. In this context, they sustain that influence on management can only be discernible over 
years or decades, thus making "success" of campaigns (in terms of influence on managerial 
decision-making)an elusive concept, that can be assimilated to the capacity of shareholder 
proposaIs to focus managerial attention on the issues raised in the proposaIs and creating debate. 
In spite of their view, the authors identify two indicators of outcomes' success, a relatively high 
vote (10 percent or more) and a negotiated withdrawal by resolutions' sponsors. Because Proffitt 
and Spicer lack information about agreements leading to the withdrawals, they treat ail 
withdrawals as indicators that management has made enough concessions to filers, and thus, they 
can be counted as successful outcomes. Unlike Proffitt and Spicer, Tkac (2006) analyzes ail 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) proxies filed during the period J992-2002, not only those 
related to international labor and human rights. Tkac also concurs with the view that withdrawal 
of social resolutions signais an influence on management, and thllS can be labeled as a "success." 
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Our al1icie makes a distinct contribution to the literature on the ability of social policy 
shareholder proposai resolution filers to influence management of targeted firms in a number of 
ways. First, as in Tkac (2006) we do not concentrate in a single type of resolutions or filers, 
analyzing in fact ail types of shareholder proposais filed at targeted firms during the period under 
study. Secondly, we focus our analysis on the short-term capacity of filers to influence 
management. Following Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) we conceive the initiation of a 
shareholder proposai as being part of an ongoing process of negotiations between shareholders 
and management. Only if an agreement cannot be reached by the parties, is the proposai put to 
vote. Thus, we focus our research on the outcome of withdrawn resolutions to measure success. 
However, in doing this, we do not assume that ail withdrawals take place in exchange of 
management concessions. Instead, we try to unearth information on the deals conducing to the 
resolution withdrawal. Drawing on Rojas et al. (2009) we classify some of the withdrawals as 
ineffective, and others as successful attempts to exert pressure on management to change course. 
Third, unlike Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999), who compare firms with withdrawn social 
policy resolutions and companies that have not received at ail resolutions, we focus our analysis 
on the differences among firms exhibiting different outcomes of resolutions. Fourthly, by 
focusing our analysis on the short term, we are able to examine econometrically if finn traits, 
such as size, and profitability, and social performance may play a role in the outcome of social 
resolutions. These traits were suggested to us by literature on the interplay between CSR and 
corporate financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Orlitzky et aL, 2003) as weil as the 
review of accounts of the operation of activist campaigns, such as those presented by Vogel 
(1978), and the case study of Hoffman (1996). Previous findings in the domain of corporate 
governance also suggest that characteristics associated with resolutions themselves, such as the 
type of issue raised or the filer may play a role in management decision to adopt requests from 
shareholders. Fifthly, we introduce our criteria of sllccess into logistic regressions that are l'un to 
test our hypotheses concerning the role of the abovementioned traits of the firm in management 
decision to abide to shareholder requests. Finally, we examine determinants of vote turnover. 
Although we consider that resolutions put to vote reflect a faiJure in the negotiations, as we stated 
above, it has been recognized in literature as weil that management can adopt new policies 
contained in voted resolutions, even if they fail to reach 50 percent of vote turnover (Romano, 
2002). 
The l'est of our article goes as follows. Next section presents our methodological choices in terms 
of the ability of shareholder resolution filers to influence management. A third section discusses 
113 
pertinent literature on CSR that sustains our empiricai search, concluding with hypotheses set up 
for our study. A fOUlth section presents data sources and methodoJogy. Fifth section presents 
results of the study. A final section wraps up the article, suggesting also future avenues for 
research. 
What is a successful outcome of a shareholder resolution? 
There is no agreement among researchers about what constitutes a successful outcome of 
shareholder resolution. This is particularly val id for the social policy shareholder resolution 
domain. Two streams appear to emerge from previous literature. Both seem to share, implicitly, 
the view that activist shareholders' success is related to its capacity to induce changes in 
manageriaJ behavior, making firms to adopt measures that are responsive to activist shareholders' 
desires on a certain issue. 
A tirst stream of research focuses on the ability of shareholder activists to extract concessions 
from management, mostly in a lapse of few years span, or even within the year foJJowing to the 
filing of the resoJution. Many articles on corporate governance shareholder activism fall within 
this classification, or they are closer to it. Bi~ak and Marquette (1998) showed that the proposai 
sponsor, voting outcome, and number of previous pill rescission proposaIs affect the probability 
of whether a pill will be restructured. Resolutions filed by pension funds were more likeJy to lead 
ta a pill restructuring than those sponsored by other institutions or by individuals. Smith (1996) 
examined the effects of shareholder activism by Cal PERS, a large pension fund, over the 1987­
1993 period. During the period under study, CalPERS targeted 51 firms with corporate 
governance shareholder resolutions. He concluded that 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 
adopted the proposed changes or made changes resulting in a settlement with Cal PERS. Carleton 
et al. (1998) have examined the capacity of TIAA-CREF, an important institutional investor in 
the U.S. to induce management to implement two corporate governance policies that TIAA­
CREF considered desirable, instituting confidential voting and limiting the use of blank check 
preferred stock as an anti-takeover device; as weil as a social policy, increasing board diversity. 
Their paper analyzed the private negotiation process between the activist shareholder and 45 
firms that it contacted between 1992 and 1996. In more than 95 percent of the cases TIAA-CREF 
was able to reach agreements with targeted companies. In more than 70 percent of the cases, this 
agreement was reached without shareholders voting on the proposaI. Evidence from Carleton et 
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al. is consistent with Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999), who have argued that the initiation of a 
shareholder proposai is part of an ongoing process of negotiations between shareholders and 
management. Only if an agreement cannot be reached by the parties, is the proposai put to vote. 
ln this perspective, managers would be willing to enter into negotiations or adopt the proposai 
only when they believe that the resoJution will bring unwanted attention or receive widespread 
shareholder support. Thus, voted proposais signal an end of negotiations and are in princip le 
unable to induce changes in corporate behavior. In this definition, thus, only withdrawn 
resolutions have the potential of inducing changes in management actions, and this ability can be 
observed in the short run. 
Another stream of research (Proffitt and Spicer, 2006; Hoffman 1996; Logsdon and Van Buren, 
2009) emphasizes the capacity of resolution filers to force management to focus its attention on a 
certain social issue first, and then, to use shareholder resolutions and negotiation, over a long 
period of time, to force management of targeted companies to adopt actions consistent with their 
desires. Within this view, management of targeted companies reacts not only to pressure from 
filers; it is also forced to follow the footsteps of other companies that have adopted policies 
consistent with shareholder activists' views, because not doing so would be risky for corporations 
in terms of losing segments of customers or investors, who may become dissatisfied with their 
social performance. Moreover, the broader societal setting also shapes finns' reactions. Firms 
may prefer to adopt CSR policies that they can still shape to governmental intervention. Logsdon 
and Van Buren (2009) stress the point that in some cases, in the context of a long standing 
process of dialogue between management of a firm and social activist shareholders, submission of 
proxy resolution can be even dropped by activist, as a way to encourage productive discussions. 
ln analyzing the topic of our study, we follow a shol1 term approach. In other words, we seek 
information about the short term reaction of firms to requests contained in social proxies, and 
ex.amine if some traits of targeted finns and the resolutions themselves may play a role in 
advancing adoption by management of social activists, shareholders requests. The choice of our 
definition of success cannot be viewed as a challenge of previous literature focusing on the 
outcome of shareholder activism in the long or very long run. We recognize that social policy 
activism has the potential to induce changes in multiple ways in the long term, with management 
mimicking other firms' actions and advancing new social policies that are suitable to give them 
an edge over competitors. Also, management sometimes may not acknowledge that some of the 
changes in corporate social policy steam out of requests contained in social proxies received by 
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the firm. Researchers have recognized that in some cases, voted resolutions can subsequently 
induce changes in management actions.' However, we believe that even if it is possible to find 
evidence of shareholder activism capacity to induce changes in social policy in the long run, this 
does not preclude the emergence of successful outcomes in the short run as weil. In fact, it seems 
unlikely that shareholders can induce any change in the long run at ail, ifthere is no such capacity 
as weIl in the negotiations conducting to the withdrawal of resolutions during the year that they 
have been filed. We also argue further that management decision to ab ide to shareholders' 
requests can be linked to a number of traits of the firm, such as profitability, size, or social 
performance, type of req uest, or type of fi 1er. 
Next question to tackle in order to move forward our analysis is how to determine if a resolution 
Jeads to changes in social policy of targeted firms. There is no a clear cut answer question to this 
question. In a baseline scenario, we follow Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999), who have argued 
that withdrawn signal the intention of management to adopt the resolution, in full or in a diluted 
version. Voted proposais, however, signal an end of negotiations between management and fi lers. 
ln this view, by letting the issues arrive to the proxy ballot management signal that it is confident 
that the resolution will obtain a rather low vote turnover, abstaining in fact oftaking action. Voted 
proposais then, are not considered to be successful in inducing changes in firm actions. 
Management can also request a no-action letter from the SEC, in order to take out the resolution 
from the proxy materials. If the SEC concurs with the request, the resolution is also considered 
unsuccessful in tenns of its capacity to induce changes in targeted firms' social policy. 
There are reasons, however, suggesting that equating resolution withdrawal with adoption by 
management can be misleading, particularly in the context of social policy resolutions. 
Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) have reported that a larger percentage of social policy proxies 
are withdrawn, vis-à-vis corporate governance proposaIs. In fact, 43,5 percent of social policy 
proposais in their sample were withdrawn, but only in 17,6 percent of those related to corporate 
governance did their sponsors agree to do so. Chidambaram and Woidtke's explanation suggests 
that this result can be the consequence of social proxies being less costly for management to 
1 Ryan (1988) has observed [hat by means of proposaIs, shareholders can put management on notice of their 
expectations; because they are infrequent and hard to overlook or misinterpret. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) 
reported that in many cases, corporate governance resolutions going above the voting threshold of 20 percent or more 
(which seems modest by the standards of corporate governance activism as reported in Thomas and Cotter, 2007) made 
management uncomfortable enough to satisfy shareholder demands. Romano (2002) found that management is 
responsive to voted proposais on the issue of confidential proxy voting, even if they have not attained the majority 
level. 
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implement, or because social proposaIs reflect policies that are largely in effect. We rather find 
more plausible an alternative explanation. Social proxies gather much less support than corporate 
governance proposais, as Thomas and Cotter (2007) repolted. Then, if filers of social proxies 
anticipate very low turnovers and face an uncompromising management, they can withdraw their 
resolution in exchange of a minimum dialogue, or even in the absence of it. If so, it is advisable to 
develop a more restricted definition of outcome success. For that purpose we investigate every 
withdrawn proposai, in order to seek information from a number of sources about the nature of 
agreements between management and filers leading to the withdrawal, or the absence of such 
agreements. If there are public announcements acknowledging that the resolution has been 
withdrawn in exchange of adoption of its contents, or eventually, as a consequence of dialogue, 
we will considered the outcome of the resolution as successful. Otherwise, we treat the resolution 
as a failed attempt to induce a change in the targeted fïrms' social policy, aJong with voted and 
olTIitted resolutions. The result is a much restricted capacity of resolution filing to influence 
managers of targeted companies to adopt the suggested policies? Next section explores what kind 
of traits of firms and shareholder characteristics resolutions can be linked to successful outcomes 
of shareholder resoJutions. 
Are sorne Cirrns' and shareholder resolutions characteristics linked to successful 
withdrawal of social policy shareholder resolutions? 
Previous literature on corporate governance shareholder activism suggests that it is possible to 
identify a number of factors associated with the capacity of activist shareholders to see their 
requests implemented by management. This literature depicts an adversarial relationship between 
managers and activist shareholders. In the framework of this adversarial relationship, basically 
modeled along the lines of the agency theory, activist shareholders can file resolutions in order to 
discipline managers of firms with a poor financial performance, who pursue their selfish interests 
in detriment of the targeted company's stockholder base. In turn, corporate governance activist 
shareholders can also pursue their own interests, advancing resolutions to gain personal publicity 
in order to advance professional or political careers. In any case, previous literature has examined 
some factors that can favor one of the two palties involved in resolutions filing. We also consider 
2 One should take notice that, even if a firm agrees ta satisfy a sharcholder request, for instance, ta pull out From a 
country with a government that is considered to violated its citizens' human rights, does not impede other investors to 
acquire the concern and continue the operations. We don 't take into consideration that kind of systemic effects in the 
analysis. 
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the negotiation between management and filers of social proxies as adversarial. However, the 
variables that may favor the negotiation for fllers of social proxies should be altered, in order to 
take into account sorne particular traits of their activity. 
Characteristics of resolutions (types of issues and filers) 
Characteristics of the resolutions themseJves, most notably the type of issue that they raise, has 
shown to favor adoption by management. Smith (1996) presents evidence that, under certain 
circumstances, the type of issue favored adoption of the proposai by management, although this 
influence disappeared when the model includes the two-day abnormal return at initial public 
announcement of targeting, suggesting that the abnormal return is more important than the type of 
resolution. Rojas et al. (2009) suggests that a higher percentage of resolutions reJated to 
environment and energy, equal employment, board diversity, and international human and labor 
rights, ended up being adopted by management, in exchange of withdrawal by their sponsors. 
Rojas et al. also present evidence that some type of sponsors of social resolutions, most notably 
pension funds and mutual funds, tend to be more able to negotiate withdrawals with management, 
in exchange of adoption of their proposais. This is consistent with Chidambaran and Woidtke 
(1999) who found that corporate governance proposais sponsored by institutions and coordinated 
groups have a higher probability ofwithdrawal than those filed by individuals. 
Il also seems plausible that resolutions that have been voted a year before, receiving large vote 
tallies, could have a greater likelihood of ending up being adopted in way or another by 
management oftargeted firms. It has been argued that the proxy machinery favors management in 
a number of ways (Davis and Thompson, 1994). For instance, proxy vote is not generally 
anonymous, which leaves institutional investors open to pressure from managers who may be 
able to determine in many circumstances who voted with them and against them. This can be a 
sensitive issue for institutional investors who supply financial services to the firm. Because proxy 
votes are revocable up to the time of the vote at the annual meeting, management can lobby to 
change the votes of sbareholders who voted against its wishes. In some cases, however, 
management anticipations about vote turnover can be proved wrong, with higher unexpected vote 
turnover signaling investors' dissatisfaction with corporate lack of responsiveness towards a 
sensitive social topic. 
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Firm size 
Previous research about firm targeting - 111 both domains, corporate governance and social 
policy shareholder resolutions-, suggest that large firms are preferred by activist investors. 
Thomas and Cotter (2007) found that companies targeted by corporate governance shareholders 
are relatively large, albeit those targeted by social policy shareholder resolutions could be even 
larger. Three reasons could explain that preference. First, large firms can be the leaders in the 
industry. Innovative social policies can spin-off, if smaller competitors adopt them, either by 
mimesis or out of fear of Josing an important segment of the consumer base. Secondly, 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) conjecture that there are economies of scale and economies of 
scope in firms provision of goods with CSR attributes. Larger firms, thus, can be arguably more 
likely to abide to shareholders requests, because they are more prone to deploy resources to CSR. 
Thirdly, larger firms are more visible, they are more likely to have global operations, and 
consequently they attract media attention. This could be particularly relevant if political or 
personaJ careers can be furthered by social policy shareholder activism, as Romano (2001) and 
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) have argued that can be the case of corporate governance 
activislll. Additionally, Baron (2003) suggests activists advocating for social causes (whether 
L1sing the proxy machinery or not) may want to attract new members and contributions. If these 
motivations apply in the case of social proxy filer, clearly larger firms are more likely to provide 
higher rewards. Thomas and Cotter (2007) provide partial evidence that larger firms are more 
likely to respond to shareholder proposais. Neveltheless, Smith (1996) uncovers evidence that 
firm size, although important in the targeting selection process for corporate governance 
shareholder activism, does not affect the likelihood of a successful outcome. 
Firm profitability 
Researchers have po inted out that firms with higher profits could invest in programs allowing 
tllem to ameliorate their social performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997, Seifert et al., 2004; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003). If that is the case, finn profitability will be positively related to 
management decision to yield to socially-concerned shareholders' requests. Chidambaran and 
Woidtke (1999) findings are suppoltive of the notion that financially performing firms could be 
more likely to negotiate settlements with shareholder resolution filers. They found that firms that 
have received social policy shareholder resolutions, which subsequently withdrawn (what they 
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equate with success) perfonned better than their match finns (i.e. those that that have not received 
social proxies at ail) and the market. Thomas and Cotter found that the firms' market adjusted 
one-year return increased the likelihood of board taking action on corporate governance 
resolutions receiving majority votes, indicating that well-performing firms are more willing to 
abide to the their activist shareholders' requests, especially when it comes to removing anti­
takeover defenses. On the contrary, Carleton et al. (1998), aJso in the corporate governance realm, 
reported weak evidence that poor stock market performance leads to a higher likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement. 
Firms' social performance 
We have the intuition that companies that perform better in social terms should be more likely to 
yield to requests presented to them in social policy resolutions. There is anecdotal evidence 
showing that socially performing firms cou Id attract corporate campaigns intended to ameliorate 
their CSR involvement, as a way to pressure other less performing firms to follow their step. 
Manheim (2001) presents the case of a company that was targeted in the 1960s by a corporate 
campaign -Kodak- not because of its disregards for societal concerns, but because it was a model 
corporate citizen. The underlying rationale for these actions was, according to the author "to push 
to the company's value structure to its very limits and then using Kodak's example as a way to 
pressure such other local employers as Xerox, Bausch and Lomb, General Dynamics, and General 
Motors" (Manheim 2001: 12). According to Rehbein et al. (2004), at a certain moment, Operation 
PUSH, an organization intended to promote black people's advancement decided to target 
Anheuser Busch, because of its lack of minority distributors. The company was targeted, Rehbein 
et al. claim, to maximize publicity about diversity issues, even if the company exhibited an 
aboye-average record regarding diversity issues. 
Firms with high brand recognition 
Li terature related to the so-called resource-based view of the firm proposes that firms seek to gain 
competitiveness by getting access to certain resources. To increase competitiveness of the firm, 
these resources should be, among other things, valuable, rare, imperfectly mobile, and non­
substitutable. Brand and organizational image have been identified as being among those 
resources capable of driving up competitiveness (Runyan and Huddleston, 2006). Other observers 
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suggest that financial markets can positively value the contribution of product and corporate 
brands (Balmer and Gray, 2003). However, they can also be damaged by dissemination of news 
of company actions which can be potentially deemed socially irresponsible by con su mers. For 
instance, Elliot and Freeman (2001) pointed out that "Large retailers with a prominent market 
presence, such as Wal-Mart and The Gap, or firms with high brand recognition, such as Nike and 
Levi's, are the most vulnerable to activist campaigns since they sell their 'image', which can be 
tarnished by campaigns" (Elliot and Freeman, 2001: 7). Moreover, Baron (2003) points out that 
technological change has made possible for activists to mobilize information to millions of people 
al1d to attack companies at a global scale. 
Sample and sources of data 
We put together ail social policy resolutions received by US firms during the period 2000 to 
2004. These proposais were retrieved from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)'s 
yearly publication Social PoJicy Shareholder Resolutions. A total of 1486 resolutions were thus 
assembled. We use Compustat to retrieve targeted firms' accounting data and market returns. 
KLD's Socrates database provided data ta appraise social performance offirms. In some cases we 
could not find information about the firms. We drop these firms from the sample. In total, we kept 
\424 for further analysis. 
For each proposai, IRRC provides a checklist, containing the name of the company; the 
su mmarized title of the resolution; the sponsor(s) name; as weil as the status of the resolution, i.e. 
withdrawn, omitted, not in proxy or voted (in this later case, turnover is reported in percentage of 
shares). The publication also contains additional information and analysis about an important 
num ber of proposai withdrawals, omissions and vote tallies. 
In a second step, the abovementioned information was complemented. First, a number of sources 
were used to establish the outcome of negotiations for each withdrawn proposaI. We visited the 
websites of filers and targeted companies and we also used Google searches and the database 
ABI/lnform in order to collect information on the outcome of the negotiations leading to 
withdrawals, as weil to establish appropriate categories concerning issues and filers. 
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VVe assigned a code for the outcome of the negotiation according to the results repolted in the 
press or in the internet. Thus, a first code was assigned to proposaIs for which we found an 
explicit claim that the proposaI was withdrawn in exchange of implementation of the request; 
al10ther code was given to those that were withdrawn in exchange of actions other than those 
requested or because management has agreed to initiate a dialogue with the sponsor of the 
proposai (a 'dialogue' category); a third code was applied to those proposaIs for which the IRRC 
explicitly reported that the filer wanted to avoid likely omission by the regulator; a fourth code 
was assigned to withdrawals for which no information could be retrieved concerning a negotiated 
settlement of any sort, and finally, a separate code went to the proposais that have been 
withdrawn in recognition that the requested policy was already in place. In two cases, filers 
preferred to withdraw their proposais because the targeted company merged or it was acquired 
since the proposai was filed. We did not consider those reso!utions as withdrawals, because there 
was no meaningful negotiation to talk about. We instead classified them as "not presented, not in 
proxy, shareholder meeting cancelled, or takeover or merger took place during the proxy season." 
VVe did not have the possibility to check out effective implementation of the request. In some 
cases, filers of withdrawn proposaIs labelled them as "successful," without adding any other 
additional information. If the information of the withdrawal was published by the filer of the 
resolution, and if it does not distinguish systematically between withdrawals motivated by 
dialogue, from those motivated by effective implementation of the requested pol icy, we labeled 
the withdrawal as motivated by dialogue. 
For the years 2000 to 2003, IRRC reported the names of the first sponsor and cosponsors of 
resolutions. For the year 2004, only the main sponsor's identity was reported. For the sake of 
comparability, we dropped from the analysis the identity of cosponsors. Thus, only the first 
sponsor is associated with each of the resolutions. 
Results 
Table 1 shows that if the baseline scenario of success, proposed by Chidambaran and Woidtke 
(1999) applies, most resolutions do not arrive to modify managerial conduct. More than half of ail 
resolutions filed during the period (54.3 percent) ended up being voted by shareholders, signaling 
management unwillingness in making concessions to resolution filers. Moreover, about 13 
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percent of resoll1tions were omitted by the regulator, which sided with management requests to 
keep those resolution proposaIs out of the proxy materials distributed to shareholders. Nearly a 
third of aIl resolutions (29.4 percent) were withdrawn, presumably in exchange of concessions 
from management. 
Withdrawal of resollitions is not uniform across the types of topics raised in resolutions and filers. 
Although not very numerous, resolutions connected with local and indigenous rights (calling 
management, for instance, to conduct risk analysis of developing tribal land) were withdrawn in 
half of the cases. Cali s to diversify boards also exhibited a large percentage of withdrawals during 
the period. From the point of view of sponsors, religious investors, mutual funds and pension 
funds exhibited a greater capacity to negotiate with managers. 
lNSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 presents the reslilts of a more restricted view of success. It breaks down the category of 
withdrawn proposaIs, taking into account the possibility that resolution withdrawals could take 
place as a consequence that management had made concessions to filers (implementing the 
resollltion request or opening negotiations or dialogue), but also that filers could have withdrew 
the resolution for other reasons. As we have already stressed out, filers could withdraw their 
resolutions from the proxy ballot because they anticipate that vote turnover is going to be 
extremely low, or because they consider likely that management of the targeted company would 
successflllly demand a no-action letter from the SEC, allthorizing it to omit the resolution. As 
table 2 reports, in a greater percentage of cases we were able to find reports of companies 
adopting the resolution (in full or in a diluted version) in exchange of withdrawal, if requests 
were connected with topics sllch as energy and environment, international labor and human 
rights, equal employment,3 and board diversity. Equal employment issues can be used to illustrate 
the information conveyed by table 2. A total of 78 resolutions about equal employment issues 
were withdrawn over the period 2000 to 2004. We were able to find out information confirming 
3 Equal employment proposais seek to promote discrimination-free workplace environments in domestic operations of 
firms. Discrimination could be the result of gender ie!entity, ethnicity, religious confession, sexual orientation, or age. 
Resolutions in the international labor ane! human rights category include calls for management to adopt codes of 
conduct in their operations in certain countries, such as China, or adoption of the International Labor Organization 
standards and external monitoring. 
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that in 60 cases, targeted companies expressed commitment to implement the content of 
resolution, motivating the filers to withdraw the resolution. In the case of 6 resolutions, filers 
started negotiations, withdrawing their resolutions to foster dialogue with management of targeted 
firms. We were not able to find information concerning the motivation to withdraw 12 other 
resolutions appertaining to this classification. We reasoned that these withdrawals were the 
consequence of filers anticipating very Jow turnovers or other forms of failure. Finally, it is 
important to highlight that equal employment resolutions comprise 30 percent of ail 200 
withdrawn resoJutions that were adopted by management, but less 20 percent of ail withdrawals. 
Table 2 also sheds another light on the ability of sorne filers to deal with management. When the 
percentage ofwithdrawals is chosen to measure success (as in table 1), religious investors, mutual 
funds, pension funds and asset managers appear to be particularly successful in tbeir deals with 
management. The more restricted definition of success presented in table 2, however, suggests 
that both religious investors and asset managers are not as skillful as mutual funds and pension 
funds in securing deals with management in exchange of withdrawing their resolutions. Religious 
investors, for instance, filed 39 percent of ail 418 witbdrawn resolutions. However, we were able 
to find information confirming adoption of resolutions in 51 of religious investor-sponsored 
resolutions, roughly a fifth of ail adopted resolutions. We cOlild not find information about 36 
resolutions withdrawn by activist religious investors. Tbese resolutions constituted almost half 
(46.2 percent) of ail withdrawn resolutions for which no information was avai lable over the 
internet or in the newspaper database ABIIlnform. 
mSERTTABLE2ABOUTHERE 
The view tbat certain types of issues and filers could have an accrued capacity to negotiate with 
management is reinforced by tbe examination of voting patterns. As table 3 reports, when 
negotiations with management fail and the resolution is put to vote, resolutions linked to energy 
and environment, international labor and hllman rigbts, and especiaJly equal employment and 
board diversity receive tallies which are higher than average. Likewise, voted resollitions 
sponsored by mutual funds and pension funds gather a higher turnover tban those sponsored by 
other types of filers. 
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\Ve employ logit analysis to verify our intuition that variables concerning resolution 
characteristics, firm size, profitability, social performance and ownership of renowned brands can 
play a role in management of targeted companies' decision to abide to activist shareholders' 
requests. We hypothesize that some traits of resolution themselves can help filers in their 
negotiations with management, increasing the likelihood of withdrawal (as implicit indication of 
successful negotiations) or withdrawal in exchange of a managerial promise to implement the 
suggested poiicies or initiation of dialogue (the more restricted view presented in table 2). More 
precisely, we hypothesize that resolutions connected with energy and environment, international 
labor and human rights, equal employment, and board diversity are more likely to exert influence 
on management. We also hypothesize that mutual funds and pension funds have an accrued 
capacity to induce management to negoliate. Likewise, we suspect that because higher vote 
turnovers may be uncomfoliable for management, previous vote turnover will favor filers in their 
negotiations with management. 
\Ve also expect that firm size can favor filers. Large firms could be trend setters in their industry, 
and can take advantage of being the first to adopt innovative social policies, that other 
competitors are bound to foJlow. Moreover, McWilliams and Siegel (200\) conjecture that there 
are economies of scale and scope in firms provision of goods with CSR attributes. 
\Ve hypothesize that firm profitability is positively related to increase the likelihood of 
withdrawals and adoption of resolutions, because higher profits have been associated with firms' 
decision to ameliorate their social performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997, Seifert et al., 2004; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003). If that is the case, firm profitability will be positively related to 
management decision to yield to socially-concerned shareholders' requests. 
\Ve expect that social performance of the finn will increase filers' influence on management of 
targeted finns. Likewise, we expect that finns with more valuable and recognizable brands can 
yield more easily to pressure from social activist shareholders. 
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Table 4 presents the results of a logistic regression, where the dependant variable is set to be one, 
if filers have withdrawn their resollltion, and zero if management, instead of negotiating an 
acceptable withdrawal for the filer, felt confident enollgh to let the proposai voted by 
stockholders or permission from the SEC to omitted from proxy materials. Three models were 
l'Un in order to test our hypotheses. The first model incllldes as independent variables the natural 
logarithm of market value of the finn (the proxy for size), one-year total retllrn (as indicator of 
profitability), a separate dummy variable set to be one if the resolution was connected to issues of 
energy and environ ment, international labor and hllman rights, equal em ployment or board 
diversity. Also, separate dummy variables were introdllced in the model, if the filer was a mlltllal 
fund or a pension fun, and finally, social performance of the firm, as reported by KLD. Model 2 
adds the natural logarithm of intangibles as an independent variable into the regression. Model 3 
adds the percentage of vote received by the proposaI one year earlier. In ail three models, 
accounting data and market returns, as weil as KLD social rating have been lagged one period. 
This is because the so-called proxy season covers a number of months, and proposais for one year 
can start to be filed as early as the month ofMarch the previous years (Karpoff et aL, 1996). 
Results from Table 4 suggest that finn size does not increase the likelihood of a withdrawal, even 
if larger firms could benefit from economies of scale to adopt innovative social policies, or take 
advantage of early adoption of them to foster their competitiveness. Although the coefficient for 
the variable is positive in ail three models l'un, it is also non significant. 
Contrary to our expectations as weil, profitability of the finn appears to diminish the likelihood of 
a negotiated settlement leading to withdrawal of resolutions. In models one and two the 
coefficient is negative and significant; it is negative although insignificant in model three. We 
suspect that this could ref1ect that financially underperforming firms are subject to heavier 
scrutiny from stockholders than their more performing counterparts. If so, their management 
could be tempted to give more consideration to demancls from social activist shareholders, 
because refusing to do that could provoke reactions (Iike threats of divestment) or bad publicity 
that can be particularly damaging for an underperforming finn. 
Table 4 also shows that in some cases the type of issues connected with the proposais do play a 
l'ole in facilitating resollltion withdrawals. Resolutions containing requests to provide 
discrimination-free workplace environments in domestic operations or more diverse board rooms 
increase the likelihood of withdrawal. Hs coefficients are positive and significant in ail three 
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l11odels. However, that is not the case of resolutions dealing with the environmental impact of 
operations of the firm or energy. Although the sign is positive, aU three coefficients were non 
significant. This is a puzzling result, because environmental issues are pervasive in the public 
mena concerning firms' interaction with society (Hoffman, 1996). lt is interesting to observe as 
\Vell that the coefficients for the dummy variable international labor and human rights are 
negative -and significant-, in models one and two (although they are weakly significant and 
positive in model three). This result runs contrary to our expectations. We reason that potential 
damage of issues connected with operations outside the country would be less damaging in terms 
of discrediting the finn than domestic issues connected with employment or board design, or 
perhaps threats of legal action or consumer boycotts are larger at the domestic level. We are not 
entirely satisfied with this explanation though, given that rights of foreign workers (the so-called 
"sweatshops" issue) have attracted a lot of public attention during the very years covered by our 
study (Elliot and Freeman, 2001). The topic clearly warrants more research. 
Mutual fund filers appear to have an accrued capacity to negotiate withdrawaJs with management 
of targeted firm. The coefficient for their dummy variable is positive and significant in ail three 
l11odels. The coefficient for the dummy variable (resolution filed by a pension fund, zero 
otherwise) is positive and significant in models one and two. Sociat performance of firms 
increases also the likelihood of withdrawal; the coefficients for the variable are positive in aIl 
three models and significant in two ofthem. The coefficient for the naturallogarithm of the value 
of intangibles in model two and tluee is insignificant, suggesting that firms owning valuable 
brands and enjoying widespread recognition are not more likely to abide to activist shareholder 
requests, contrary to our expectations. This conclusion as weil must be handled with caution. 
First, there is wide consensus among accounting scholars that although intangibles are extremely 
important, most intangibles do not appear in the balance sheet and that, with sorne exceptions, the 
minority of intangibles that do appear there are not reported at their current values (Hodgkinson, 
2(08). Moreover, items appearing in firms' accounting reporting are those that have been 
acqu ired by the firm, rather than those internally generated (Wyatt, 2008). Thus, data on 
intangibles can be an unreliable measure of the value of brands possessed by the firms and other 
as sets that can be damaged by activist activists spreading bad news. 4 
4 We also l'un two models with the logarithm of advertising expenses as proxy of the measure of the importance of 
val uabJe brand and recognition for targeted firms, instead of logarithm of intangibles' value. The results (not reported 
to save space) were positive (consistent with our hypothesis) but insignificant. We recognize that logarithm of 
advcrtising expenses can also be considered not entirely satisfactory as a proxy for the intangibles of the firm. Franses 
and Vriens (2004, cited by Wyatt, 2008) have pointed out that the amount of money companies allocate to advertising 
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Model 3 introduces as an independent variable the percentage of votes gathered by the resolution 
the previous year. The estimated coefficient for the variable is positive and significant. Moreover, 
when this variable is introduced in the regression other variables (such as profitability, the 
dummies for mutual funds and pension funds, or rating from KLD) loose their significance, 
suggesting that it dominates over them. This dominance tells us that a relatively high vote 
turnover for a resolution constitutes for management an indication of the potential resonance of 
the issue in society at large, and facilitates negotiations for filers. This conclusion, however, must 
be handled with care, because introducing the percentage of voted received the previous year 
implies that the outcome of the resolution (voted, not withdrawn) at time t, becomes an 
independent variable at t+ l, and this could be the source of potential econometric problems. 
ln Table 5 we examined the possible determinants of withdrawal Sl\ccess, using a more stringent 
definition of success. In this case, the binary dependent variable becomes l, if we could find 
announcements of a negotiated settlement between management and filers leading to resolution 
withdrawal (because the proposaI has been adopted in entirety or because dialogue has been 
initiated), and 0 if the resolution has been voted, omitted, withdrawn for reasons unknown to us; 
or in few cases, because we were able to find information suggesting explicitly that the proposai 
was withdrawn to avoid likely omission or because the suggested policy was already in place. 
Independent variables correspond to those identified in table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
often surpasses their after tax profits, alLhough it is not known if this investment pays off or not, or how advertising 
alfects consumers and leads to brand awareness or image, among other things. 
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OveraIl, results are similar when success of negotiations is redefined in this way. Results from 
table 5 suggest that firtn size does not increase either the likelihood of a negotiated settlementin 
more restricted definition of successful withdrawal. The coefficient for one-year total return 
remains negative in ail three models although these estimated coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. As in table 4, the coefficient for the dummy variable assigned to equal employment­
related resoJutions remains positive in aIl three models, and statistically significant, suggesting 
that management considers this type of issues as potentially harmful, in terms of reactions from 
consumers or activist investors, and prefers to settle the issue before it arrives to the proxy ballot. 
Estimated coefficients for the dummy board diversity are positive and significant in aIl three 
models. The estimated coefficients for the dummy for energy and enviranment are positive in ail 
models, but the estimated coefficient is only positive in the case of model one. 
The coefficient for the variable KLD rating IS negative 111 models one and two, but it Joses 
statistical significance when the percentage ofvote received by the resolution is introduced in the 
regression (model three). The coefficient for the dummy international labor and human rights is 
negativein models one and two, but it is only statistically significant in the latter case. 
Resolutions filed by mutual funds are more likely to be withdrawn successfully (coefficients 
positive and significant in aIl three models). The coefficient is also positive for resolutions filed 
by pension funds, suggesting that these resolutions are more likely to generate successfully 
negotiated withdrawals. However, the coefficient for the dummy pension fund Jooses significance 
when the percentage of votes received by the resolution is included (model three). A number of 
coefficients of independent variables which are significant in model one and two, loose their 
statistical significance if we introduce the percentage of votes received the previous year, 
sllggesting that this variable dominate over the others. Results fram Table 5 also suggest that 
firms possessing valuable brands, proxied by the natural logarithm of intangibles, are not more 
likeJy than those that do not to abide to shareholders' requests expressed in social policy 
resol utions.5 
Given the importance of vote turnover of resolutions to influence management, we examined the 
impact of the independent variables analyzed in tables 4 and 5 in vote turnover. Table 6 presents 
5 We also run in this case two models using the natural logarithm of advertising as a proxy for the importance of 
val uable brand names held by companies (not reported for the sake of saving space). In one of the cases, the coefficient 
ornaturallogarithm ofadvertising is positive, although it looses significance when the percentage ofvoted received by 
the resolution the previous year is introduced in the regression. 
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tlle results of an OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the percentage of vote gathered 
by resoJutions submitted to vote. Independent variables are the same than those appearing in the 
different models of tables 4 and 5. 
Coefficients for natural logarithm of market value and one-year total return are insignificant, 
suggesting that these variables do not play a role either in determining vote turnover. Equal 
employment resolutions and energy and environ ment resolutions tend to gather higher 
percentages of vote turnover, keeping other variables constant. The coefficient is positive and 
significant in both cases, in models one and two, although the coefficient looses significance 
when the percentage of vote obtained the previous year is introduced in the regression. Board 
diversity shows positive and significant estimated coefficients in models one and two, although 
tlle estimated coefficient reverses its sign (still being significant in model three). Resolutions filed 
by mutual funds and pension funds tend to exhibit a larger vote turnover, although these 
coefficients loose significance when the percentage of votes received by the resolution is 
introduced in the regression. Coefficients for KLD rating are negative in ail three models, and 
significant in models one and two. This is an intriguing result which may reflect that management 
teams wouJd pursue social perfol'lns beyond their stockholders' desires; however, other 
interpretations could be possible; the issue warranting additional research. As it was the case in 
the regressions presented in tables 4 and 5, the introduction of the percentage of vote received the 
previous year eliminate the statistical significance of other variables, suggesting that it dominates 
over them. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERB 
Conclusions 
This paper examines empirically the capacity of filers of social policy shareholder resolutions to 
induce changes on management. Drawing on corporate governance literature, we conceive the 
re lationship between filers of social policy and management of targeted fil'lns as antagonistic. 
Previous research from the corporate governance realm suggests that some fil'ln traits favor one 
are another of the actors who participate in the social proxy resolution filing scene when they 
negotiate. Arguably, these traits change in the context of social pol icy resol ution fi 1ing. On the 
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basis of previous literature on corporate governance, as weil as CSR and strategy literature, we 
formulate a number of hypotheses concerning aspects such as firm size, profitability, social 
performance and ownership of brands and other intangible assets. Specifically, we formu!ate the 
hypothesis that size, profitability, social performance and ownership of brands and other 
intangibles are positively connected with the capacity of filers to influence managers. 
The task of determining if filers of resolutions are able to exert an influence on management of 
targeted firms is not an easy one. Firstly, it is possible to look at this issue from a long term and a 
short term perspective. Proffitt and Spicer (2006); Hoffman (1996); Logsdon and Van Buren 
(2009) emphasize the capacity of resolution filers to force management to focus its attention on a 
certain social issue first, and then, to use shareholder resolutions and negotiation, over a long 
period of time, to force management of targeted companies to adopt actions consistent with their 
desires. Proffitt and Spicer (2006) have argued that the very fact that management of a targeted 
company should define a position towards the resolution (that is mailed with the resolution and 
other proxy materials to shareowners) forces management to focus on a particular social issue and 
reflect on it, paving the way for dialogue with stakeholders and eventual changes. Hoffman 
(1996) argues that management of firms targeted with social resolutions could react to requests 
from activist shareholders, even ifthey do not acknowledge so. 
Although we recognize these aspects, we also argue that the ability of social policy shareholder 
resolution filers to exert pressure on management of targeted firms does not preclude them to 
have also an influence management in the short term. Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) have 
argued that filing shareholder resolutions is pal1 of a negotiation process. By deciding to submit 
the resolution to vote, management in fact signais its confidence that the resolution wi Il gather a 
very limited vote tally, and its unwillingness to negotiate further with filers. In this perspective, 
withdrawn resolutions imply a negotiation, and are thus considered a successful outcome. Voted 
and omitted resolutions spell failure. 
We adopted this definition as a baseline definition of successful outcome. However, we argue that 
th is approach very 1ikely overestimates the capacity of fi lers to influence management, because it 
is possible that some filers who have the expectation of a very low vote turnover may decide to 
withdrawn the resolution, sparing it of obtaining less than the minimum vote required for 
resubmission in the following five years. Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) report in fact that 
social policy shareholder resolutions are more likely to be withdrawn than corporate governance 
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resolutions. Therefore, we also sought information in the internet and in the specialized database 
ABI/lnform about the withdrawals, in an effort to identify truly successful outcomes, i.e. 
withdrawals taking place because management adopted the proposition in full or in a diluted 
form, or in exchange of the promise of a dialogue between filers and management. We assume 
that withdrawn proposais for which no information can be retrieved were in fact motivated by 
filers' expectation that negotiations with management were doom to fail, and that the proposai 
eventually will do poorly in the proxy ballot. In total, 78 withdrawals fall in this category, 
reducing the number of successful outcomes from 418 (withdrawn resolutions in the baseline 
definition) to 340, in the more restricted definition of successful outcome. 
We used both definitions of successful outcome to test our hypotheses, namely, that size of the 
firm, its profitability, ownership of valuable brands and social performance increase the 
Iikelihood that management ab ide to the requests offilers. We also hypothesize that some traits of 
the resolution themselves, namely the identity of the filers, type of proposai, and percentage of 
voted gathered by the resolution if it has been submitted before, may tilt negotiations in favor of 
fllers. 
We run logit regressions to test our hypotheses. In a first step, the dependent variable was set to 
be one, if the proposaI was withdrawn, and zero if it was submitted to vote or omitted. In a second 
step, we considered as successful outcome only those withdrawn resolutions for which we were 
able to retrieve information indicating that the withdrawal took place in exchange of a 
negotiations or adoption of the content of the resolution, and zero if it was withdrawn for reasons 
unknown to us, or if it was voted or omitted, or because we were able to identifY evidence telling 
that advocated policies were already in place, or that a no action letter was likely to come. 
Our results falsify some of our hypotheses and confirm others. Against our expectations, firm size 
does not seem to tilt negotiations in favor of filers. The coefficients of the variable proxying for it 
-natural logarithm of market value-, exhibits coefficients which are not statistically significant 
in any of the models run, and under the two definitions of successful outcome retained for 
examination. Also against our expectations, the coefficient for profitability seems to reduce the 
like1ihood of withdrawal. It is negative and significant in two of the models repOlted in table 4, 
although it looses its significance when the percentage of votes received by the resolution is 
introduced in the mode!. In the more restricted definition of successful outcome presented in 
Table 5, the coefficient for one-year total return is still negative, but it is statistically insignificant 
132 
In ail of them. The negative coefficient leads us to think that management of financially 
1I11derperforming firms could be more likely to make concessions to filers of social policy 
resolutions, because they are more heavily scrutinized by investors, who may be worried by the 
potential damage that looming social issues could create for the bottom line of the company. This 
conclusion, however, is very provisory and must be taken with care, given that in some models 
the estimated coefficients for this variable are statistically insignificant. 
Social performance (measured by KLD rating) of the finn increases likelihood of a successful 
outcome, in both definitions of success. Estimated coefficients for the variable are positive and 
statistically significant. However, as in other cases, they loose statistical significance when the 
percentage of vote received by the resolution is introduced as an explanatory variable. This also 
happens with a number of other variables. The fact that the percentage of vote received by the 
resolution the year before dominates over other variables is an indicator of the power of the 
shareholder resolution filing process as a mechanism to communicate stakeholders' desires to 
managers. Against our expectations, ownership of valuable brands (that can be tarnished by 
refusai of management to adopt social changes), does not increase the probability of a withdrawal 
or negotiated settlement. However, this could be the result that the chosen metric proxying the 
concept (natural logarithm of intangibles' value) can present shortcomings. More research is 
warranted on this aspect. 
Our results also uphoJd the view that identity of filer and type of issue contained in the resolution 
could have an incidence in management decision to be responsive to requests of changing the 
companies' social policy. For instance, our results show that management could be more 
responsive to filers when they raise issues concerning equal employment issues. The estimated 
coefficient for the dummy variable is positive and significant, even if percentage of previous vote 
is included in the regression. Resolutions calling for a more diverse board also carry more weight 
in negotiations with management. The coefficient for this dummy is positive and significant in ail 
three models presented in table 4 and table 5. Less clear-cut are results concerning energy and 
environment as weil as international labor and human rights. The fact that the resolution deals 
"vith energy and environmental performance issues does not increase the likelihood of 
withdrawal, because ail coefficients are statistically insignificant. When the restricted definition 
of successful outcome applies (table 5), the coefficient is positive and significant in just one 
model. We cannot provide an entirely satisfactory response for this puzzling result. Firms that 
neglect their energy and environment impact of their operations can indeed be harshly punished 
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by large segments of consumers and, consequently, they can fare worse in capital markets. A 
partial explanation for our results regarding energy and environ ment issues could be provided by 
the fact that energy and environment is a very heterogeneous and broad category. We have the 
illtuition that only some of the calls to reform environmental or energy policy of the corporation 
could be perceived by management of the targeted firm as having a potential to damage financial 
performance, if shareholder concerns are not addressed properly. In many other cases -our 
argument goes-, energy and environment resolution could ref1ect the concerns of a very limited 
segment of activist shareowners, with a narrow agenda, and a very 1imited potentia1of hurting the 
economic fortunes of the concerned finn if left unanswered. Thus, future research could benefit 
fl'om separating this type of resolutions in two or more subgroups, and study the capacity of those 
su bcategories to ti It negotiations in favor of filers. 
Also puzzling are the results concerning the dummy variable for international labor and human 
rights. The estimated coefficient in this case is negative and significant in two of the models 
presented in table 4 (although the coefficient is positive and significant in model three), and 
negative (and significant in one case) in models one and two in table 5. International labor and 
11llman rights resolutions include, for instance, calls to multinational corporations to adopt codes 
of conduct that can guarantee respect of workers' rights in operations overseas (including their 
su ppl iers) and independent compliance of this mon itoring. O'Rourke (2003) and Elliott and 
Freeman (2001) present evidence that many firms have positively reacted to pressure from 
stakeholders to adopt codes of conduct for themselves and their suppliers abroad. O'Rourke 
(2003) identifies a host of schemes (mostly non governmental) that have emerged during the late 
1990s and early 2000s to develop appropriate codes of conduct for multinational firms and 
certifications of compliance. These firms enter those arrangements voluntarily, in order to avoid 
negative reactions from consumers, who could refuse to buy products, presumably elaborated 
under exploitative conditions. This corporate commitment to adoption of codes of conduct and 
illdependent monitoring runs contrary to our finding. Our only provisory explanation is that 
resolutions that we have put together as international labor and human rights constitute also a 
relatively broad array of issues. Some of them could be related to adoption of codes of conduct 
(for wh ich management cou Id presumably be responsive), but some others are connected with 
more requests more difficult for finns to implement, such as demands of a "living wage" in their 
operations in developing (presumably much higher that the prevai 1ing average salary in those 
countries), or calls to divest from countries with a record of massive violation of human rights. 
This explanation is only partial, and more research is needed on the issue. 
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Our results uphold the notion that the identity of the filer increases likelihood of withdrawal and 
negotiated withdrawal. Resolutions filed by mutual funds and pension funds have more likelihood 
of ending up exeliing an influence on management. 
Given the importance of previous vote received by a resolution in the subsequent proxy season (if 
su bmitted again), our paper also analyzes the possible determinants of vote turnover. For that 
purpose we ran three regressions, in order to test independent variables included in the logit 
regressions could play a role in determining vote tally of resolutions put to vote. According to the 
results, firm size may have a limited impact on vote tally (only in one model is the coefficient 
significant). Coefficients for one-year total return are not statistically significant. In most cases 
the coefficients for the dummies related to type of issues were positive and significant. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient for KLD rating is negative and significant in two of the models. 
High social performance increases likelihood of negotiated settlement, but reduces vote turnover, 
a result that for us suggests that in many cases, management and large segments of the 
stockholder base cou Id be at odds regarding social performance of the firm. 
Our article focuses on ail types offilers and issues. We believe that by doing so, it sheds light on 
the capacity of shareholder resolutions to induce managers to adopt changes in policies. Future 
research however, could gain if other approaches were implemented. For instance, by focusing on 
a single filer of social shareholder resolutions who give access to its communications, researchers 
could gain additional information about the capacity of ail resolutions over a number of proxy 
seasons, both withdrawn resolutions and those that have submitted to vote. Future research could 
also benefit of taking into consideration how media coverage of social policy shareholder 
resolutions may tilt negotiations in favor of filers. Reports in the financial press suggest that 
media attention may indeed play a role in management decision to implement an action suggested 
by activist shareholders. For instance, in 2007 Berkshire Hathaway, a financial company 
controlled by renowned investor Warren Buffett, received a shareholder resolution asking it to 
sell its shareholding stake in PetroChina, a company that activists have accused of indirectly 
funding human right abuses in the region of Darfur, in SlIdan. The board of Berkshire suggested 
stocl<owners to vote against the proposai and it received slightly less than 2 percent of support 
(Berkshire Hathaway, 2007). However, and presumably as a consequence of media coverage and 
demonstrations Olltside the bllild ing where the general anllUal meeting of the company was taking 
place, Berkshire Hathaway's board decided to divest, effectively abiding to shareholders' 
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request.6 Thus, the role of media coverage can be potential fruitful for research on shareholder 
activism, although it can imply methodological challenges, such as how to develop appropriate 
metrics for it. 
Future research could also address another limitation of our study. Although we do not deal with 
tlle topic, previous research on corporate governance and social policy suggests that less public 
forms of activism such as private letters and phone caUs to management could be common. Del 
Guercio and Hawkins (1999) point out that pension fund proposing changes in corporate 
governance will onJy use the proxy machinery to file a shareholder resolution as a measure of last 
resOIt. Naturally, this only works if the threat is credible. As one pension official quoted by Del 
Guercio and Hawkins (1999: 297) put it, "every once in a while the junkyard dog has to bit." 7 
Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) have already noticed that a resolution is not filed for several 
years because of an ongoing dialogue, putting this fonn of activism out of the public view, and 
making it much more difficult for researchers to scrutinize it. In spite of the difficulties of this 
avenue of research, we agree with Logsdon and Van Buren observation that understanding 
dialogue could greatly enlarge our capacity to understand the ability of activist shareholders to 
influence management on matters of social policy. 
6 Some observers have pointed out that Berkshire Hathaway's decision could have been driven by profit seeking, rather 
than desire to appease criticism on its social policies (National Public Radio, 2009). 
7 Baron (2003: 36) in his study about activism seeking to promote "private orderings" intended to change targeted 
firms' social policies, states that more important than the successful or failed attempts of activists are the proactive 
measures adopted by many firms to avoid private politics. Some of these attempts are, according to the researcher a 
liltle more than public relations, but many represent real commitments to changes in policies and practices. 
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Table 1: Outeome of social potiey shareholder proposaIs in the V.S., 2000-2004, aeeording to the eategory of issues raised and type of 
sponsors 
Type of issues 
Energy and environment 
International labor and human rights 
Equal employment 
Fairness in society 
Human health issues 
Involvement in partisan politics 
Charitable giving 
Tobacco issues 
Involvement in the militarll 
Board diversity 
Local or indigenous commun. rights 
Animal rights 
Otherlunknown51 
Total 
Not 
Total Voted Withdrawn presented ll Ommitted 
No. %21 No. %31 No. %31 No. %31 No. %31 
362 25.4 203 56.1 103 28.5 13 3.6 43 11.9 
287 20.2 178 62.0 76 26.5 8 2.8 25 8.7 
145 10.2 54 37.2 78 53.8 3 2.1 10 6.9 
102 7.2 62 60.8 29 28.4 2 2.0 9 8.8 
97 6.8 41 42.3 43 44.3 2 2.1 Il 11.3 
87 6.1 66 75.9 4 4.6 4 4.6 13 14.9 
71 5.0 28 39.4 6 8.5 1 1.4 36 50.7 
64 4.5 39 60.9 21 32.8 2 3.1 2 3.1 
57 4.0 46 80.7 6 10.5 3 5.3 2 3.5 
55 3.9 27 49.1 26 47.3 1 1.8 1 1.8 
16 1.1 6 37.5 8 50.0 1 6.3 1 6.3 
15 1.1 8 53.3 2 13.3 o 5 33.3 
66 4.6 15 22.7 16 24.2 2 3.0 33 50.0 
1424 100.0 773 54.3 418 29.4 42 3.0 191 13.4 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Total Voted Withdrawn Not presented'/ Omitted 
%2/ %3/ %3/ %3/ %3/Type of sponsor No. No. No. No. No. 
Religious investor 469 32.9 267 56.9 163 34.8 15 3.2 24 5.1 
Mutual fund 249 17.5 101 40.6 122 49.0 7 2.8 19 7.6 
Individual 246 17.3 128 52.0 15 6.1 8 3.3 95 38.6 
Public pension fund 185 13.0 99 53.5 72 38.9 4 2.2 10 5.4 
Asset manager 109 7.7 70 64.2 28 25.7 4 3.7 7 6.4 
Advocacy group 99 7.0 63 63.6 14 14.1 1 1.0 21 21.2 
Trade union 56 3.9 42 75.0 3 5.4 2 3.6 9 16.1 
Unknown/university or college 11 0.8 3 27.3 1 9.1 1 9.1 6 54.5 
Total 1424 100.0 773 54.3 418 29.4 42 2.9 191 13.4 
li Not presented, not in proxy, shareholder meeting cancelled, or takeover or merger took place during the proxy season.
 
2/ Percentage of total number of resolutions.
 
3/ Percentage of each outcome for the issue category.
 
4/ It also includes issues of national security.
 
5/ No category found for four resolutions; plus other categories comprising less than 1% of resolutions each.
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Table 2: Outcome ofwithdrawn proposais in terms of their capacity to influence management 
Unknown Withdrawn to Already 
Withdrawn Adopted Dialogue (failure) avoid omission implem. 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Energy and environ ment 103 24.6 43 21.S 43 36.8 17 21.8 0 0 
International labor and human rights 76 18.2 43 21.S 16 13.7 12 IS.4 S 27.8 0 
Equal employment 78 18.7 60 30.0 6 S.I 12 IS.4 0 0 
Fairness in society 29 6.9 4 2.0 13 11.1 10 12.8 1 S.6 1 20.0 
Human health issues 43 10.3 10 S.O 27 23.1 4 S.l 2 11. 1 0 
Involvement in partisan politics 4 1.0 2 1.0 0 2 2.6 0 0.0 0 
Charitable giving 6 1.4 1 O.S 0 3 3.8 2 11.1 0 
Tobacco issues 21 S.O 4 2.0 2 1.7 8 10.3 6 33.3 1 20.0 
Involvement in the militaryl/ 6 lA 3 I.S 2 1.7 0 0.0 1 S.6 0 
Board diversity 26 6.2 24 12.0 0 1 1.3 1 S.6 
Locallindigenous commun. rights 8 1.9 2 1.0 3 2.6 2 2.6 1 20.0 
Animal rights 2 O.S 0 0.0 1 0.0 1 20.0 
Other/unknown2/ 16 3.8 4 2.0 4 3.4 7 9.0 1 20.0 
Total 418 100.0 200 100.0 117 100.0 78 100.0 18 100.0 S 100.0 
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Table 2 (cont.} 
Withdrawn 
Unknown to avoid Already 
Withdrawn Adopted Dialogue (failure) omISSIon implem. 
Type of sponsor No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Religious investor 163 39.0 51 25.5 67 57.3 36 46.2 6 33.3 3 60.0 
Mutual fund 122 29.2 77 38.5 32 27.4 10 12.8 2 11.1 1 20.0 
lndividual 15 3.6 3 l.5 1 0.9 7 9.0 4 22.2 
Public pension fund 72 17.2 53 26.5 6 5.1 9 11.5 4 22.2 
Asset manager 28 6.7 12 6.0 6 5.1 9 11.5 1 5.6 
Advocacy group 14 3.3 4 2.0 4 3.4 4 5.1 1 5.6 1 20.0 
Trade union 3 0.7 1 0.9 2 2.6 0.0 
Unknown/university or college 1 0.2 0.0 1 1.3 0.0 
Total 418 100.0 200 100.0 117 100.0 78 100.0 18 100.0 5 100.0 
1/ lt also includes issues of national security. 
2/ No category found for four resolutions; plus other categories comprising less than 1% of resolutions each. 
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Table 3: Vote turnover of voted proposais in the V.S., 2000-2004, according to the category 
of issues raised and type of filers 
Energy and environ ment 
Internationallabor and human rights 
Equal employment 
Fairness in society 
Human health issues 
Involvement in partisan poJitics 
Charitable giving 
Tobacco issues 
. h '1' Il1IWO1vement ln t e ml Itary 
Board diversity 
Local or indigenous commun. rights 
Animal rights 
Other/unknown21 
Total 
Type of sponsor 
Rel igious investor 
MutuaJ fund 
Individual 
Public pension fund 
Asset manager 
Advocacy group 
Trade union 
Unknown/un iversity or college 
Total 
1/ lt a1so includes issues of national security. 
No. Average turnover (%) 
203 10.8 
178 10.3 
54 16.9 
62 8.3 
41 8.4 
66 7.6 
28 5.7 
39 7.2 
46 6.2 
27 19.8 
6 7.3 
8 4.1 
15 6.3 
773 10.0 
No. Average turnover (%) 
267 9.0 
101 13.5 
128 7.0 
99 13.5 
70 10.7 
63 7.6 
42 9.6 
3 43.8 
773 10.0 
2/ No category found for four resolutions; plus other categories comprising less than 1%. 
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Table 4: Determinants of resolutions' withdrawal 
Results of logit regressions, 1= resolution withdrawn, 0= resolution submitted to vote or omitted (z 
statistics within parentheses) 
Modell Model2 Model3 
Ln (market value) 0.003 0.065 0.171 
(z= 0.07) (z =1.03) (z= 0.93) 
One-year total return -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
(z***= -1.68) (z**= -2.24) (z= -0.16) 
Dummy energy & environ. 0.212 0.296 0.347 
(z= 1.21) (z= 1.50) (z= 0.42) 
Dummy int. labor & human rights -0.449 -0.489 1.325 
(z***= -1.93) (z***= -1.83) (z***= 1.64) 
Dummy equal employment 0.984 1.161 1.705 
(z*= 4.36) (z*= 4.47) (z**= 2.01) 
Dummy board diversity 0.672 1.100 2.288 
(z***= 1.78) (z***= 2.53) (z***= 1.70) 
KLD rating 0.655 0.809 1.165 
(z*= 2.69) (z*= 2.84) (z= 1.22) 
Dummy mutual fund filer 1.157 1.096 0.503 
(z*=6.57) (z*= 5.38) (z= 0.76) 
Dummy pension fund filer 0.857 0.883 -0.296 
(z*= 3.61) (z*= 3.27) (z= -0.40) 
145 
Table 4 (coot.) 
Ln (intangibles) -0.074 -0.077 
(z= -1043) (z= -0.52) 
Vote previous year 0.066 
(z**= 2.11) 
Constant -1.306 -10415 -4.816 
(z**= -2.66) (z* *= -2.42) (z=-2.61) 
No. of observations 1165 935 216 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.15 
*, **, *** significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
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Table 5: Determinants of resolutions' adoption or dialogue 
Logit regression, dependent variable, 1= withdrawn resoJution adopted or dialogue initiated, O=resolution 
submitted to vote, withdrawn for unlmown reasons, to avoid omission, already implemented or omitted (z 
slatistics within parentheses) 
Ln (market value) 
One-year total return 
Dummyenergy & environ. 
Dummy int. labor & human rights 
Dummy equal employment 
Dummy board diversity 
](LO rating 
Dummy mutual fund filer 
Dummy pension fund filer 
Modell 
-0.028 
(z= -0.56) 
-0.001 
(z= -0.49) 
OA06 
(z**= 2.06) 
-0.391 
(z= -IA8) 
1.187 
(z*= 4.93) 
0.814 
(z**= 2.06) 
0.656 
(z**= 2.38) 
lAIS 
(z*= 7.68) 
1.018 
(z*= 3.98) 
Model2 Model3 
0.065 0.291 
(z= 0.93) (z= 1.25) 
-0.003 -0.003 
(z= -1.27) (z= -0.34) 
0.349 0.291 
(z= 1.58) (z= 0.22) 
-0.630 1.049 
(z**= -2.06) (z= 0.80) 
1.232 2.515 
(z*= 4.50) (z**= 2.05) 
1.195 3.011 
(z*= 2.67) (z***= 1.83) 
0.710 1.645 
(z***= 2.23) (z= 1.28) 
1.399 0.521 
(z*= 6.56) (z= 0.62) 
1.247 0.891 
(z*= 4.30) (z= 0.92) 
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Table 5 (co nt.) 
Modell Model2 Model3 
Ln (intangibles) -0.092 -0.151 
(z= -1.61) (z= -0.84) 
Vote previous year 0.115 
(z*= 2.90) 
Constant -1.614 -1.818 -7.040 
(z*= -2.95) (z*= -2.81) (z*= -2.81) 
No. of observations 1165 935 216 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.29 
" **, *** significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
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Table 6: Determinants ofvote turnover 
OLS regression (1 statistics within parentheses) 
Ln (market value) 
Model1 
-0.404 
(t**= -2.31) 
Model2 
-0.497 
(t= -1.60) 
Model3 
-0.352 
(t= -1.10) 
One-year total return 0.004 
(t= 0.39) (t= 
0.003 
0.23) 
-0.007 
(t= -0.90) 
Dummyenergy & environ. issues 3.058 
(t*= 3.42) 
3.198 
(t*= 2.81) 
1.380 
(t= 1.34) 
Dummy int. labor & human rights issues 0.665 
(t= 0.67) 
0.375 
(t= 0.29) 
1.801 
(t* **= 1. 89) 
Dummy eCJual employment issues 8.313 
(t*= 3.91) 
8.886 
(t*= 2.90) 
3.096 
(t= 1.59) 
Dummy board diversity issues 8.478 
(t*=3.37) 
5.688 
(t***= 1.91) 
-10.097 
(t*= -2.73) 
K.LD rating -2.880 
(t*= -2.71) 
-2.828 
(t**= -2.00) 
0.549 
(t= 0.45) 
Dummy mutual fund filer 2.782 
(t**= 2.53) 
3.106 
(t**= 2.26) 
1.232 
(t= 0.64) 
Dummy pension fund filer 4.632 
(t**= 2.56) 
4.980 
(t**= 2.25) 
-0.662 
(t= -0.60) 
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Table 6 (coot.) 
Modell Mode12 Model3 
Vote turnover previous year 0.606 
(1*= 6.85) 
Ln (intangibles) 0.108 0.050 
(F 0.38) (F 0.22) 
Constant 10.900 11.201 5.883 
(1*= 6.03) (1*= 4.86) (1**= 2.33) 
No. of observations 662 529 247 
R.-squared 0.13 0.11 0.42 
F statistics F(9,652)= 7.47 F(10, 518)= 4.37 F(ll, 174) = 8.23 
*, **, *** significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE
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Le but principal de ce travail était d'étendre la connaissance sur l'activisme de l'actionnariat à 
l'intention du social. Plus précisément, notre but était d'analyser les types de firmes ciblées par 
les actionnaires ayant déposé ou soumis des résolutions à caractère social; les types d'acteurs et 
des sujets amenés à la considération des dirigeants de firmes par l'intermédiaire de ce mécanisme 
de gouvernance d'entreprise, les dénouements des résolutions dans le court terme, ainsi que les 
facteurs pouvant leur être associés. 
Notre premier essai a comme objectif de vérifier si les actionnaires ayant soumis des résolutions à 
caractère social ciblent davantage des compagnies qui affichent un nombre de caractéristiques 
financières et autres. Pour cela nous comparons, en utilisant des analyses univariée et multivariée 
(régressions de vraisemblance maximale), les caractéristiques d'un groupe de firmes ayant reçu 
des résolutions à caractère social avec un groupe témoin de firmes, ces dernières n'ayant pas reçu 
ce genre de résolutions pendant une fenêtre de temps déterminé (trois ans avant et trois ans après 
la soumission de la résolution à la compagnie dans l'échantillon original avec laquelle elles sont 
comparées.) Notre approche nous permet de faire une contribution importante à la littérature 
e:<istante. Les auteurs qui ont analysé la question ont comparé les caractéristiques des firmes qui 
avaient déjà reçu une résolution en examinant, par exemple, les caractéristiques reliées à 
l'intensité avec laquelle elles recevaient des résolutions (par exemple, Rehbein et al., 2004). Notre 
article permet d'aller en amont dans l'analyse de la prise de décision, car nous examinons les 
caractéristiques des firmes comparables qui auraient pu être ciblées (mais qui finalement n'ont 
pas reçu une résolution) avec d'autres qui ont été effectivement ciblées par les actionnaires 
activistes. 
Notre analyse univariée signale que les actionnaires activistes ciblent davantage les compagnies 
de plus grande taille, ce qui est cohérent avec notre hypothèse. Ils ont tendance à cibler aussi des 
firmes moins performantes socialement. Cependant, les résultats de l'analyse univariée sont 
1110ll1S clairs concernant d'autres variables. Notre hypothèse indique que les firmes plus 
performantes financièrement devraient être ciblées davantage, car elles auront plus de capacité 
pour investir dans des projets destinés à améliorer leur performance sociale. Les résultats sont 
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hétérogènes. Le rendement total de marché, par exemple, est plus élevé pour les firmes témoins 
comparativement aux firmes dans J'échantillon original. Par contre, les rendements des capitaux 
propres des compagnies ciblées sont plus élevés. On observe une situation similaire concernant le 
niveau de risque des firmes ciblées. Notre hypothèse indique que les firmes qui affichent des 
indicateurs de risque moins élevés devraient attirer l'attention des activistes, car les firmes 
auraient accès à des sources de revenus plus prévisibles. Certains indicateurs de risque tels que la 
dette à long terme divisée par la valeur des actifs, appuient notre hypothèse. D'autres indicateurs, 
comme le ratio passif total aux actifs ou encore la dette à long terme divisée par les capitaux 
propres, infirment notre hypothèse. 
L'analyse multivariée nous permet de clarifier considérablement les résultats de l'analyse 
urlivariée. D'abord, elle confirme que la taille de la firme (mesurée par le logarithme naturel de la 
,'aleur de marché) augmente la probabilité d'être ciblée par des soumissionnaires. Nos régressions 
infirment plus clairement notre hypothèse concernant l'effet de la rentabilité de la firme sur la 
probabilité d'être ciblée. En fait, le coefficient du rendement total de marché (un an) est négatif et 
significatif, ainsi que le coefficient de la variable flux de trésorerie disponible (divisée par la 
valeur totale d'actifs.) Les rendements des capitaux propres affichent un coefficient positif, mais 
non significatif. L'analyse multivariée suggère également que les compagnies plus risquées ont 
tendance à être davantage ciblées. Nous supposons que les activistes préfèrent ce genre de firmes, 
car ils pourraient ainsi profiter du soutien potentiel des autres investisseurs non activistes qui 
pourraient exprimer leur mécontentement aux dirigeants de cette façon. Alternativement, nous 
trouvons plausible que les compagnies moins performantes financièrement et plus risquées soient 
choisies par les activistes, parce qu'elles sont surveillées de plus près par tous les intervenants 
dans les marchés financiers, qui seraient plus inquiets concernant les enjeux sociaux qui ne sont 
pas pris en compte au sein de la firme et qui pourraient nuire à la performance financière de la 
firme. 
L'analyse multivariée confirme qu'il y a une relation négative entre la probabilité d'être ciblée 
par les activistes et la performance sociale de la firme. En fait, les coefficients pour cette variable 
sont négatifs et statistiquement significatifs dans tous les modèles. Nous concluons que pour un 
nombre important d'acteurs, il y a un intérêt à provoquer des changements dans les firmes qui 
sont précisément moins performantes socialement, car cela pourrait attirer une plus grande 
clientèle (fonds de placement en commun, par exemple) ou bien plus de frais d'adhésion des 
nouveaux membres (organisations sans but lucratif), entre autres. 
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Nous avons effectué des régressions séparées pour différents types d'actionnaires ayant soumis 
des résolutions: fonds de retraite, fonds communs de placement, organisations à but non lucratif, 
investisseurs individuels et investisseurs religieux. On détecte que ces acteurs affichent des 
différences en termes de caractéristiques des firmes qu'ils ciblent, mais pas d'une façon 
significative. Globalement, la probabilité d'être ciblée augmente avec la taille de l'entreprise pour 
les différents types d'actionnaires ayant soumis des résolutions et diminue avec la rentabilité. 
L'évidence est plus hétérogène concernant l'impact du risque dans la décision de cibler une 
compagnie. Les régressions séparées montrent également des coefficients négatifs de la 
performance sociale pour l'ensemble d'actionnaires ayant soumis des résolutions, sauf pour les 
investisseurs individuels. Nous supposons que cela pourrait refléter que ce type d'acteur ait un 
agenda plus « idéologique» que d'autres intervenants. Cette possibilité demande toutefois une 
étude plus approfondie. 
Notre deuxième article aborde la question des acteurs et sujets contenus dans les résolutions 
reçues par les compagnies. Nous avons élaboré des catégories complètes et exhaustives à cet 
effet. Nous avons étudié également dans cet article les différents dénouements possibles des 
réso lutions, c'est-à-d ire si les résolutions ont été soumises au vote d'actionnaires, omises par le 
régulateur ou bien retirées de la circulaire, car négociée entre les actionnaires ayant soumis la 
résolution et les dirigeants de la firme. La littérature existante sur les résolutions à caractère social 
suggère que le retrait des résolutions indique une négociation entre les deux parties, et que le 
retrait reflète des concessions de la part des dirigeants. Donc, « succès» dans le sens de capacité 
d'influencer la politique sociale de la firme, au moins dans le court terme, est assimilé au retrait 
des résolutions. Dans cet essai nous avons examiné l'opération de la Règle l4a-8 qui gouverne la 
soumission des résolutions d'actionnaires. Nous y présentons une série de raisons qui rendent 
plausible la vision que le retrait pourrait refléter une négociation entre actionnaire activiste et 
dirigeants de la firme ciblée, mais aussi un intérêt de ce dernier de ne pas afficher des échecs 
en visageables. Nous examinons chaque résolution retirée par les soumissionnaires afin de 
déterminer la raison sous-jacente du retrait, soit l'adoption du contenu de la résolution, le 
dialogue ou bien l'absence de publicisation du dénouement de la résolution, que nous assimilons 
à un échec de la part de l'actionnaire engagé. Notre approche nous permet de constater que 
l'activisme de l'actionnariat à l'intention du social est moins effectif que ce qui a été suggéré dans 
la littérature existante. Néanmoins, certains types d'actionnaires activistes, tels que les fonds de 
retraite et les fonds mutuels, affichent une capacité accrue d'influencer les dirigeants des 
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entreprises ciblées. Également, certaines catégories de sujets contenus dans les résolutions ont 
tendance à être adoptées par les dirigeants des firmes ciblées. En outre, nous constatons que si 
l'activisme de l'actionnariat à caractère social peut être confronté à des limites dans les 
compagnies ciblées, cette forme d'activisme ne demande pas de grands investissements, comme 
pourrait être le cas des boycotts ou d'autres formes de pression sur les entreprises. 
Le troisième essai cherche à vérifier si certaines caractéristiques des firmes et des résolutions 
elles-mêmes, favorisent dans le court terme l'adoption par l'équipe de direction des suggestions 
contenues dans les résolutions d'actionnaires à caractère social. Une partie importante de la 
littérature existante sur l'activisme de l'actionnariat soutient que l'utilisation de la Règle 14 a-8 a 
des effets à long terme, notamment parce que les dirigeants des compagnies ciblées adoptent les 
politiques suggérées par les actionnaires engagés, mais sans reconnaître l'influence de ces 
dernières. En plus, selon celiains chercheurs, les firmes ont tendance à suivre leurs pairs plus 
innovateurs sur le plan de la politique sociale, par crainte de pelies significatives de demande 
dans les marchés de produits et de capitaux, ainsi que pour éviter l'adoption de régulations plus 
contraignantes par les gouvernements. Notre recherche reconnaît que ces points peuvent s'avérer 
importants, mais nous concentrons l'analyse dans le COllli terme car il semble nécessaire qu'un 
nombre de compagnies adoptent d'abord ces initiatives pour qu'elles soient ensuite adoptées par 
d'autres firmes. 
La littérature existante sur l'activisme à l'intention de la gouvernance d'entreprise a été guidée 
par la théorie de l'agence. Dans cette approche, la relation entre activistes de l'actionnariat et 
dirigeants est forcément de confrontation, car les actionnaires essaient de forcer les dirigeants à 
adopter une série de mesures destinées à accroître leur richesse. Dans notre recherche, nous 
concevons également comme une confrontation la relation entre actionnaires ayant soumis des 
résolutions à caractère social et dirigeants. Cependant, dans notre cas, en tenant compte de 
différences dans les buts visés par les activistes engagés dans cette activité, les caractéristiques de 
la firme qui pourraient faire pencher la balance en faveur des actionnaires sont différentes. 
Nous utilisons deux critères de succès (c'est-à-dire résultats favorables aux actionnaires 
activistes) : le retrait de la résolution (définition de base dans la littérature), car il constituerait une 
év idence des négociations entre activistes et dirigeants, et une défin ition plus restreinte où l'on 
compte comme succès uniquement les retraits de résolutions pour lesquelles on a pu constater une 
promesse des dirigeants en contrepartie du retrait. 
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Nous utilisons des régressions de vraisemblance maximale pour étudier si un nombre de variables 
a un impact sur les succès de la résolution, ces derniers mesurés par les deux indicateurs 
mentionnés plus haut. Notre recherche montre que la taille de l'entreprise (mesurée par le 
logarithme naturel de la valeur marchande de la firme) ne joue pas un rôle important dans le 
dénouement de la résolution favorable aux actionnaires, et cela au-delà des critères de succès 
utilisés. Nous arrivons aussi à la conclusion que la rentabilité de la firme, mesurée par le 
rendement total de marché (1 an), diminue la probabilité d'un retrait. Il est possible que le résultat 
soit expliqué par un monitoring accru des compagnies peu performantes financièrement, 
lesquelles pourraient souffrir davantage à cause de possibles sujets sociaux non résolus, qui 
pourraient être mis en évidence par l'absence d' lIne négociation avec les actionnaires activistes. 
Cependant, l'introduction dans la régression de la variable pourcentage de votes reçus par la 
résolution l'année précédente (laquelle affiche un coefficient positif et significatif) élimine la 
sign ification statistique de la rentabil ité. 
Dans certains cas, les types de sujets contenus dans les résolutions semblent favoriser les retraits 
des résolutions; tel est le cas de résolutions proposant des mesures pour créer des environnements 
de travail libres de discrimination dans les opérations domestiques, et d'autres demandant des 
conseils d'administration avec plus de représentation de minorités ethniques et de femmes. 
D'autres types de demandes contenues dans les résolutions, telles celles reliées à l'environnement 
et l'énergie ainsi qu'au respect des droits de la personne et des travailleurs dans les opérations 
internationales, ne semblent pas augmenter la probabilité d'un retrait. On s'attendait à ce que tous 
les types de demandes évoquées augmentent la probabilité d'un retrait de résolutions. Les 
résultats concernant l'impact du type de résolutions sur la probabi lité d'un retrait sont diffici les à 
expliquer. Une explication possible serait que des sujets tels que l'environnement ou les droits de 
la personne et du travail au niveau international couvrent un ample éventail de demandes. 
Certaines de ces demandes seraient perçues comme appartenant à des agendas très 
« idéologiques » émanant de groupes avec des intérêts très étroits, avec une capacité très réduite 
de nuire à la firme en cas de rejet. 
Les fonds communs de placement montrent une capacité accrue, vis-à-vis d'autres types 
d'acteurs, de négocier des retraits des résolutions. C'est le cas aussi des fonds de retraite, mais 
\'influence positive de ces derniers sur la possibilité d'un retrait disparaît quand on introduit le 
pourcentage de vote de l'année précédente dans les régressions. La cotation de la performance 
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sociale des firmes, élaborée par la firme KLD, augmente la probabilité d'un retrait. Néanmoins, 
cette variable perd son influence dans le modèle qui contient le pourcentage de votes reçus par la 
proposition l'année précédente. La possession de marques facilement reconnaissables par le 
public, qui pourrait être entachée par une publicité négative, et qui a été mesurée par le 
logarithme de la valeur des intangibles, ne montre pas une influence claire sur la probabilité d'un 
retrait. Cependant, on doit prendre cette conclusion avec précaution, car les chercheurs dans le 
domaine de la comptabilité signalent que les actifs intangibles sont souvent sous-évalués. 
Globalement, les résultats sont semblables quand on utilise la définition plus contraignante pour 
le succès de la résolution, c'est-à-d ire qu'on caractérise comme succès seulement les retraits pour 
lesquels nous avons identifié de l'information sur l'implémentation ou initiation possible d'un 
dialogue entre activistes et dirigeants. Toutefois, il est important de remarquer que les coefficients 
pour le rendement total de marché, tout en restant négatifs, deviennent non significatifs dans ce 
cas. 
L'article examine, en utilisant la méthode des moindres carrés ordinaires, les déterminants du 
vote reçu par les résolutions. À cet égard, les coefficients de régressions pour la taille de la firme 
et le rendement total de marché sont statistiquement non significatifs. Certains sujets tels que 
['environnement et l'énergie ainsi que la diversité dans le conseil d'administration, reçoivent plus 
de votes, néanmoins, dans les deux premiers cas les coefficients perdent leur significativité 
statistique lorsque le pourcentage de votes reçus par la résolution est introduit dans la régression. 
Les résolutions soumises par les fonds de placement en commun et les fonds de retraite récoltent 
elles aussi plus de votes. Également, ces variables perdent leur signification quand on introduit le 
pourcentage de votes reçus par la résolution l'année précédente. Le rating pour la performance 
sociale affiche des coefficients négatifs et significatifs dans deux des modèles, ce qui nous amène 
à supposer que dans certains cas, les dirigeants pourraient favoriser une performance sociale de la 
firme qui est au-delà du niveau souhaité par les investisseurs. Cet aspect demanderait, toutefois, 
plus de recherche. 
La thèse a étendu la connaissance sur l'activisme de ['actionnariat à l'intention du sociaL Nous 
avons appol1é de nouvelles informations et perspectives sur les types des firmes ciblées par cette 
forme d'activité. Aussi, nous avons élaboré l'information sur les acteurs impliqués dans cette 
activité, les types d'enjeux contenus dans les résolutions, les résultats finaux de ces résolutions et 
leurs déterminants. Nous espérons que d'autres chercheurs pourront se servir de ces résultats pour 
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étendre la connaissance du phénomène que nous avons étudié, malS aussi d'autres aspects 
connexes reliés à la responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise. 
